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A B S T R A C T
The participation of Spain in the Seven Years'
War resulted in the humiliating defeat of its armed 
forces in America, and the French cession of Louisiana 
brought Spain face to face with the expanding English 
colonies of North America along an extended and defense­
less frontier. Fearing future English aggression against 
his American empire, Carlos III reorganized his colonial 
defenses.
The burden of maintaining Spain's growing armed 
forces in North America weighed heavily on New Spain, 
the richest of the viceroyalties. Although the public 
revenues of the kingdom more than doubled in the years 
1763-1779/ tlie increase in the subsidies (situados) paid 
by Mexico City to the colonies financially dependent upon 
it tripled. Guatemala, Cuba, Louisiana, Santo Domingo, 
and Puerto Rico were scenes of increased military and 
naval activity, and since none of these colonies was
v
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self-sufficient, the growth of their defense establishments 
was reflected in heavier disbursements by New Spain.
The Spanish government regarded another war between 
. England and Spain as inevitable, and after hostilities 
between England and her North American colonies began in 
1775/ Spain, urged on by trance, moved slowly toward sup­
port of the rebels and to war with England. Limited and 
covert aid to the Americans began in 1776 through the port 
of New Orleans, and the port officials of Spanish America 
were secretly instructed to admit American privateers.
Spain's declaration of war against England in 1779 
coincided with the death of Antonio Marla Bucareli, Vice­
roy of New Spain. His successor, Martin de Mayorga, 
unexpectedly faced the task of meeting the unprecedented 
demands made upon the viceroyalty for money, gunpowder, 
and food. The discharge of his responsibility was made 
more difficult by almost constant quarrels with Josi de 
Gilvez, Minister of the Indies, and with officials in Cuba.
The principal objectives of the Spanish forces in 
America were to expel the English from the Mississippi 
River, to conquer Florida, and to destroy the English log- 
cutting establishments on the Bay of Honduras. After
vi
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Bernardo de G&lvez, the Governor of Louisiana, had captured 
the British posts on the Mississippi River and had taken 
Mobile and Pensacola, plans were made to recover Jamaica 
and to take the Bahamas. All of these objectives were not 
realized, for Jamaica was not invaded, and the Spanish 
operation against the Baymen had only limited and tempo­
rary success. All the Spanish operations were financed 
and supplied from New Spain, as was the expedition of the 
French admiral de Grasse from the West Indies to Chesapeake 
Bay in 1781. In this service of supply Havana functioned 
as the base for Spanish naval power and as a distribution 
center for money and supplies.
During the period of hostilities, the value of New 
Spain's disbursements to Spain, to other Spanish colonies, 
and to allies of Spain, was equivalent to one-half of all 
the revenue collected by the viceregal.establishment. 
Although the viceroyalty was hard-pressed to meet the 
obligation imposed on it, the transportation of money, 
food, and supplies from Mexico to Cuba and to other points 
proved to be as difficult as their collection. Poor 
communication and a serious shipping shortage impeded the
vii
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movement of cargoes and caused the loss of perishable 
material.
This dissertation, written largely from unpub­
lished material in the Archivo General de la Nacidn in 
Mexico City and the Archivo Hist6rico Nacional in Madrid, 
Spain, traces the nature and extent of New Spain's contri­
bution to the prosecution of the American war. The conclu­
sions reached are that, despite poor communications, the 
shipping shortage and dissension among officials in Madrid, 
Havana, Guatemala, and Mexico City, New Spain was virtually 
the sole support of Spanish arms in America, and that during 
the war the viceroyalty made a contribution to the mother 
country and her allies unmatched in the history of colonial 
Spanish America.
viii
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C H A P T E R  I
SPAIN PLANS REVENGE: FROM THE PEACE OF
PARIS IN 1763 TO BELLIGERENCY IN 1779
On February 10, 1763, the Treaty of Paris ended 
the war between Great Britain, Portugal, France, and 
Spain. By its terms Spain lost the island of Minorca and 
the two Floridas, although she regained Havana and Manila, 
'both of which had been lost to the British in 1762.
France had ceded Louisiana to Spain on compensation for 
the loss of the Floridas, 1 but the effect on Spain of her 
participation in the Seven Years 1 War could not be
•'•England had apparently hoped to gain control of 
access to the Mississippi through possession of West Flor­
ida, but her negotiators at the peace conference were 
ignorant of the details of the physical geography of the 
Gulf Coast of North America. The Duke of Choiseul, anx­
ious to retain control of the river mouth for France *s 
ally, had convinced the English that Lake Pontchartrain 
was the most desirable entry to the river, and by so doing 
had retained the Island of Orleans for Spain. Wilson Lyon, 
Louisiana in French Diplomacy (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 193*0, PP* 23-24.
1
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measured solely in terms of colonial territory gained or 
lost. The armed forces of Carlos III in the Indies had 
suffered a humiliating defeat, all the more humiliating 
since it had been unexpected. As late as July 22, 1762, 
the King had written to his confidant in Naples, Bernardo 
Tanucci, that "the English will have their heads broken in 
the Indies. "2 Yet at the time he wrote Havana was under 
attack, its naval squadron had been sunk or scuttled in 
the harbor, and its land defenses had been invested by an 
English army.
Spain's mistake had been to go to war before she 
was prepared, for her ministers had been deceived by the 
misrepresentations of her commanders in the Indies. The 
soldiers of the Havana garrison had been ill-trained and 
badly equipped, their officers had been incompetent, and 
corrupt colonial officials had stolen supplies. Warships 
had been unready for service for the same reasons, and
2Quoted in Ces&reo Fern&ndez Buro, Armada Espafiola 
desde la uni6n de Castilla %  de Araq6n . 9 Vols. (Madrid: 
Tipografico "Sucesores de Rivadeneyra," Impresores de la 
Real Casa, 190i-1915),. Vol., 7» P- ^6 [hereafter referred 
to as Fern&dez Duro, Armadal .
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3
their commanders had even deprived the crews of their 
proper rations. 3 During the years that the Marquis of 
Ensenada had been in power (17^3“175^)/ he had constructed 
a fleet strong enough to alarm British observers, but its 
strength had been wasted, and the administrative reforms 
which he had decreed had either been nullified or had 
never been implemented. 4
The Viceroyalty of New Spain had never been 
invaded, and the army of 8 ,5 0 0 regulars and militiamen 
which Viceroy Cruillas had hastily formed had not been 
tested in battle. 5 Although its armies had not seen
3Manuel Danvila y Collado, Reinado de Carlos III,
6 Vols. (Madrid: El Progreso Editorial, 1892-1896},
Vol. 2, p. 216 [hereafter referred to as Danvila, Carlos 
III.
4PernAndlgz Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 108.
5Lyle N. McAlister, "The Reorganization of the 
Army of New Spain, I763-I7 6 6," The Hispanic American His­
torical Review. Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February 1953)/ P. 7- 
Cruillas had found that arms and equipment for the militia 
almost non-existent. On December 3/ 1761/ he wrote Madrid 
that he needed 2 0 ,0 0 0 muskets to arm his troops. Cn 
August 30, 1762, the Minister of the Indies answered him 
by reassuring him that the guns 'Will be sent." By the 
date of Arriaga's reply Havana had already fallen and 
peace talks were underway. Arriaga to Cruillas, AGNM,
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4
action, the war had cost the northern viceroyalty 3/390/471 
pesos, one million of which had been totally wasted. That 
sum had been sent to Havana just before the English attack, 
and had fallen into the hands of the invaders. 6
Since the payment of the first situado to Cuba in 
1529/ New Spain had increasingly assumed the role of finan­
cier for that island. 7 The function of Havana as a port of 
deposit and transshipment and as a rendezvous point for 
fleets bound to and from the Indies had necessitated 
fortifications and garrisons to man them. The shipyard at
RC, Vol. 82, August 30, 1762, expediente 6 6, fol. 34 
[hereafter referred to as McAlister, "Reorganization of 
the Army"] .
6 "Defensa del Reyno: sobre gastos que se hicieron
con motivo de la Guerra declarada a los Yngleses en el afio 
1762," AGNM, Historia, Vol. 44, Pol. 5 . This is an account 
which was rendered to Viceroy Revillagigedo on May 3/ 1793; 
it forms part of a history of the Real Hacienda which the 
viceroy had ordered to be written, and which was eventually 
published as: Fabian de Fonseca and Carlos de Urrutxa,
Historia general de real hacienda escrita cor orden del 
Virev. Conde de Revillaqiqedo. 6 Vols. (Mexico: Imprenta
de Vicente Garcfia Torres , 1845-1853) •
7Julio LeRiverend Brusone, "Relaciones entre Neuva 
Espafla y Cuba (1508-1820), " Revista de Historia de America. 
Nums. 37-38 (Enero-Diciembre de 1954), pp. 58, 88 
[hereafter referred to as "Espana y Cuba"].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
Havana had built forty-five warships between 1724 and 
I76l,s and a naval squadron was based permanently on the 
port. All of these activities required subsidies which 
New Spain had to furnish; and in 1763/ the year of defeat, 
the financial distress of Cuba was acute.
Extraordinary efforts had to be made to repair the 
damages of the siege. The fortifications had been breached 
at several points, and the English had practically 
destroyed the shipyard after the surrender. Enemy offficers 
had told Lorenzo de Montalvo, the Comisario de Marina, 
that they intended to leave the yard in such a state that no 
vessles could be constructed in it for the next six years. 9
sAlejandro de Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre la 
Isla de Cuba (La Habana: Fublicaciones del Archivo
Nacional de Cuba, L., i9 6 0), pp. 114-113 [hereafter 
referred to as Humboldt, Cuba]
9"Despacho del Comisario de Marina D. Lorenzo de 
Montalvo al Ministro de Indias, Bailio Fr. D. Juli&n de 
Arriaga, sobre evacuacion de la Plaza de la Habana por los 
ingleses," printed in extenso in Fernandez Duro, Armada, 
Vol. 7/ P. 114. Montalvo stated chat the English had 
stolen everything that they could carry, and that machinery 
and buildings had been wrecked or burned. This was con­
trary to the terms of peace, which provided that all port 
facilities should be delivered to Spain in the same condi­
tion in which they had been found at the time of 
capitulation.
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6
Cuba needed immediate relief for its land and sea 
forces, which lacked food, clothing, and supplies of every 
sort. New Spain was called upon to furnish 3/209,362 
pesos for the subsistence of the armed forces of the 
island between July and December, 1763/ 10 and Julian de 
Arriaga, Minister of the Indies, urged Viceroy Cruillas to 
aid in the rehabilitation of the island with all available 
funds. 11 Cruillas responded promptly, but not with enough
10"I763 Havana restituda en 12 de Julio," AGNM, 
Historia, Vol. 425/ fols. 79~S3*
11Arriaga to Cruillas, June 18, 1763, AGNM,. RC.
Vol. 83, expediente 80, no pagination. New Spain regu­
larly sent subsidies to Havana to meet the expenses of its 
naval squadron and its soldiery, and made similar payments 
to other points. Besdies these regular disbursements, 
there were frequent extraordinary bills to be paid from 
Mexico, for while on campaign the squadron purchased food 
and supplies where and when it was necessary. After a 
cruise by the Havana warships claims for payment came in 
to Mexico City, by way of Spain, from all ports at which 
the ships had called, and the process of debt collection 
was extremely slow. One case may be cited as an example 
of the procedure involved. In 1762 the Governor of Spanish 
Santo Domingo had furnished the Havana ships with a quan­
tity of cordage and pitch. Santo Domingo then informed 
Madrid of the quantity and value of the supplies. From the 
Ministry of the Indies an expendiente eventually came to 
Mexico City, instructing the viceroy to reimburse the Caias 
of Santo Domingo for the amount owed, 3,343 pesos. The 
processing of this debt had required a year and one-half. 
Arriga to Cruillas, June 27, 1763- Ibid., expediente 8 6 , 
no pagination. The warships of Spain frequently sailed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
money to satisfy the Governor of Havana, the Count of 
Ricla.12
While Cuba was rebuilding, hundreds of Spanish 
colonists from East and West Florida were arriving in 
Havana, for the principal settlements of that Province had 
been surrendered to the English. The fort of San Marcos, 
the strong point of St. AugUstine, had beaten off three 
English sieges since its completion in ±687; but it had 
now fallen bloodlessly into enemy hands.13 From Pensacola
with insufficient food and gear because of the widespread 
dishonesty of the purveyors, who stole from the goods 
delivered to the ships or who connived with royal offi­
cials to purchase, at the expense of the crown, non­
existent supplies. A detailed account of the nature of 
these frauds can be found in Jorge Juan and Antonio de 
Ulloa, Noticias Secretas de America (Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones Mar 0c6ano, 1953)» PP* 65-7 0 . Similarly, ships 
of the British Navy frequently found themselves short of 
food and essential supplies because of thefts by their 
victuallers and dockyard officials. Robert G. Albion, 
Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal
Navy. 1652-1862 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1926), pp. 47ff.
12Conde de Ricla to Cruillas, November 24, 1763/ 
AGNM, Historia. Vol. 425, fols. 51"56. The governor 
thanked Cruillas for an emergency remission of 900,000 
pesos, but said that it was not enough, and that the 
English had seized 2,440,000 pesos during their occupation.
13The total population of Spanish Florida in 1763 
was 3 »0 96, a figure which included women, children, slaves,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
in West Florida 634 Spaniards sailed for Veracruz on 
September 3» 1763/ carrying with them 108 Yamasee Indians 
who were Catholic. 14 The West Florida refugees, borne in 
a flotilla of small craft, arrived unannounced at Vera­
cruz in early November? and Viceroy Cruillas helped them 
to settle in New Spain. 15
At this point in his career Viceroy Cruillas must 
have felt that he had discharged his duties as Captain 
General well. On August 21, 1763/ Ricardo Wall, Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote him a congratulatory 
letter which conveyed the thanks of the King and his
and soldiers. It is not clear that all of these withdrew 
from Floi'ida when the provinces passed under the British 
flag, but the overwhelming majority did so. Verne E. 
Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565 to 1763 
(Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1941),-
pp. 6 7, 128.
14Clinton N. Howard, The British Development of 
West Florida (Berkeley: University of California Press,
19^7), P. 11.
15Arriaga to Cruillas, July 12, 1763/ AGNM, RC, 
Vol. 84, expediente 273/ no pagination.
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complete approbation of the Viceroy's service during the 
late war . 16 Less than a month later the Minister of the 
Indies, Arriaga, added his personal approval, mentioning 
Cruillas1 organization of militia units, his wise selec­
tion of officers, and his frequent trips of inspection to 
army units and coastal fortifications. 17
The Viceroy had no way of knowing that in Madrid a 
secret committee of imperial defense, composed of 
Carlos Ill's principal ministers, had been convened to 
consider the lessons learned in 1762 and that changes in 
the colonial defense system were planned. The King feared 
future English aggression against his American colonies, 18 
and the Duke of Choiseul, exploiting his fears, advised 
Carlos to speed the rebuilding of "our navy [sic] and 
colonies, in order that within a few years we may be able
16Ricardp Wall to Cruillas, August 21, 1763/ ibid., 
Vol. 8 3, expediente 136, no pagination.
17Arriaga to Cruillas, September 15, 1763/ ibid., 
expediente 142, no pagination.
laDanvila.. Carlos III, Vol. 2, p. 110.
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to wipe out our disgrace. " 19 Cruillas received the first 
notice of the activities of the defense junta in a letter 
from Arriaga, dated September 27, 1763, which stated 
briefly that the King had called a meeting of experts 
(unnamed) to consider the problems of colcnial defense.
The yiceroy would be informed of the decisions of that 
body "when it was convenient. " 20
Early in 1764 the junta devised a general plan.
For the time being warships would be buiit in Spain, 
because the thorough destruction of the Havana facilities 
made definite construction schedules in that port impos­
sible. 21 There was, however, one badly needed maritime 
reform which could be made by using existing vessels: the
19Allen Christelow, "French Interest in the 
Spanish Empire during the Ministry of the Due de Choiseul, 
1759“177i/" The Hispanic American Historical Review,
Vol. XVI, No. 4 (November 1941), p. 523-
2°Arriaga to Cruillas, September 27, 1763, AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 83, expediente 167, no pagination.
21Fern4ndez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, P* 118. No 
ships were constructed at Havana until 176 5, when three 
were launched.
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institution of a regular mail service between the 
Peninsula and the Indies. 22
The King's junta considered the fortifications of 
the principal ports of America the first line of defense 
and as a more important deterrrent than seapower. When 
Viceroy Cruillas reported that English warships from 
Pensacola were intruding in the coastal waters of New 
Spain and had even carried out a leisurely reconnaisance 
of the harbor of Veracruz, he recommended that a coast 
guard be formed to watch English ship movements in the 
Gulf of Mexico. 23 Having received no satisfaction from
22The center of the maritime post was to be 
La Corufia. On the first day of each month a packetboat 
was to leave with correspondence for the Indies. The mail 
would be left at Havana where it would be picked up and 
carried to the principal ports of the Spanish colonies in 
the northern hemisphere. A separate vessel was to leave 
La Corufia on the same dates for Rio de la Plata. The pro­
visional regulations of the correo maritime were outlined 
for Cruillas in the fall of 1764. Arriaga to Cruillas, 
October 18, 1764, AGNM, RC, Vol. 85# expediente $1, no 
pagination.
23Cruillas had first written to Spain asking for 
the protection of New Spain's coastal waters on Novem­
ber 28, 1764. Arriaga's response to this letter had been 
noncommital. Arriaga to Cruillas, February 9» ^765, 
ibid.. Vol. 86, expediente 5 3, fol. 6 9.
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his first request, Cruillas wrote again to Arriaga and 
asked that a frigate be maintained in constant readiness 
at Veracruz to challenge intruders who appeared offshore. 
In his response to the Viceroy's second letter Arriaga 
explained why such action was both impractical and 
unnecessary. The minister argued in a long didactic 
statement that to maintain a large warship in a state of 
constant readiness to put to sea was impossible. Small 
launches were more useful? they could sail from the port 
and determine the identity of a strange craft. If the 
approaching vessel proved to be hostile, the launches 
could warn the fort, whose cannon "were the true impedi­
ment to attack. " 24 Arriaga's reply reflected the deci­
sion of the King's junta to depend primarily upon repaired 
and strengthened coastal forts, but the junta had also 
decided that complete reliance upon fixed defenses was 
dangerous. Colonial armies would have to be created: not
the ad hoc militia units which Cruillas had mustered in
24Arriaga to Cruillas, April 11, 1765# ibid., 
expediente 110, fols. 224-225-
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seventeen sixty-two,: but regiments.raised and permanently 
Stationed in America.25
The fiio (fixed) regiments in the colonies would 
be built around cadres of veteran European troops, as 
would the militia regiments. As in the past, a few Penin­
sular regiments of regulars would rotate in overseas 
service. The new system was first tried in Cuba, where 
Mariscal de Campo Alejandro O'Reilly reorganized the 
troops and militia of the island in 1763 and 1764. The 
results pleased the Governor and Captain General of the 
island, who came to have a high regard for the Cuban 
militia.26
2SMcAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army,"
p. 8.
26The Governor and Captain General was Antonio 
Marla Bucareli, who was to become Viceroy of New Spain in 
1771- Bernard E. Bobb, The Vicereqency of Antonio Marri'3 
Bucareli in New Spain. 1771-1779 (Austin: The University
of Texas Press, 1962), p. 88 [hereafter referred to as 
Bobb, Bucareli]. O'Reilly also inspected the fortifica­
tions of San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1765* and after a 
consultation with the Chief Engineer, Tomds O ’Daly, 
recommended that the garrison be increased and works 
repaired. Nicolds Cabriliana, "Las fortificaciones mili- 
tares en Puerto Rico," Revista de Indias. Vol. XXVII,
Nus. 107-108 (Enero-Junio, 1967), pp. 172-173• O'Reilly's 
recommendations caused the King to send two battalions of 
infantry and an artillery company to the island and to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The task of reorganizing the armed forces of 
New Spain was entrusted to Lieutenant General Juan de 
Villalba y Argulo, who arrived at Veracruz on November 1, 
1764, accompanied by four Mariscales de Campo. the Regi­
ment of America, and veteran cadres for the militia and 
fiio regiments to be formed. Villalba had hardly reached 
the capital when he and Viceroy Cruillas began a quarrel 
which was to last almost two years. According to Cruillas, 
Villalba was arrogant, disrespectful, and many of his arbi­
trary decrees encroached on the privileges of the 
Viceroy. 27
Meanwhile, New Spain had acquired another depen­
dent: the Province of Louisiana. A royal order of
May 21, 1765/ named Antonio de Ulloa governor of the new 
colony and fixed its annual situado at 150 ,000 pesos. 28
order New Spain to send 100,000 pesos annually to Puerto 
Rico for the repair and improvement of the fortifications. 
Arriaga to Cruillas, September 20, 1765# AGNM, RC.
Vol. 27/ expediente 222, fols. 115-H5v.
27McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army,"
pp. 16-1 7.
2aArriaga to Cruillas, May 21, 1765# AGNM, RC.
Vol. 8 6, expediente 155/ fols. 331“331v * first
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The Governor, who arrived in March, 1766, found Louisiana 
helpless to resist any thrust from British West Florida. 
With less than 100 Spanish soldiers at his command, Ulloa 
was unable to do more than to disperse token garrisons to 
several posts along the Mississippi River. 29
Viceroy Cruillas' situation became more difficult 
with the arrival in July, 1765, of Jose de G&lvez, who 
came bearing the titles of Visitador General and Intendente 
del Eiercito. There was no legal precedent for such a 
title, for the intendant system had not been established 
in New Spain. Since Lieutenant General Villalba had been 
named Commandante General de las Armas de Nueva Espaffa. 
there were simultaneously in the kingdom two officials
situado was inadequate, for Spain had undertaken to redeem 
more than two million livres in paper money which was then 
in Circulation in Louisiana. The Mexican silver promptly 
disappeared from circulation into private hoards, Vicente 
Rodriguez Casado, Primer os affos de dominaci6n espaflola en 
la Luisiana (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas, 19^2), p. 116. In May 1767/ the king ordered 
the situado increased to 250,000 pesos. Arriaga: to Cruil­
las , May 19» 1767, AGNM, RC, Vol. 90, expediente 133, 
fols. 227-2 2 8.
29John W. Caughey, Bernardo de G&lvez in Louisi­
ana. 1776-1783 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
193^)/ PP* 12-13 [hereafter referred to as Caughey,
Gcilvez] .
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from Spain whose powers encroached on those of the Viceroy 
as Captain General, an office in which viceroys "often 
acted with more freedom and initiative than in any other 
capacity. " 30
Cruillas had heen solely responsible for the 
defense of New Spain during the war emergency of 1762; he 
had raisied, equipped, and commanded an army of more than
8,000 men which he had been able to create from units 
which had previously existed only on paper. Yet in 1765 
he found himself engaged in a jurisdictional struggle with 
two other high-ranking officials who had assumed direct 
command of the troops in his viceroyalty and who were 
responsible only to the crown. Only the intervention of 
the King could resolve the quarrel, and Carlos III acted 
by recalling both Villalba and the Viceroy.31 On 
August 23# 1766, Cruillas surrendered the symbolic baton
3°Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, ±9^7)>
p. 115.
3 1McAlister, "Reorganization of the Army," 
pp. 28-29. Before his departure Villalba submitted a 
report which showed the strength of the army of New Spain 
to be 2,3^1 regulars and 10,698 militiamen. Ibid., p. 28.
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of command at Otumiba to his successor, the Marquis de 
Croix, who came to America with strict orders to cooperate 
fully with Visitador General Gcilvez ,32
One of the first acts of the new Viceroy was to 
inspect the new army whose organization had caused the 
recall of his predecessor and Lieutenant General villalba. 
Despite Villalba's final report that the organized militia 
numbered more than 10,000, de Croix found that the mili­
tia units hardly existed in actuality (Foco mas que sobre 
el pa pel), a condition which the Viceroy attempted to 
correct by frequent musters and inspections. 33
De Croix found that New Spain 's financial commit­
ments to the defense of the Windard Isles had not been 
honored during the last two years of Cruillas' vice­
regency. In the period ±761-1766, the latter had sent 
1,^05 convicts and vagabonds from New Spain to work on the
32McAlister, “Reorganization of the Army," p. 30.
33Instrucci6n del Virrev Marqu6s de Croix que 
deia a_ au sucesor Antonio Maria Bucareli: prologo y
notas de Norman F. Martin, S.J. (Mexico: Editorial JUS,
i9 6 0), p. 112, Num. 139 [hereafter referred to as DeCroix, 
Instruccidnl.
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fortifications and in the shipyard of Havana, 34 but 
payments of situados had lagged. In 1J66 the situado of 
Havana had been set at 500,000 pesos, to be divided as 
follows? 300 ,000 for the fortifications and shipyard;
100,000 for other projects in Cuba, and 100,000 for 
Puerto Rico. 35
But in December, 1765, Havana had complained to 
the Minister of the Indies that no money at all had been 
received from Mexico City during the past year, and that 
work in the shipyard and on the construction of fortifica­
tions had ceased. 36 On September 30, 1?66, Arriaga wrote 
a strongly-worded letter to the Viceroy. The Intendente 
de Marina of Havana had informed him that no situados had 
been sent to Cuba for a year and one-half, and that all
34Cruillas to Arriaga, August 11, 1766, AGNM, CV, 
Vol. 9» expediente 987/ fol. 409* Cruillas stated in this 
letter that he could have sent more forzados. Although he 
had offered many more, officers of the ships sent to take 
them to Havana had rejected many, because they were not 
strong enough for the work.
35Arriaga to Cruillas, March 25# 17&6, AGNM, RC, 
Vol. 8 8 , expediente 40, fol. 82.
36Arriaga to Cruillas, March 25» 1766, ibid., 
expediente 39/ fol. 8l.
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shipbuilding and repair had been halted. The King had 
ordered Arriaga to repeat to the Viceroy that construction 
must proceed, "for the Armada is the most crucial nerve of 
the Monarchy, and in case of shortages it is to be prefer­
red to other less important enterprises. " 37
The Intendentes de Tierra %  Mar were instructed to 
list the deudas que se justifiquen (legitimate debts) of 
their respective ramos and to forward the statement to the 
viceroy for payment, in order that the credit of the crown 
should remain unimpaired. Beginning in January, 1768, the
37Arriaga to de Croix, September 3 0, 1766, ibid.. 
Vol. 89/ expediente 190, fol. 6 5. The author of the com­
plaints to Spain about the stoppage of work in the ship­
yard was Lorenzo de Montalvo, who is referred to in 
correspondence both as Comisario and Intendente. This 
able officer, who had spent his whole working life in 
naval administration, had come to Havana in 1756 bearing 
a title previously unknown in America: Intendente de
Marina % Director de _la Real Fabrica de Navios. The date 
of his appointment antedates by six years the establish­
ment of an Intendencia de Guerra y Hacienda in Cuba.
*  ■ ■ . u « i .  ■— 1 ■ .  y  11 1 r ■■■■' ■ ■■ —  « * »  ■ ■ i i  ■ ' 1Luis Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias (Sevilla: 
Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1959), 
pp. 18-1 9. Haring had previously accepted 176^ as the 
date of the first intendency in the American co IcniOo• 
Haring, Spanish Empire in America, p. 13̂ -.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
situados were to be increased. One million nine hundred 
thousand pesos were to be divided in this manner: 700 ,000
for all expensfes of the marine, 300 ,000 for the fortifica­
tions of Havana, 400,000 for the pay of the garrisons, and
500,000 for the purchase of Cuban tobacco for the royal 
monopoly'.38
The increase in the money allocated to the marine 
was needed for an accelerated program of naval construc­
tion and was so used. Eighteen warships were launched at 
the Havana shipyard during the five years of de Croix's 
viceregency, a greater number than had been launched in 
any comparable period of time. 39 Extraordinary requests 
for funds for shipbuilding were frequent during the next 
few years, 40 and de Croix wrote in his lnstrucci6n to
30Arriaga to de Croix, February 2, 1768, ibid., 
Vol. 9 2, expediente 47# fols. 85-8 7 .
"Humboldt, Cuba, p. 116.
4°Between 1766 and 1770 ten royal c6dulas directed 
New Spain to pay the Intendente de Marina at Havana vary­
ing amounts to meet emergency expenses hot covered by the 
annual situatos.
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Bucareli that the demands of Havana had nullified an 
increase of 3/200,000 pesos in the annual income of the 
Real Hacienda during the period of his rule.41
In the summer of 1769, New Spain received a sub­
stantial shipment of artillery and small arms from the 
Peninsula,42 which enabled the viceroy to arm shore bat­
teries erected to support the fort of San Juan de Ultia in 
the defense of Veracruz, the port which the Viceroy called 
"the key to the Kingdom."43 The fort of San Diego which 
guarded Acapulco possessed more artillery and muskets 
than it needed, but the Viceroy allowed the surplus; 
weapons to remain on the west coast. The road between
4lDe Croix, Instruccidn, p. 100, num. 114.
42Arriaga to de Croix, June 20, 1769/ AGNM, RC, 
Vol. 9 /̂ expedientes 135 and 135 bis, fols. 247~248v.
The shipment had left Cadiz on June 8, 1769/ in seven 
merchant ships which also transported the Regiment of 
Sevilla to garrison duty in Havana. The cargo for Vera­
cruz included thirty-six pieces of artillery, ten mortars, 
and 2,130 muskets, together with 3 8/000 projectiles of 
varying calibres.
*3De Croix, Instrucci6n. 115, num. 146.
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Acapulco and the capital was so wretched that their 
transportation would have been too costly and difficult. 44
Fortunately for Spain, the reorganization of its 
colonial defenses could be carried out in time of peace, 
for Europe remained quiet during the rule of de Croix and 
of his successor, Bucareli. In 1770 the expulsion of a 
British garrison from West Falkland Island by an expedi­
tion from Buenos Aires brought tension, and an embargo was 
placed on all transatlantic shipping from the ports of
44Ibid.. p. 117, num. 152. Travel over the road 
from Acapulco to the capital was mostly by mule-back, and 
the passage of wheeled vehicles was virtually impossible 
during the eighteenth century. In the first decade of the 
nineteenth century a better highway was planned, but great 
blocks of stone lay along the road for generations without 
ever being placed in position. When Teodoro de Croix 
traveled the road in 1767 to assume the post of castellan 
at the Acapulco fort, he called the road "impracticable.'' 
William L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York:
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1939)» PP* 386-387 [hereafter 
referred to as Schurz, Manila Galleon]. Eighteenth cen­
tury guns were inordinately heavy, by modern standards, in 
relation to their power. A thirty-two pounder gun weighed 
more than three tons. Many of the guns mounted at 
Acapulco had come from Manila, since transportation from 
Manila, which had an excellent foundry, was more 
practicable than transportation from Veracruz.
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America, but the ban was lifted less than two months later 
when the dispute was resolved.45
Yet. the government of Spain expected war with 
England sooner or later. Count Aranda, President of the 
Council of Castile, in a dictamen addressed to the King on 
September 13, 1770, expressed the belief that England 
would attack as soon as she felt herself prepared, per­
haps without a formal declaration of war. Therefore,
Spain must plan to wage defensive war in America. The 
principal ports must be reinforced. He felt no concern 
for the safety of the Viceroyalty of Peru, because its 
geographical isolation would protect it.46 Carlos III saw 
the threat of English aggression in all parts of the world, 
and in a personal letter to King Louis XV of France 
recommended that his ally devote more time and attention 
to his navy and less to his army. The naval forces which
45Arriaga to de Croix, December 22, 1770, AGNM, RC, 
Vol. 97/ expediente 155/ fols. 2 89-290 and same to same, 
February 4, 1771/ ibid.. Vol. 9 8 / fols. 67-67V.
46"Dictamen dado por el Conde de Aranda, Presi­
dents del Consejo, al rey Carlos III, en Madrid a 13 de 
Septiembre de 1770," printed in Danvila, Carlos III.
Vol. 4, p. 129.
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England maintained in the East Indies, in the 
Mediterranean, and in Jamaica, justified great vigilance 
on the part of the Bourbon powers; and Carlos had ordered 
that two Spanish squadrons be constantly kept in a state 
of readiness to put to sea.47 Shortly afterwards he 
declared to Louis:
In reference to armaments in the present time of 
peace, my plan is formed, because all my ships are 
always maintained in such a1 state that in three 
months of time they can be armed and ready to go on 
campaign.48
47"Carta de Carlos III a Luis XV, Aranjuez, 27 de 
Mayo de ljjl," printed in ibid., Vol. 4, p. 152.
48Carta de Carlos III a Luis XV, Aranjuez, 27 de
Mayo de 1771# " printed in ibid., Vol. 4, p. 154. The
Earl of Sandwich, who took office as First Lord of the
Admiralty in London in 1771# wrote to Lord North:
"Had we broke with Spain the other day [17703# 1 am con­
vinced that we should have lost the Indies and possibly 
Gibraltar, and suffered the capture of an immense fleet 
of merchantmen, before we could have had a fleet in readi­
ness so as to venture to dispatch any considerable force 
from home: for when I came to the Admiralty we had not
above fifteen ships fit for sea, and I believe the French 
and Spanish were then superior to us and more forward in 
their preparations."
George Martelli, Jemmy Twitcher: A Life of the. Fourth
Earl of Sandwich, 1718-1792 (London: Jonathan Cape,.
1962), p. 8 9.
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A Spanish historian of the reign of Carlos III has 
described the temper of Spain in the 1770's by stating 
that "the resolution to fight England was already a fact. 
The only things lacking were to arm and to seek an oppor­
tune moment. " 49 In spite of the belligerence of Count 
Aranda and the insistence by the King on the constant 
readiness of his ships, the "opportune moment" was some 
time in coming. There was still peace in Europe and the 
Indies when a change of viceroys occurred in New Spain.
On September 22, ± 7 7 Antonio Maria Bucareli, 
Governor and Captain General of Cuba since ±7 6 6, suc­
ceeded the Marquis de Croix. War did not appear to be 
imminent, and Bucareli was instructed to increase the 
income of the Real Hacienda and to practice economy.
Within ten days of his arrival in Mexico City he dis­
charged three battalions of militia then serving in the 
capital. His preliminary inspection of several militia 
units convinced him that they were of little value. Since 
his initial reduction of their numbers had received the
40Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 412.
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approval of the King, he then dissolved two infantry 
companies and a lancer squadron of Veracruz. Because he 
had formed a low opinion of the Mexican militia and had 
been directed to economize whenever possible, Bucareli 
formed no new militia units until 1775/ when the incipient 
rebellion in the English colonies of North America caused 
general uneasiness throughout the Spanish-American 
empire.50
While practicing economy in the employment of 
soldiery, the Viceroy favored substantial expenditures on 
the fixed defenses of Veracruz. Upon first seeing the 
fort of San Juan de Ul6a at that port he had expressed 
surprise at its small size, and he began at once to plan 
its expansion and improvement. He convened a junta of 
engineers to discuss changes in the works and, finding 
that the members of the junta were unable to agree among 
themselves, forwarded all their opinions to Spain for 
judgment at a higher level. The decision of the home 
government was to call in more experts. In informing
soBob, Bucareli. pp. 89“90*
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Bucareli of this, Arriaga delivered a short homily on the 
planning of fortifications. The King had noted, the Min­
ister of the Indies wrote, the frequency with which vice­
roys, captains general, and governors of fortified places 
proposed and planned fortifications for their respective 
districts and their extravagant demands for artillery, 
munitions, and all types of war materiel. There was 
always a wide diversity in these plans and requests, and 
the proposals for improvement were always presented when 
there was a change of administration in the Indies, 
whether of viceroys, governors artillery commandants, 
or engineers. Apparently, every new commander, no matter 
what his rank, felt that his predecessor, had been negli­
gent in providing for the defense of his district. In 
order to cut short the debate in the case of the fortifi­
cations at Veracruz, the King had dispatched two engineers 
from Spain to Mexico to decide the matter.51 After dis­
cussion among the visiting engineers and those already in 
New Spain, plans were formed and work was begun. The
slArriaga to Bucareli, September 20, 1775/ AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 106, expediente 226, fols. 432-433*
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reconstruction was completed in 1777 at a cost of 
approximately 4,500,000 pesos*52
Throughout the viceregency of Bucareli the sub­
sidies paid by New Spain to its financially dependent 
colonies rose steadily.53 In Havana an accelerated pro­
gram of shipbuilding which had begun in 1765 was still in 
progress,54 and the annual cost of the improvements of the 
fortifications of Puerto Rico rose to 225/000 pesos by 
1775*55 To the old outposts of defense a new one had been 
added within the past decade: the Province of Louisiana.
The loss of Canada in the Seven Years' War and the cession
52Bobb, Bucareli. p. 148.
53The situados paid to the Windward isles and to 
Louisiana and distributed through Havana were as follows 
for the years 1772, 1774, and 1778: 3,146,332 pesos,
4,324,347 pesos, and 4,531,910 pesos. Ibid.. p. 226.
Bobb states that figures for the missing years are either 
unclear or missing.
54Humboldt, Cuba, p. 117. Thirteen ships were 
built at Havana during Bucareli's viceregency.
55Arriaga to Bucareli, November 6, 1775, AGNM,
RC, Vol. 106, expediente 271, fols. 491"491v.
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of Louisiana to Spain had brought Spain and England into 
collision along a frontier that extended from the mouth of 
the Mississippi River to the coast of the Pacific North­
west. The acquisition of Louisiana with its thin popula­
tion and its poorly defended border made the fear of 
further English aggression more acute and intensified 
Spanish belief that war was inevitable.56
The first Spanish governor of Louisiana, Antonio 
de Ulloa, found the Province helpless to resist any 
attack from the English establishments in their new pos­
session, West Florida. An attempt to determine the opti­
mum northern limit of Spanish control of North America 
was begun in 1764, when the Marquis of Rubi, who accom­
panied Lieutenant General Villalba to New Spain, was 
charged with the inspection of the northern frontier of 
the viceroyalty. His lieutenant, a young engineer officer 
named Nicol&s Lafora, spent two years traveling the line 
of the isolated missions and presidios of the north. His 
report, submitted as an informe of twelve chapters,
56Haring, The Spanish Empire in America^
pp. 134-135.
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recommended the establishment of a chain of forts on or 
near the Rio Grande River and the abandonment of fortified 
points north of the river, with two exceptions. San 
Antonio de B6xar in Texas and Santa F6 in New Mexico were 
to be left as salients projecting deep into hostile Indian 
territory. The presidios on the proposed line would, in 
the Words of de Croix, "form a barrier which would serve 
for defense, and they should be able to aid one another."57
Such an approach to frontier defense was impos­
sible in the case of the newly-acquired territory of 
Louisiana, whose eastern boundary, the Mississippi River, 
faced an area rapidly being penetrated by English colo­
nists. The great distances involved, the lack of support 
from Cuba, and the hostility of the French population 
combined to frustrate the efforts of Ulloa to establish a
57De Croix, Instrucci6n, p. 128, num. 128.
Lafora's reports of the conditions of the frontier 
presidios. their garrisons and their equipment were almost 
uniformly unfavorable. His account is filled with 
descriptions of unpaid, ill-equipped and ill-fed soldiers 
and of mission priests who had made rio converts for 
decades. Lawrence Kinnaird, The Frontiers of New Spain: 
Nicolas Lafora's Description. 1766-1768 (Berkeley: The
Quivira Society, 1958), passim.
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series of forts on the river. No real progress toward 
strengthening the Province was made until after Ulloa was 
ousted from New Orleans by a revolt of the colonists in 
1768. His successor, Lieutenant General Alejandro 
O'Reilly, the organizer of the Cuban militia and the 
friend of Bucareli, then Captain General of the island, 
reduced Louisiana to obedience and organized a citizen 
militia. By 1770 this force numbered 1,040 men, who were 
commanded by native French colonial officers and trained 
by Spanish regulars. The small force could not serve as a 
bulwark against the English, but it could be "an obstacle 
that would delay them, at least temporarily, in their 
attempts to get at the mines of Mexico. . . ."se
When the conflict between England and her colonies 
in North America began in 1775/ Spanish concern for the 
safety of Louisiana and Spanish America in general grew.
In June of that year, Count Aranda, then Ambassador to
1
France, expressed his fears in a letter to the Marquis of
S8Caughey, Galvez, p. ^2. O ’Reilly 
maintained seven fortified points on the Mississippi River 
between the mouth of the river and the mouth of the 
Missouri River.
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Grimaldi, the Spanish Minister of State. If the North 
Americans should win their independence, he predicted, 
Louisiana would be the first object of their expansion. 
Whether they became independent or not, the English colo­
nies "must be viewed as a growing power for our 
subjection."50
Grimaldi's reply to Aranda in August was equally 
gloomy. He feared that no possible program of coloniza­
tion from Spain could increase the population of Louisiana 
enough to meet the tide of British migration moving west­
ward toward the Mississippi River. The English would 
always be able to raise armies which Spanish Louisiana 
could not match. To develop the province and to erect 
strongly garrisoned forts would only cause the conquest 
of Louisiana to be more of a challenge to the English. In 
short, he-concluded, "the evil has no remedy."60
After fighting between British troops and 
Massachusetts colonists had begun, Governor Luis de Unzaga
59Panvila. Carlos III. Vol. 4, p. 415. 
6°Ibid.. p. 4l6.
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of Louisiana became alarmed. He sent a vessel to 
Philadelphia, ostensibly to buy flour, but actually to 
discover how serious was the rift between England and her 
colonies. The reports which he received were not encour­
aging, and he feared attack from both loyalists and 
rebels. Lacking troops and strong fortifications, he 
wrote to Spain that he could only follow the advice given 
in 1770: if attacked, fight a delaying action and fall
back to Mexico.61
In September, 1775 the: Marquis.:of Grimaldi wrote to 
Count Aranda in Paris that war might break out at any 
time between the Bourbon allies and England, and that 
England could not possibly muster forces for the subjec­
tion of the French and Spanish colonies before the autumn 
of 1776. The defenses of the Indies must be strengthened 
and the colonial forces supplied with war m=tteriel at 
once. Precautions must be taken against a sudden assault 
with or without a declaration of war. He warned that 
"prudence dictates that the two Courts take without delay
6l0aughey, Galvez, p. 5^•
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effective steps to defend their respective possessions, 
as if war were already upon us."62
In New Spain Viceroy Bucareli turned his atten­
tion to the militia, whose numbers had remained static 
since 1772. By 1776 the strength of the enrolled mili­
tiamen was increased from 6,837 to 14,000, and the number 
of regular troops stationed in the kingdom rose from 3/754 
to 4,527.63 More soldiers were sent to reinforce the 
Cuban garrisons? the Regiment of Spain, for instance, 
being ordered to Havana in February, 1776.64 With the 
troop transports were to come four frigates to cruise the 
Windward Isles, the Antilles, the Mexican Gulf, and "ail 
the other places enemy squadrons could sail to our 
Dominions.,,ss
62Danvila, Carlos III. Vol. 4, p. 421.
63Bobb, Bucareli. pp. 101-102, 108.
°4Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, August 6, 1776, 
Vol. 108, expediente 66, fol. 138. The burden of the 
regiment,!s annual payroll, 200 ,656 pesos, became an 
additional expense to New Spain.
65Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, February 29, 1776, 
ibid., Vol. 107, expediente 5 8/ fols. 100-lOOv. Aranda 
reported the dispatch of the cruisers to Vergennes, the
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By the same mail packet which brought the above 
orders, the new Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de Gctlvez, 
sent Bucareli his appraisal of the deteriorating European 
situation. He forecast the involvement of Spain in the 
struggle between England and her rebellious colonies. 
Relations between Madrid and London were for the moment 
cordial, but the American conflict was a growing threat 
to the neutrality of all the nations of Europe. The 
Viceroy was directed to make a survey of the defenses of 
New Spain, but he was also told not to manifest alarm nor 
to indicate that an emergency might soon arise.66
French Foreign Minister, who was pleased by the move. 
Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p.. 452.
66Jos4 de Gctlvez to Bucareli, February 28, 17?6, 
ibid., expediente 50, fols. 87“88v. Julictn de Arriaga, 
who had served as Minister of the Indies since the fall of 
the Marquis of Ensenada in 1754, had died in January,
1776. An unsociable man, incapable of forming friend­
ships, he had been humorless, efficient, and incorrupti­
ble, but his undoubted talents as an administrator had 
not been appreciated by Carlos III, who had always 
regarded him with suspicion because of Arriaga's friend­
ship with Jesuits. Fernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7/ p. 187. 
Bucareli, after a survey of New Spain's resources for war, 
requested that artillery of all calibres be sent from 
Spain. Gctlvez in his reply admitted that Spain could not 
satisfy even its domestic needs for guns, and he wrote 
that negotiations were underway to buy naval guns from
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A major threat to the neutrality of continental 
Europe was the growing activity of American commerce 
raiders, particularly in the English Channel, where they 
so successfully harassed English shipping that marine 
insurance rates rose to more than twenty percent by 
1777 *67 Count Aranda, from Paris, expressed amazement at 
the American successes at sea. The maritime strength 
which the colonists displayed was incredible to him, and 
he speculated that a large percentage of the Americans 
were seamen because of their extensive foreign commerce. 
Although the British also took many prizes, their losses 
exceeded their gains, because the prizes taken by the
Carron, Scotland (the well-known large-calibre pieces 
known as "carronades" ). Bucareli was directed to plan 
the establishment of a foundry for bronze cannon in New 
Spain. Gcilvez to Bucareli, October 6, 1776, ibid.,
Vol. 109, expediente 21, fols. 36-37* For the next two 
years surveys, plans, and reports on the projected foundry 
were made, but it was never built. Bobb, Bucareli, 
pp. Ill-112.
67Samuel P. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935),
pp. 5^-55*
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American vessels were more numerous and of greater 
value.68
The success of the rebel privateers prompted Jos6 
de Galvez to advise Bucareli, in a secret letter of 
September 20, 1776, how the American ships should be 
received in the ports of Spanish America.
In an official communication of September 19, the 
Marquis of Grimaldi tells me the followings "The 
Ambassador of England hinted to me (assuring me above 
all that he did this on his own initiative and without 
orders from his Ministry) how pleasing to his Sover­
eign would be the news that American ships had been 
denied entrance into the ports of Spain, as had just 
been ordered in Portugal, by considering them rebel­
lious subjects of a friendly power.69,! was quick to
68Juan P. Yela Utrilla, Espafla ante la independen- 
cia de los Estados Unidos. 2 Vols. in one (Lerida:
Graficas Academia Mariana, 1925), Vol. II, p. 11. In some 
cases American cruisers caused near-starvation in the 
British West Indies, which were almost completely dependent 
upon North America and Europe for food. A decline in the 
free Negro population of Jamaica has been attributed to 
starvation during the war years„ The whites fared better, 
as did their valuable chattels, the slaves. Piers Mackesy, 
The War for America, 1775-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1964), p. 228 [hereafter referred to as 
Mackesy, War for America].
690n August 23, 1775# England had issued a Procla­
mation of Rebellion which forbade all intercourse with the 
rebellious colonies, and the seizure of rebel shipping 
began. The proclamation could not be effectively enforced
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respond by declaring that it was my belief that very 
few cargoes came from their colonies: that if they
did it was part of a continuing exchange of goods to 
which Spain had always been accustomed, and that doubt­
less they bore the English flag. But I added that I 
would write to the Governors of the principal ports 
to ask news. I did this really to warn the Governors 
of the terms in which they ought to answer me in a 
letter that can be shown, and in another in which they 
privately expressed the plain truth: whose contents
the Ambassador need not hear.
The King has taken the foregoing matter under con­
sideration: and reflecting that to close his ports to
the Americans would be to declare them enemies of 
Spain, and they would take as prizes our ships in every 
3ea, without leaving us any means of reprisal or even 
of punishing this offense: the result is that the
Americans may be cordially admitted into the ports of 
Spain, although they may present themselves under their 
own flag, distinct from the British, and that if the 
English Court should make complaints, that they may be 
made to see that the King cannot expose the commerce 
of his subjects to suck risks, since neither his 
Britannic Majesty nor his Ministry would be obligated 
to compensate for the damages which their rebellious 
colonists would cause us.
For my part, I have made the matter known to the 
Governors, under the greatest secrecy, about how to 
receive and deal with with the ships of the English 
colonies in the ports of Spain, instructing them that
because of the shortage of British warships, and the Amer­
icans were quick to begin reprisals. "The sea is now 
over-spread with privateers on every part," the Earl of 
Sandwich wrote to Lord Howe in 1778, "and the demands for 
convoys and cruisers is so great that we know not how to 
supply them." Mackesy, War for America, p. 173*
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if an American privateer with a prize, no matter what 
its nationality, should enter, they must not impede 
it, assuming that the prize should fly the same flag 
as her captor, as is the general practice. In the 
same manner an English privateer which might capture 
an American prize would not be molested."
I make these dispositions known to Your Excellency 
in order that they may serve as a guide in interpreting 
orders dispatched to the ports of the Indies, although 
there may be in the orders the general prohibition 
agair.st foreigners, whether friends or enemies, and it 
must be understood that the Americans under their own 
flag or with any prize, must be received and dealt 
with in cases or urgency and apparent need, with the 
same hospitality as would be the English or the French: 
I notify Your Excellency of the order of the King, so 
that from this date you may direct that in the ports 
of your jurisdiction it be observed in the cases speci­
fied, and with the idea that the Royal Wish is that 
when refuge is granted to the ships of the colonists 
through hospitality, that the sale of goods not be 
permitted, nor any trade, and only if they should make 
repairs and buy what may be necessary, paying its 
price in money, bills of exchange, or negro slaves.
And Your Excellency, having been informed of this, 
will give me notice at the first opportunity.70
As if this letter might seem ambiguous to officials 
in a position to admit American vessels, Jos6 de G&lvez 
followed it a month later with more bluntly worded 
instructions.
7°Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, September 20,: 1776, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 108, expediente 157. reservada 129/ 
fols. 320-321v.
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I advise you very confidentially of his Majesty's 
order, that under the precautions listed in the letter 
of September 20, his Royal Will be followed. Observe 
it carefully within yout jurisdiction in cases that 
may occur, with the advice that in regard to refuge 
given to American corsairs, you can proceed without 
any scruples.71
The first Spanish colony in America to face the 
dilemma of giving covert aid to the American rebels while 
remaining officially neutral was the Province of Louisi­
ana. In May, 1776, a Captain George Gibson and twenty- 
five men disguised as traders appeared in New Orleans 
from upriver bearing a letter from Major General Charles 
Lee, second in command to General George Washington. The 
letter solicited Spanish aid for the American colonists, 
warned of the dangers to the Spanish colonies if the 
English won, and offered to take Pensacola for the Span­
iards. Governor Luis de Unzaga, elderly, infirm, and 
hoping for retirement after forty-one years' service in 
America, referred the propositions to Spain.72 To Jos6 de
71Jos6 de Ghlvez to Bucareli, October 23» 1776, 
ibid., Vol. 109» expediente 51/ reservada 134, fols. 21- 
22v.
72Caughey, Gctlvez, p. 55*
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G&lvez the time seemed propitious to aid the Americans, 
although not as flagrantly as Prance was then doing.73 
In a dictamen addressed to the Council of Castile, he 
urged, “Let us establish indirect and secret intelligence 
with the American colonies, inspiring them to vigorous 
resistance, and hoping for the diversion of English 
forces. 1,74
In the summer of 1776 Spain moved to strengthen 
the defenses of Louisiana and to use New Orleans as a dis­
tribution center for secret aid to the Americans. A royal 
order of September ±9 named young Colonel Bernardo de 
Galvez interim Governor, and instructed him to increase
73A clause in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 had 
forbidden France to receive the vessels of the enemies of 
Great Britain in her ports, and this ban had been renewed 
by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Prom the beginning of 
the American rebellion France's violation of this prohibi­
tion had been so flagrant that Count Vergennes expected 
war with England as early as 1777* Bemis, The Diplomacy 
of the American.Revolution, p. 53.
74Quoted in Yela Ultrilla, Independencia, Vol. II,
p. 78.
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the militia strength, to make accurate charts of the 
Mississippi, River, and to estabU-ab-i ntp.lligence agents 
among the English settlements and the Indians.75. The sum 
of 40,000 pesos was added to the situado of the Province 
to be employed in "objectives useful to that colony, as a
75Caughey, Galvez, pp. 67-6 8, Unzaga surrendered 
his office in January, 1777- The new governor was greatly 
disturbed by the defenceless state of New Orleans. The 
city had no fortifications to protect it, and in Galvez' 
opinion, there would not be enough time to build them 
before hostilities began. There was not a boat at his 
disposal, and he complained to his uncle, the Minister of 
the Indies, as follows:
"In all the ports of Spain and America His Majesty main­
tains launches for the Governor, Intendant, the Captain 
of the Port, and the royal officials, and only in this 
one is there no boat for me nor for employment in crown 
duties. We must beg a launch from the very ship which we 
are going to visit, or else embark in a canoe, which is as 
dangerous as it is unbecoming for Ministers of the King."
"Carta de D. Bernardo de G&lvez, en que da cuenta de sus 
preparativos para defendarse de los inqlesse. 1 Docitmentos 
historicos de la Florida _y Luisiana; siglos XVI al XVIII 
(Madrid: Libreria General de Victoriano Suarez, 1912),
P. 315.
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barrier against the English in that part of the continent 
and the Province of Texas, 1,76 and complete freedom of comr- 
merce was allowed between Louisiana and all the ports of 
Mexico for the first time.77
Governor Unzaga was informed that the Governor of 
Havana would receive by the monthly mail vessel from 
La Corufta goods to be delivered to the Americans by way of 
New Orleans. In the meantime the rebels should be given 
whatever surplus of Mexican gunpowder there might be, and 
surplus firearms would be sent from Havana.78 Before'; the 
end of 1776, an American party had departed upriver with
9,000 pounds of gunpowder, the first product of New Spain 
to be giver as aid to the enemies of England in the war.78
76Jos& de G&lvez to Bucareli, November 25, 1776, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 109/ expediente 107/ fols. 95~95v.
77Jos& de G&lvez to Bucareli, November 25/ 1776, 
ibid., expediente 10 6, fol. 94.
78Yela Utrilla, Independencia. Vol. I, p. 108.
79The gunpowder arrives just in time to save Forts 
Pitt and Wheeling from being taken by a British and Indian 
force. More gunpowder was shipped from New Orleans at 
the same time by Oliver Pollock, an Irish-American who 
figured prominently in the clandestine transactions with 
the Americans. Caughey, G&lvez. p. 8 7 .
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In January 1777/ monthly paqu^bot sailed from
La Coruna for Havana carrying medicine and cloth for uni­
forms . In February a second shipment was made by the 
paquebot. and in Havana 300 muskets with bayonets and 100 
quintales (10,000 pounds) of powder were added.80 By means 
of a complicated but transparent subterfuge which did not 
deceive the watchful English in West Florida, material for 
the Americans was declared to be condemned royal stores 
unfit for use by the Spanish troops. Such material, 
falsely labeled, was shipped to New Orleans to be "sold."81
By the end of Bernardo de Gdlvez' first year as 
Governor, $70,000 worth of arms, clothing, and gunpowder 
had been sent to the upper Ohio River after repeated 
requests by George Morgan, the commander of Fort Pitt.82 
Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the first ship­
ment of stores from New Orleans, a merchant of Bilbao, 
Spain, received 70,000 pesos from the crown to be spent
soYela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, p. 109.
81Ibid.. pp. 108-109-
82Caughey, GSlvez, pp. 91-92. The exact amount of 
money and supplies given by Spain directly to the Americans 
has not been determined. Spanish and American archival 
records of the disbursements are incomplete. Bemis, The 
Diplomacy of the American Revolution, pp. 91“92.
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in goods to be picked up by American ships.83 In 
anticipation of increased traffic, Count Floridablanca, 
now the principal minister of Carlos III, announced the 
opening of a regular paquebot service between Havana and 
New Orleans.84
Throughout 1777 Spain continued preparations for 
war with England, although her approach toward belliger­
ency was not as overt as that of France. While the Span­
ish government sought to reinforce colonial defenses, it 
did not wish to provoke an English preventive attack by 
abrupt and large-scale troop and ship movements. Count 
Floridablance recommended to Vergennes that France make 
cautious movements of men and vessels to the West Indies. 
He felt that neither of the Bourbon powers could know when 
war would begin, but that it would be better for France to
83The merchant of Bilbao, Diego de Gardoqui, "was 
our Beaumarchais in the matter of aiding the colonies, "
Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, pp. 242-243.
84Floridablance to Bucareli, May 28, 1777» AGNM, 
RC, Vol. Ill, expediente 51/ fol. 107*
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emulate Spain and to move selected units overseas with 
discreet intervals between sailings.85
Spain's schedule did not call for war in 1777 if 
it could be avoided. Although there were in Spanish ports 
113 warships of all types completely armed, it would be 
November before C4diz would have 20 ships of the line 
ready for sea, and in the same month there would be 9 
ships of the line in the West Indies available for the 
protection of the Spanish colonies of North America. The 
government of Spain believed in 1777 that England had not 
committed her full naval strength to the suppression of 
the American revolt, and that she still held her heaviest 
warships in reserve for possible action against France and 
Spain.86 Yet in August, Spain felt Strong enough to
8SDanvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 4 9 6. After 
Count Aranda, Spanish Ambassador at Versailles, had 
delivered this communication, Vergennes read it, and he 
expressed bewilderment at a reference to the port "El Gua- 
rico." He asked Aranda if it were a French possession. 
Aranda told Vergennes that "El Guarico" was another name 
for Cap Francois, and he later wrote to Madrid that "the 
French Ministry is lost in regard to American geography." 
Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, p. 201.
86"Memoria hecha por el Gobierno de Espana para 
presentarla a la Corte francesa, S. Lorenzo 17 de Octubre 
de 1777/" printed in extenso in Yela Utrilla,
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reject an English protest concerning the admittance of 
American corsairs into Spanish harhors. The Spanish reply 
was that the English complaint could not be considered at 
a time when the Royal Navy was harassing the legitimate 
commerce of Spain and other neutral nations.87
The involvement of New Spain and its dependent 
provinces in the mother country's preparations for war 
increased after the initial shipments of gunpowder from 
New Orleans in 1776. There was a constant shortage of 
this explosive, so essential to war, to mining, and to the 
quarrying of stone , Since the powder factory in Mexico 
City was the sole source of supply for all the Spanish 
colonies in the northern hemisphere, Jos6 de G&lvez 
expressed concern about the ability of that establishment 
to meet the demands of an emergency. In July ±777/ when 
the Minister of the Indies ordered Viceroy Bucareli to
Independencia, Vol. II, p. 152. Spain had overestimated 
British naval strength, which was at the time insufficient 
to maintain a blockade of the North American coast and to 
arrest American traffic with the Continent and with neu­
trals in the West Indies. Nine-tenths of the supplies 
that reached the rebels came by sea. Mackesy, The War for 
America, pp. 88-8 9 .
87Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 487-
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send 1,500 auintales of gunpowder to Havana, he directed 
that the output of the Mexican factory be increased. At 
the time, Havana needed the ejqplosive because that port 
had just sent 1.500 auintales to Cartagena de Indias, 
whose magazines were empty. Havana was the distribution 
point for money and munitions to the other islands, to 
Cartagena, to Caracas, and to Louisiana. The shipment to 
Cartagena was only one example of the continuing need. 
Actually, 9,902 quintales would have been needed to fill 
the magazines at Havana and to allow that port to meet the 
requests of other points. Therefore, instead of ordering 
that any specific quantity be sent to Cuba in the near 
future, Gcilvez directed that the Viceroy continue to send
"the greatest quantity that may be possible. " 881
In this period of transition from nominal neutral­
ity to open belligerence, New Spain was also asked for aid 
in the recruitment of manpower to defend Louisiana. In
88Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, July 22, 1777# AGNM, 
RC, Vol. Ill, expediente 176, fols. 282-282v. The Viceroy 
had anticipated Galvez' plan to increase the capacity of 
the capital's powder mill before he received the letter 
cited, and he had already begun expansion of the existing 
facilities by May. Same to same, ibid.. expediente 252, 
fol. 411.
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August 1777, Viceroy Bucareli was informed that an officer 
from New Orleans would soon arrive in Mexico City to 
recruit men for a second battalion of infantry to serve in 
Louisiana, for the Province had only one battalion of reg­
ular troops. 89 The recruiting party, consisting of a Sub- 
Lieutenant Godeau, four sergeants, eight corporals, and 
twelve enlisted men, was given 1 ,2 0 0 pesos for expenses 
when they arrived in the capital, 90 but the prospect of 
military service in Louisiana had attracted only thirty 
recruits by July 1778. At that time the Viceroy ordered 
criminals who had been convicted of minor crimes to be 
drafted into the new Louisiana battalion, an action that 
was approved by Jos6 de Gcilvez. 9 x
G&lvez acted also to relieve the chronic shortage 
of foodstuffs in Louisiana. He directed Bucareli to order
89Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, August 15, 1777/
Xbicl * , pvhp 9 239 / fol • 396 •
9°Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, September 25/ 1778,
ibid., vol. 115/ expediente 34, fol. 54.
91Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, December 21, 1778/ 
ibid., expediente 154, fol. 3 8 7* In July 1779, there were 
106 Mexicans serving with Bernardo de Galvez in Louisiana. 
Gaughey, Gcilvez, p. 139-
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the port officials of Veracruz to fill without prior 
approval from the capital all orders for provisions pre­
sented to them by the officers of ships from Louisiana, 92 
where Gcilvez continued to build an army. 93
The aid to the North American insurgents before 
her entry into the war may be viewed as one aspect of 
Spain's general policy of opposition to the British along 
the Mississippi River, a "new application of the divide et 
impera policy. 94 Yet aid to the new republic might defeat 
the ultimate Spanish objective: the preservation of her
American empire. As an armed opponent of England, the 
young nation was to be encouraged, but as the founder of a 
new and vigorous political force that would menace Spanish 
America, to be hindered. Count Floridablanca, foreseeing 
the dangers of an independent Anglo-America, recommended 
the proper Spanish counter-measures in 1777-
ssJos6 de Galvez to Bucareli, October 29/ 1778/ 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 115/ expediente 91/ fol. 230.
93Caughey, Galvez. p. 1 37. From 1778 to I779 the 
number of regular troops in Louisiana rose fromo437 to 
76 9', from 1777 to 1779 number of militiamen-rose from 
136 to 1 ,5 0 0.
94Ibid.. p. 101.
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In the event of their independence, we should 
intervene in the formation of' their constitution by a 
kind of protection or guarantee, and then we should 
work so that the power of the Americans and their 
republic should remain so divided, and the 'indepen­
dence of one province from another so contrary, that 
we may not fear the establishment of a formidable 
power in the future, near our America. 85
In spite of Spain's steady course toward war, her 
government attempted to maintain the appearance of neutral­
ity until February 6 , 1778, when France signed two treaties 
with the United States, one of amity and commerce, the 
other of conditional and defensive alliance. The treaties" 
had hardly been signed when Spain began to pressure the 
British government to accept the mediation of the Spanish 
monarch, a service far which he expected to be rewarded.
The Spanish ambassador, the Marquis of Almodovar, suggested 
the cession of Minorca and Gibraltar, otherwise Carlos III 
might be forced to honor his obligation to France by 
entering the war. But Viscount Weymouth, the English Sec­
retary of State for Foreign Affairs, made it clear to
ssYela Utrilla, Independencia. Vol. I, p. 184.
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Almodovar in December 1778/ that England would offer Spain 
nothing for her neutrality. 06
On March 22, 1779 / Jos6 de G&lvez ordered an 
embargo on all shipping from the ports of New Spain, and 
warned Viceroy Bucareli that neutrality would soon be 
ended:
Refrain from mixing in the quarrels and war between 
the French and the English, maintaining equal harmony 
with both in every incident that may occur, so long 
as Your Excellency should not have well-verified word 
to the contrary, which will be communicated to you at 
the proper time. 07
On April 3, 1779, Count Floridablanca sent a vir­
tual ultimatum to England which demanded that she accept 
Spanish mediation of the war on terms completely unaccept­
able to the former. Before the communication could have 
been answered, Spain and France signed the Convention of 
Aranjuez, which provided that Spain should enter the war
0eBemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
PP. 78-79-
07Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, March 22, 1779/ AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 116, expediente 148, fols. 254-254v, and same to 
same, ibid.. expediente 2 0 7/ fols. 294-294v.
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if England refused the demands made by the Convention, one 
of which was the restitution of Gibraltar. 98
The actual declaration of war against Great Britain 
was written in Madrid on May 18, 1779 * ^ut New Spain had 
received prior warning. The orders prohibiting the depar­
ture of vessels and giving the Viceroy notice that neutral­
ity would soon be ended had been followed on May 12 by an 
order which forbade all royal officials, no matter what 
their ranks, to leave New Spain without permission. 90 The 
declaration of war could hardly have come at a more inop­
portune time. Viceroy Bucareli had died suddenly on 
April 9th. The task of executing the first war measures 
fell upon the Audiencia of Mexico,- until a new Viceroy 
could be designated.
98The Convention, ratified at Versailles,
April 28th, provided for Spain’s entrance into the war, 
"in case England should refuse Charles Ill’s final offer, 
so studiously composed as to be unacceptable." Bemis,
The Diplomacy of th^ American Revolution, p. 80.
"josd de Gcilvez to Bucareli, May 12th, AGNM, RC, 
Vol. 118, expediente 19, fol. 29-
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C H A P T E R I I
SPAIN ENTERS THE WAR FOR AMERICA
Martin de Mayorga, the forty-seventh Viceroy of 
New Spain, was born in Spain in the third decade of the 
eighteenth century. In 1773/ when appointed Captain Gen­
eral and President of the Audiencia of Guatemala, he held 
the rank of Mariscal de Campo and was a Cabellero of the 
Order of AlcSntara. 1 He still occupied this post in 
Guatemala when Viceroy Bucareli died on April 9 , 1779*
The Real Acuerdo2 opened the C^dula de Providencia, or
^is service in Guatemala was arduous. Shortly 
after his arrival, on July 23/ 1773/ a violent earthquake 
destroyed the capital of Guatemala and devestated a wide 
area. In his reports to Spain of this disaster and its 
consequencies, he stated that he had a force of only 
forty-eight dragoons to police the stricken region. Pil­
lage, disease, and famine followed, and Guatemala, not a 
rich province under the best of conditions, was slow to 
recover. Manuel Garcia Pur6n, Mexico yr sus Gobernantes 
(Mexico: Libreria de Manuel Porrua, 1964f, p. 125.
2When an Audiencia sat as a council of state to 
deliberate matters of political administration, its
54
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Mortaia, which Jos6 de Galvez, Minister of the Indies, had 
sent from Spain shortly before Bucareli's death, and found 
that the paper provided that the successor to the Viceroy 
should be the President of Guatemala.
Matias de G&lvez, who had just been appointed by 
the crown as President of Guatemala to succeed Mayorga, 
was the elder brother of the Minister of the Indies and 
the father’of Bernardo, Governor of Louisiana. Jos6 de 
Galvez had undoubtedly expected that Matias would assume 
the presidency of Guatemala before it might be necessary 
to implement the Mortaja which appointed a successor to 
Bucareli. The mail had made an unusually swift crossing 
of the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mortaia had outdistanced 
Matias. Thus Mayorga became Viceroy of New Spain by 
chance; it was a position which he had neither desired 
nor sought, and he was the object of Jos6 de Gcilvez' 
resentment during his term of office. He received only
sessions were known as Acuerdos, and its decisions as 
Autos Acordados. While functioning as an Acuerdo, the 
colonial Audiencia exercised powers somewhat analogous to 
those of the Council of Castile in Spain. Haring, The 
Spanish Empire in America, p. 124.
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half the salary of his predecessor, 3 and his correspondence 
reveals that he was almost constantly at odds with the Min” 
ister of the Indies, who never seemed to forgive him for 
unintentionally blocking the ambition of the elder Gcilvez. 4
A courier dispatched by the interim governing body 
of New Spain, -the Audiencia Gobierna. made a swift journey, 
traversing the wretched roads from Mexico City to Guatemala 
in seven days. The Audiencia, well aware of the almost 
impassable trails between the two capitals, ordered hasty 
repairs made to the roads and bridges to facilitate the 
passage of the new Viceroy and his entourage; 5 but Mayorga,
3Herbert I. Priestley, Jos6 de Gcilvez, Vistor- 
General of New Spain (1765-1771) (Berkeley: University of
California Press, I9I0) , p. 9* Bucareli's salary had been
40,000 pesos per year. Bob, Bucareli, p. 25.
^Manuel Rivera Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico, 
Gal^ria de biografxa de retratos de los virreyes, impera- 
dores, presidentes _y otros gobernantes que han tenido 
Mexico, 2 Vols. (Mexico: Imprents de J. M. Aguilar Ortiz,
1872-1873)/ Vol. 1, p. 438.
5Ibid., p. 439.
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who had started northward upon receiving the news, found 
travel slow and difficult. He did not arrive in Mexico 
City until August 23rd, and one of his first letters to 
Spain from the capital recounted the hardships of the trip. 
When he learned in Puebla that Spain had declared war upon 
England, he attempted to speed his progress, but with 
little success. 6
After he had taken formal possession of his office, 
Mayorga turned at once to the emergency created by the 
state of war. The declaration of hostilities, written in 
Spain on May 18th, had been received in Mexico on 
August 13th , 7 and notice of the formal opening of
6The road between Veracruz and the capital, which 
passed through Puebla, had apparently not been improved 
since the viceregency of the Marquis de Croix,.although it 
was the most important road in the kingdom. De Croix, in 
his Instrucci6n of 1771 to his successor, Bucareli, stated 
that he had found the road in very bad condition, and that 
he had levied a tax of one and one-half real on every 
beast of burden traveling the road. He predicted that 
after the road had been improved, all travelers would be 
happy to pay the tax. De Croix, instruccidn, pp. 79”80, 
num. 62. Mayorga's colorful description of the hardships 
and dangers of his forced journey is found in Mayorga to 
Jos£ de Galvez, August 27/ 1779/ AGNM, CV, Vol. 122, No. 6 , 
fols. lv-3 .
7Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, May 18, 1779/ AGNM,
RC, Vol. 116, expediente 257, fols. 451-451v.
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hostilities had been followed by an order to cease all 
communication and trade with the enemy. 8 The Audiencia 
Gobierna had begun to initiate war measures before the 
arrival of the new Viceroy. After a courier had been sent 
to meet Mayorga, a million pesos had been sent to Veracruz 
with instructions to forward half of it to Havana, and to 
divide the remainder between the governors of Louisiana 
and Yucatcin. Pood and gunpowder had also been sent to 
Havana and Yucatan. The port of San Bias had been alerted 
to be ready to send money and supplies to the Philippine 
Islands, for Manila was as yet unaware of Spain's entry 
into the war . 9 Mayorga, after having reviewed the actions
8Jos6 de G&lvez to Bucareli, June 24, 1779# ibid.. 
expediente 2 9 6, fols. 510~510v.
9William L. Schurz has written that when word of 
the war between Spain and England reached San Bias, a 
pilot named Francisco Murelle carried the news to Manila 
in a ship's yawl, a feat which Schurz cited as proof of 
the ease of navigation from New Spain to the Philippines, 
as contrasted to the difficult eastward voyage. The 
Manila Galleon (New York: E . P . Dutton, 1939)» P • 247•
No mention of this extraordinary voyage was found in the 
correspondence of Mayorga. On the contrary, the Viceroy 
found it difficult to send a ship to Manila with news of 
the war and emergency aid, a problem which is described 
in this chapter.
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taken by the Audiencia Gobierna, praised them, particularly 
the preliminary orders which had been given by the Reqente 
Francisco Roma y Rosell, who had personally assumed the 
interim duties of Captain General. 10
Mayorga inherited a military establishment whose 
strength and effectiveness are debatable. There were in 
1779 a total of approximately 4,400 regular army troops in 
New Spain, plus urban and provincial militia units num­
bering approximately 7,000. These figures do not include 
1,997 men stationed at the presidios of the Interior Prov­
inces under the command of the Commandant General, Teodoro 
de Croix. 11
10Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, August 27, 1779 , AGNM, 
CV, Vol. 122, No. 7 , fols. 3^-4, On this’ same date Mayorga 
acknowledged the belated receipt of a c^dula dated Octor 
ber 2 2, 1778, urging strict economy in all defense mea­
sures. The Viceroy made no comment on this impossible 
order, and stated merely that he had ordered copies of it
forwarded tb all military posts.
13The figures of troop strength are called approxi­
mations because there seems to be no agreement as to the 
exact count of regular army and militia enrollment. The 
biographer of Bucareli states that "their strength on 
paper reflected little actuality." Bobb, Bucareli. p. 102. 
The author who has made the most detailed study of the 
armies of New Spain in this period arrives at a total 
slightly higher than that given by Bobb, but she also
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The principal fortified point designed to prevent 
seaborne invasion of the east coast of the realm was the 
Castillo de San Juan de Ultia, which guarded the major port, 
Veracruz. Construction of the fort had begun in 1863, and 
since that date it had been enlarged and altered several 
times. The most recent reconstruction and addition had 
been made under the direction of Viceroy Bucareli. Four 
and one-half million pesos had been spent on its rehabili­
tation, and its engineers regarded the condition of the fort 
as satisfactory. 12 There were minor fortifications on the
states that reports of the number of troops and militiamen 
given out by individual units cannot be added to produce 
the totals reported by Bucareli and Mayorga to the Min­
ister of the Indies. Marla del Carmen Veldzquez, El 
Estado de Guerra en Nueva Espana. 1760-1808 (Mexico: El
Colegio de Mexico, 1950), p. 125. There is agreement that 
the militia units were in deplorable shape and that it 
was fortunate that they were not tested in battle against 
an invader. McAlister, Fuero Militar. p. 55*
12Jos6 Antonio Calder6n Quijano, Fortificaciones 
en Nueva Espana (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de Investi-
gaciones Cientificas, Escuela de Estudios Hispano- 
Americanos, 1953)/ P* 148.
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coast of Tabasco and Yucatan, but most of the Spanish money 
and care were devoted to the maintenance of the defense of 
Veracruz. All thought concerning the defense of the east­
ern seaboard of New Spain was limited in scope, and plans 
were based "on the stubborn insistence that the 
English . . . must attack the Castle of San Juan de 
Ultaa. " 13 In the event that an enemy penetrated the 
defenses of Veracruz and advanced toward the capital, he 
would encounter the new fort of San Carlos at Perote, on 
the road to Mexico City. 14
The point most likely to be an objective of attack 
from the Pacific Ocean was Acapulco, the American terminus 
of Philippine-American navigation and the eastern port of 
the Manila galleon. Acapulco was guarded by the Castillo 
of San Diego, which was undergoing reconstruction after
13Bobb, Bucareli, p. 120.
14Ibid., pp. 122-123- Bobb observed that a sense 
of inferiority ran through the defense plans and that "one 
must almost conclude that the only really effective 
defense for the Mexican viceroyalty would have been for 
Spain to remain at peace with England." Ibid., p. 121.
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having been damaged by an earthquake in 1776. For some 
reason the enemies of Spain felt this fort to be as strong 
as the works of San Juan de Ultia or those of Cartagena de 
Indias, and even if its reputation was undeserved, it had 
in the past served effectively to keep invaders at a 
distance. 15
The eastern sea approaches to New Spain were pro­
tected by a naval squadron based on Havana, whose strength 
in 1779 was five 70-gun ships and three frigates. 16 Imme­
diately after the news of the declaration of war reached 
America this squadron, commanded by Lieutenant General 
Juan Bautista Bonet, surprised and captured a convoy of 
sixteen British merchantmen homeward bound from Jamaica. 17 
Regardless of the activity of Bonet's small force, the 
most potent sea defense of the Spanish possessions around 
the Gulf of Mexico was the French navy in the West Indies.
15Schurz, Manila Galleon, p. 373*
lsGerv.asio de Artiffano, La Arduitectura naval 
espaftola en madera (Madrid: published by author, ±920) ,
p. 364.
l7Ferncindez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7/ P* 282.
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By 1779/ squadrons of d'Estaing, Vaudreuil, and
LaMotte-Picquet had taken the British islands of Dominica, 
St. Vincent, and Grenada, the last-named being the rich­
est sugar island of the Lesser Antilles. The British, 
outnumbered and outmaneuvered, had temporarily lost control 
of the West Indian waters. 18
The Spanish colonies in America were spared an 
immediate attack because French naval superiority in the 
West Indies was only one manifestation of British weak­
ness in 1779• As Piers Mackesy stated:
For three years England had kept far more men in 
America than had beaten the French out of Canada, and 
she had maintained them without the resources of her 
American colonies. The decision to persevere com­
mitted the country to three more years of exhausting 
effort in America; and its immediate effect was that 
no fresh resources could be deployed against the 
Spaniards in the Caribbean. 19
lsMackesy, The War for America, pp. 2J3-2J4. The 
passage cited also states, that French successes in the 
islands and the threat of Spanish intervention caused six 
battalions of British troops intended to reinforce 
Sir Henry Clinton in North America to be retained for gar­
rison duty in the British West Indies, thus indirectly 
aiding the cause of American independence.
19Ibid., p. 2 6 6.
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The scanty British forces in West Florida had 
been ordered to seize New Orleans if war were declared, 
but had been unable to do so. For years both East and 
West Florida had lived in fear of an attack by the Spanish, 
since Spain's intention to retake the Floridas had never 
been concealed.20 The fear was justified, for on 
August 27, the same day that Mayorga assumed power in 
Mexico City, Bernardo de G&lvez, Governor of Louisiana, 
led an army of 1,427 men against his first English 
objective, the fort at Manchac.21
There being no war emergency that demanded his 
immediate attention, Mayorga turned his attention to mat­
ters which had been neglected because of the death of his
2°Charles Loch Mowat, East Florida as â British 
Province, 1763-1784 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1943)/ P. 107.
21Caughey, Getlvez, p. 153. The foremost historian 
of the British army has written that all British posts in 
Florida and on the Mississippi River should have been 
evacuated at once, "so burdensome were they from their 
unhealthiness and their absolute dependence on supplies 
from without." West Florida did not learn that war had 
been declared until September. John W. Fortescue, A His­
tory of the British Army, 13 Vols. in 20 (London:
MacMillan and Company, 1899”1930), Vol. Ill, pp. 307”308.
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predecessor. He wrote numerous letters to Jos6 de Gcilvez, 
most of them representative of the tedious hut indispens­
able trivia that consumed the time of a Viceroy acting in 
his capacity of Captain General. The arrival of a cargo 
of solid shot for the fort at Perote was acknowledged. 22 
In obedience to a royal order of May 12th, Inspector 
General Pasqual de Cisneros had circulated a warning that 
royal officers of all ranks were forbidden to leave the 
realm unless directed to do so by an order from Spain. 23 
On May 30th a report on the progress of work on the 
earthquake-shaken fort at Acapulco had arrived. Mayorga 
forwarded it to Spain with a note of praise for the 
engineer in charge of the project, Engineer-Captain Ram6n 
Pan6n . 24
On August 29, 1779/ while Mayorga was disposing 
of the unfinished business that had accumulated during
22Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, August 27/ 1779/ AGNM, 
CV, Vol. 122, No. 14, fols. 8v-9.
23Same to same, ibid., Vol. 122, No. 19, fols.
llv-12.
24Same to same, ibid.. Vol. 122, No. 28, 26v-27v.
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the regency of the Audiencia Gobierna, Jos6 de G&lvez. 
dispatched from Spain a secret expediente outlining the 
objectives of Spain in the war and the part that New Spain 
was expected to play in their attainment:
After mature deliberation the King has determined 
that the principal object of his forces in America 
during the war against the English shall be to expel 
them from the Gulf of Mexico and the banks of the 
Mississippi where their establishments are so preju­
dicial to our commerce and also to the security of 
our richest possessions. The present situation in 
Europe favors the success of this important under­
taking, for Great Britain, weakened by its great 
losses, pressed by superior forces in both hemispheres, 
has been abandoned by other nations who have been 
angered by her hateful predominance.’ And on the eve of 
seeing herself assaulted within her own island by a 
French army of more than forty thousand men, she finds 
it impossible to resist our forces, directed with pru­
dence and vigor. But since to wait for assistance 
which could be sent from Spain will be to risk an 
operation in which speed is so essential, and perchance 
to lose amid delays the fortunate moment of execution, 
His Majesty wishes that with no delay whatever an expe­
dition be formed, composed of land and sea forces which 
can be collected in those Dominions, and that Mobile 
and Pensacola, which are the keys to the Gulf of Mex­
ico, be attacked, detaching them sooner or later from 
the Mississippi, which must be considered as the 
guard-post of the vast empire of New Spain.
To accomplish this desired object, Your Excellency 
will send all the troops possible, and the Governor of 
Havana will do the same, acting in concert, and 
deciding with the Commandant of Havana the point where 
the forces must be united under the escort of the 
squadron, which must support the land operations, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
the number of men which each must contribute: it
being well understood that from four to five thousand 
men must be mustered, among them three hundred dra­
goons or those who appear suitable for the success of 
the expedition, according to the plan dictated by the 
Governor of Louisiana; for although the English have 
in Pensacola no strong fortifications, only wooden 
forts, it is to be expected that the garrison of thnt 
post may be reinforced, they being well aware of its 
importance and fearing our attacks.
The units which Your Excellency may send must be, 
inasmuch as is possible, picked men, commanded by 
officers of talent and vigor. The force will bring 
two field guns and a full complement of stores and 
munitions. Also there will go fifty artillerymen, 
commanded by a Commandant who is completely satisfac­
tory, and an engineer officer of the rank of Colonel 
or Lieutenant Colonel, accompanied by two subalterns. 
The embarkation of the troops, with abundant rations, 
will take place in Veracruz, in the ships which may be 
in that port, and Your Excellency will agree with the 
Commandant of the squadron on this point, and on the 
rendezvous where you must join the convoy leaving 
Havana, and you will take all necessary steps for safe 
transportation.
The King wishes that this expedition be commanded 
by the Brigadier Don Bernardo de G&lvez, Proprietary 
Governor of Louisiana, who prior to forming the plan 
of the expedition, gained practical knowledge of those 
areas, having established agents among the enemies.
He knows the diversions that must be made at the same 
time by the troops of the United States of America: 
he has gained the friendship of the Choctaws and other 
Indian nations who would always take the part of the 
English if the enterprise were headed by some other 
chief unknown to them, and finally, his actions and a 
happy combination of circumstances have accredited him 
with the members of Congress and have spread respect 
for his name among the English establishments near 
Louisiana. The knowledge of how much enemy opinion is
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worth in war has guided His Majesty to the selection 
of this Governor in preference to other officers with 
more years of experience and who are doubtless more 
suited for any other undertaking.
At the same time that the attack by sea and land 
will be executed against Pensacola and Mobile, troops 
of the United States of America in the number of three 
thousand will besiege St. Augustine, and perhaps there 
will be another diversion high upstream on the Mississ­
ippi . This has been offered by Congress, using money 
will must be given them to repay the costs of the 
expedition. Let Your Excellency not delay in sending 
all the troops which the Governors of Havana and 
Louisiana may ask, as well as the rations 
and supplies necessary for the success of an expedition 
of so much importance, for the English, attacked from 
all sides, are incapable of seizing even one house of 
this Kingdom, and truly in no way can this be accom­
plished more usefully than by dislodging the English 
from the Mississippi and Florida, and making Louisiana 
an impregnable barrier.
However, in order to provide for any contingency, 
it had been arranged with the Governor of Havana that 
in case the troops he can collect in Cuba and in that 
Kingdom (without leaving either of the two indefensi­
ble)’ should be insufficient to bring about the con­
quest of Pensacole, he should ask the Governor of the 
French part of Santo Domingo for the number of men he 
should judge necessary to complete the expedition, for 
the Court of Versailles has reiterated to the Comman­
dants of their islands and the Chiefs of their squad­
rons that cruise in those waters the order that they 
wait upon and aid effectively with their land and sea 
forces whatever undertakings our forces may form 
against the establishments of Great Britain.
Let Your Excellency maintain the most profound 
secrecy about this expedition, and of your effective 
dispositions for the mustering, preparation and march
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of the troops to Veracruz, pretending that they have 
some other object than the real one. Perhaps, for 
example, an attack on Jamaica. The confidence which 
the King has in your spirit and military talents does 
not permit me to enter into trivial details, since in 
accord with the Governors of Havana and Louisiana you 
will send to the latter whatever aid in the way of 
troops, money, supplies and rations may be necessary, 
and make every effort which your love of King and 
Country may inspire, in order that the splendor of 
Spanish arms may be assured in an undertaking of the 
greatest importance. May God keep Your Excellency 
many years. San Yldefonso, August 29, 1779*
Jose de Galvez?5
At the same time that he sent the above letter to 
Mexico, Jos6 de Galvez issued several lesser orders con­
cerned with New Spain's war effort. He approved the 
emergency remissions of money, powder, and food made by 
the Audiencia Gobierna; and he ordered that an additional
2,000 quintales of powder be sent to Havana, part for 
that port and part to be transshipped to Cartagena de 
Indias. The situado of Louisiana was to be raised from 
155,322 pesos to 315 ,000 pesos because of the war, and
25Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga, August 2 9, 1779, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 117, expediente 122, reservada, 
fols. 225-227v.
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Mayorga was to aid Bernardo de G&lvez in creating a company
of dragoons if asked to do so . 26
The expedientes cited were not received in Mexico 
City until February 1, 1780, after Governor G&lvez had 
taken Manchac, Baton Rouge, and Natchez and was on his way 
to Mobile. The five-months delay between the issuance of 
orders in Spain and their receipt in Mexico is only one 
example of the slow transmission of intelligence between 
the Peninsula and its American colonies. In peacetime such 
delays inhibited effective action both by the crown and by 
colonial authorities. In wartime, when communications were 
inevitably disrupted, the delays could be disastrous to 
planned military or naval actions. Spanish ministries 
issued directives in ignorance of the actual situation in
the Indies. Colonial officers waited months for orders
which they were often unable to execute because .
26Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, August 26, 1779,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 117, expediente 107, 'fol. 210; same to 
same, ibid., August 29, 1779, expediente 125, fol. 230; 
same to same, ibid., August 30, 1779, expediente 127, 
fol. 2 3 7-
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circumstances had made the orders meaningless by the time 
they arrived.27
In ignorance of the plans of Jos6 de Gcilvez and in 
the absence of any known crisis in the Gulf theatre, 
Mayorga was free to deal with an emergency on the Pacific 
Coast. The Philippine Islands had to be notified of the 
declaration of war, and money had to be sent to Manila in 
the event that the regular sailings between New Spain and 
the islands were interrupted.
When on August 13 the Audiencia Gobierna received 
the foyal order declaring war on Great Britain, it sent
200,000 pesos to the port of San Bias with instructions 
that a vessel be sent to Manila as soon as possible 
carrying 150,000 pesos. The remaining 50,000 pesos were
27The correo marltimo which had been established 
in 1764 and which departed La Coruha on the first of each 
month was apparently immediately disrupted by the war, if 
one can judge from the frequent and increasing complaints 
about delayed mail delivery noted in Mayofga's correspon­
dence. The armed forces of England in America operated 
under similar handicaps. A letter from London dated Sep­
tember 24, 1779# ordering three ships sent from New York 
to the Leeward Islands, did not reach its destination 
until May, 1780, and was not executed until a month later. 
Mackesy, The War for America, p. 332.
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to be used to defray the expenses of the voyage.28 In 
1779 there had been regular maritime traffic between New 
Spain and the Philippines for 214 years, and in the light 
of this long practice of transpacific navigation, it might 
be assumed that an order to dispatch a ship to Manila 
could be easily and promptly executed. It proved impos­
sible to comply with the directive of the Audiencia with­
out protracted delay. On the west coast of New Spain 
there were few ships available for the royal service and 
even fewer pilots trained in Pacific sailing. There was 
even a shortage of the basic tools of navigation.
28The port of San Bias was situated on the west 
coast of Mexico twelve leagues south of the Rio Santiago 
and seventy-five leagues from Guadalajara. There was a 
small inner harbor and a large outer anchorage. Inland 
there were forests of cedar and other timbers suitable for 
shipbuilding. The base had been created after Jos6 de 
Galvez' Sonora expedition of 1767-1768 had shown the need 
for a permanent naval post in Nueva Galicia. The new 
Department of San Bias was independent? it derived its 
authority directly from the viceroy, indirectly from the 
crown, and it was considered a unit of the Real Armada. 
Shipbuilding had begun in I7 6 7. The two paquebotes El 
Principe and San Carlos, which eventually went to Manila, 
were constructed in San Bias and were two-masted vessels 
of 139 tons burden, Michael E. Thurman, "The Establish­
ment of the Department of San Bias and its initial Naval 
Fleet, 1767-1770," The Hispanic American Historical Review. 
Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (February,'1963) , pp. 67-6 9, 71.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
When the new Viceroy took office he found that the 
money and the official papers which were to accompany it29 
were still in San Bias. The Commandant of Marine at San 
Bias, Bruno de Hezeta, planned to send the paquebot 
El Principe to Manila, but no pilots were available, for 
all of them had accompanied an exploring expedition to 
Upper California.30 Furthermore, the Department of San 
Bias had no charts of the Pacific Ocean, and there was no
29Among the papers to be sent to Manila was a let­
ter from Jos& de G&lvez to the Governor, Jos& de Vasco y
Vargas. Galvez warned him that Manila must not be sur­
prised again, as it had been in 1762. England's naval 
forces in Oriental waters were superior to those of France, 
and G&lvez regarded an attack on the Philippines entirely 
possible. He also emphasised that the annual galleon must 
not sail for Acapulco if the presence of British naval 
units was suspected. Jos& de G&lvez to Jos& Vasco de 
Vargas, May l8th, AGNM, RC, Vol. 116, expediente 2 5 6, 
reservada No. 133/ fols. 449-450v.
30Viceroy de Croix and Visitador Jos& de G&lvez
had begun planning a series of exploring voyages to the
northwest in 1767* Exploration continued throughout the 
viceregency of Bucareli, but after the voyage of 1779# 
which was commanded by the famous pilot Juan Francisco 
Bodega y Cuadra, orders were received to discontinue 
exploration. Charles E. Chapmen, A History of Spanish 
California: the Spanish Period (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1921) , p. 343.
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artillery to arm El Principe. Some of the vessels based 
on San Bias had guns which could be used to arm the Manila 
ship, but these ships were dispersed all the way from 
Guaymas, at the head of the Gulf of California, to the 
Pacific coast of Upper and Lower California. Hezeta sent 
a small boat in search of the absent ships, and he made 
plans to form an armed guard for El Principe; a corporal 
and twelve soldiers from the militia of Tepic.
Meanwhile, Mayorga instituted a vain search for 
pilots in the capital.31 The Administrador General of the 
Real Hacienda, Pedro Antonio de Cosio, urged that the 
Viceroy order whatever pilots might be in Veracruz to 
leave their ships and go to San Bias, whether the pilots 
were willing to go or not. Mayorga refused, however, to 
take this coercive step. It would be dangerous, he wrote 
to Jos& de G&lvez, to entrust ships, money, and important 
papers to pilots who had to be forced to make the voyage 
and who were, moreover, ignorant of the Pacific Ocean.
Two pilots were eventually found, but two more were needed,
31Mayorga to .Jos& de G&lvez, September 26, 1779/ 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 82, fols. 11-13.
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for the Viceroy had decided to send a second ship to 
Manila with an additional 150,000 pesos and copies of all 
important documents in case the first ship should fail to 
arrive.
Antonio de Coslo found a five-volume maritime 
atlas, while Mayorga located some charts of the Pacific 
Ocean, two binnacle compasses, two surveyor's compasses, 
and two half-hour watch glasses. The pilots, glasses, and 
charts were hastily ordered to San Bias, and the Viceroy 
hopefully reported to Spain that if more pilots had been 
located, the "ships already could be sailing. " 32 But the 
last of the indispensable four pilots was not found until 
the end of September, when one was discovered commanding a 
schooner in the port of Guaymas. On October 10, the San 
Carlos sailed for Manila. 33 At last, on December 18, 1779/ 
the second paquebot, El Principe, departed. The Governor 
of Manila was instructed to use the vessels indefinitely 
if he needed them. Mayorga requested him to return them
32Same to same, Ibid., No. 8l, fols. J-ll; 
fols. 7-llj No. 8 3, fol. 13v.
33Same to same, November 15, 1779/ ibid., No. 154, 
fols. 22-24.
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to New Spain armed with full complements of artillery, 
because Manila had a cannon foundry, and New Spain had 
none. The ships had sailed from San Bias only partially 
armed, because few guns had been available by the time of 
sailing.34 Almost six months elapsed between the day the 
Audiencia Gobierna issued the first order and the day the 
second vessel left San Bias.
During the period between the outbreak of war and 
the beginning of heavy shipments of supplies to Havana, 
Mayorga set in motion a project which increased the supply 
of gunpowder. Explosives had been manufactured in Mexico 
since the time of Cortes, and by 1600 a factory had been 
constructed at Chapultepec and leased to private oper­
ators . The production and sale of gunpowder was a crown 
monopoly, although it was neither centralized nor closely 
supervised, and by the time of the visitation of Jos£ de 
G&lvez, explosives were being made in 112 other places.
In 1767 Gcilvez reorganized production, raising the standard 
of quality and lowering the price. Despite the lower 
price, the new code worked so well that the Real Hacienda
34Same to same, December 15, 1779/ ibid., Vol. 125/ 
No. 183, fols. 7~7V *
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realized a 200 percent profit on the operation, and gross 
income from sales rose from 190,204 pesos in ±765 to
326,000 pesos in I7 8 8 .35
Even in peacetime there were heavy demands upon 
Mexican powder production. The continuous construction of 
fortifications in Cuba consumed explosives in demolition, 
excavation and quarrying, while the Mexican mining indus­
try regularly used large quantities. 36 It was certain 
that wartime demands would strain the facilities of the 
Chapuitepac factory, for New Spain was the sole source of 
supply for Cuba and other islands, as well as for all 
ships of the Real Armada in American waters. The Peninsula
3SPriestley, Jos6 de Gcilvez, pp. 346-34-7- Because 
of the wide distribution of saitpptre and sulphur beds in 
Mexico there were many illicit powder factories. Humboldt 
estimated that the royal factories produced only one- 
quarter of the explosives used in Mexico. Humboldt,
Ensayo politico sobre la Nueva Espana, sexta edicion 
castellana, 5 Vols. (Mexico: Editorial Pedro Robredo,
1941), Vol. 4, p. 17.
360ne mine, La Valenciana, in Guanajuato, used 
from 1,400 to 1,500 auintales annually. Ibid., p. 17.
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produced its own powder, and after the Seven Years' War 
attempts had been made to increase its output. In 1766 
Arriaga had asked Viceroy de Croix to send samples of 
salitre (potassium nitrate) to Spain for testing, since 
the mother country lacked this essential ingredient of 
black powder. 37 He reminded the Viceroy that Mexican 
production must be increased, since New Spain had to pro­
vide explosives not only for its own mining industry but 
also for "Havana and other dependent ports. " 38 As the 
years passed, the Ministry of the Indies continued to 
express concern about the ability of the Chapultepec 
factory to meet wartime emergencies. 39
37Arriaga to de Croix, November ±5, 1766, AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 8 9 # expediente 9 6 , fols. 25^-256.
38Same to same, December 23/ 1766, ibid., 
expediente 2 1 7, fols. 25^-2 5 6.
39E.g., Arriaga to Bucareli, December 20, 1772, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 101, expediente 164, fol. 521; Jos6 de 
G&lvez to Bucareli, July 8 , 1777, ibid., Vol. Ill, 
expediente 135, fol. 215. These are not the only letters 
urging increased powder output, but the urgency of their 
tone must have impressed Mayorga, for he referred several 
times to the two expedientes cited as justification for 
the expenses of building a new plant.
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Just before the beginning of hostilities in 1779/ 
Jos£ de Gcilvez, in an admission of weakness rarely found 
in his correspondence with the viceroys of New Spain, 
wrote:
The King orders me to notify Your Excellency that you 
must send 2,000 quintales of powder with all possible 
speed to Havana, for this amount has been shipped 
from that port to Cartagena de Indias, where there was 
a serious lack of it, and Your Excellency must attempt 
by all means to increase the production of the Royal 
Powder Factory, for those of Spain can hardly supply 
the needs of the Peninsula, and the overseas Dominions 
need immense quantities for their defense, an objec­
tive that demands the greatest care in the present 
critical circumstances.40
When Mayorga received this letter, he acted with 
speed. During the viceregency of his predecessor, 
Bucareli, plans had been drawn for a new factory and a 
site selected: a barranca which ran from Tacubaya to
Santa Fd. But Bucareli, who had been a thrifty adminis­
trator, had decided to improve the existing plant, and 
the new plant had never been built. The Viceroy reviewed 
the plans, and after consultation with Engineer—Captain
4°Jos6 de Gcilvez to Bucareli, May 15/ 1779/ AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 116, expediente 243# fol. 424.
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Miguel Costanzo decreed on August 25, 1779, that the new 
factory be built. He did not call a junta of the Real 
Hacienda to discuss the matter because, as he explained to 
Jos6 de Galyez, "of the delay'which that formality required." 
Construction was to begin at once, and no offices or 
living quarters would be built until the machinery was in 
place. A weekly progress report would be required.41
41Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, August 27, 1779,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 122, No. 11, fols. 5~6v. Scattered 
throughout Mayorga’s correspondence are many references to 
correspondence of previous years, and it is evident that 
the Viceroy had thoroughly perused the letters sent and 
received by his immediate predecessors. It may be that 
his decision not to convene a junta to discuss the new 
powder factory was prompted by advice once given to 
Viceroy Cruillas by the old Minister of the Indies, Julidn 
de Arriaga. On November 1^, 1761, when war with England 
appeared imminent, the veteran administrator counseled 
Cruillas:
1
"Take all measures necessary to defend the Kingdom, with­
out submitting them to a Junta de Guerra, because such a 
Junta is often composed of people who do not understand 
what is going on" (vndibiduous aue no entienden aue es).
Arriaga to Cruillas, November 14, I76I, AGNM, RC,
Vol. 8l, expediente 166, no pagination.
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The Viceroy's next step was to appoint a commission 
headed by a French engineer, Salvador de Dampier,42 to 
procure and to refine potassium nitrate, in anticipation 
of an increased consumption of this basic raw material.43 
By September 20th the buildings which were to house the 
machinery had been framed, steel and iron for machinery 
had been collected, and a forge had been built on the site. 
Eighty men were working on the project under the direction 
of Engineer-Captain Costanzo.44
42Salvador de Dampier (or Dampierre) had come to 
New Spain with the title of enqineur de salpetres. He had 
come from France to Spain and had spent some time at the 
University of Madrid making experiments with explosives.
He came to Mexico with a salary of 2,000 pesos per year.
His career in America was marked by frequent quarrels with 
officials, and when he returned to Spain in 1783* he was 
charged with stealing funds appropriated for the purchase 
of chemicals, j. Houdaille, "Les francais au Mexique et 
leur influence politique et sociale (I76O-I8OO)," Revue 
Francais d'Histoire d 'Outre-Mer. Vol. 48, No. 2 (I96I), 
p. 1$8.
43Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, September 26, 1779/ 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 85, fol. 35-
44Same to same, September 29# 1779/ ibid., No. 124, 
fols. 59“6 0.
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On August 27, 1780, exactly one year after he had 
first written to Jos6 de Gcilvez of his decision to conr 
struct the new establishment, Mayorga reported to Spain 
that the new mill was in operation and that the first gun­
powder had been produced. Royal officials had made formal 
test firings of the product, and its strength far exceeded 
the minimum standards required for the army and navy.45
The summer of 1779 was the only period of rela­
tive peace which Mayorga was to enjoy during his tenure of 
office. Within the area dependent upon New Spain for 
money and supplies, no army was in action except that of 
Bernardo de Gcilvez. At the outbreak of war between Spain
45An Ynstruccion issued August 1957/ which was 
used as a standard of excellence, required that a half­
ounce of powder propel a musket-ball 240 feet to be 
acceptable for the royal service. Six test shots from 
each of several lots of powder were fired at the new 
plant; the range of the shots was from 318 feet to 398 
feet. Same to same, August 27/ 1779/ ibid., Vol. 127/
No. 619, fols. 14-15. The Spanish treatment of gunpowder 
as a crown monopoly provides an interesting contrast to 
Great Britain's method of supply. Before and during the 
American Revolution, gunpowder used by the British armed 
forces was brought from private manufacturers and mer­
chants. In 1779 its poor and irregular quality provoked 
a strong protest from Admiral Samuel Barrington, then in 
command of the Leeward Islands station. In 1787 the 
British government began to manufacture its own powder. 
Fortescue, History of the British Army. Vol. 3/ P- 547*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
and England both powers had feared and expected assaults 
on their respective American colonies by the other, but 
only the Governor of Louisiana had taken the offensive.
Sir Henry Clinton, Commander of British forces in the 
North American colonies, had admitted his inability to aid 
West Florida. Communication with the Province was so 
infrequent that Clinton did not even feel justified in 
sending instructions to Brigadier John Campbell, 
commanding in Pensacola, and
the only means, therefore, left for me to serve him to 
any effectual purpose were by repeatedly representing 
his defenseless situation to the Admirals on the 
Jamaica and Leeward Island station and requesting that 
they would send to Pensacola some ships of war for its 
protection,46
Meanwhile in Jamaica young Horatio Nelson, com­
manding a battery at Port Royal, was studying French in 
the expectation of being captured, for Governor Dalling 
of Jamaica had written to Clinton that Count d'Estaing 
was at Hispaniola with a fleet and army, and that "his
46Quoted in William B. Willcox, The American 
Rebellion; Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of flis Campaign. 
1775-1782 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 195*0 »p. 133
[hereafter referred to as Willcox, American Rebellion!.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
descent upon the island may be daily expected." The 
Governor had no hope of successful resistance.47
Spain's fears of prompt attacks upon her American 
possessions corresponded to British apprehensions.
Repeated warnings had been sent to New Spain since 1776, 
urging constant vigilance against a surprise British 
attack before the formal declaration of war by either 
nation. There was reason for concern, for as early as 
1778-the anticipated entry of Spain into the war had sug­
gested to the British a change of strategy, a means of 
breaking off the struggle with their colonies in North 
America and seeking compensation by the conquest and reten­
tion of French and Spanish territory. Hugh Elliott,
British Minister to Prussia, had advised William Eden, 
Undersecretary for the Northern Department, to press for 
abandonment of the war with the rebellious thirteen 
colonies:
4701iver Warner, Victory; the Life of Lord 
Nelson (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p. 26 
[hereafter referred to as Warner, Nelson].
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Declare them independent, and add the independence of 
all the Spanish colonies and islands. In order to 
support this, let our fleets and armies evacuate North 
America, fall upon Santo Domingo, Martinique, Cuba and 
force free trade in the Gulf of Mexico. The straight 
road to the gold and silver mines, the sugar islands, 
and the revolt of the Spanish settlements, these will 
be the consequences of this vigorous measure. Our 
Presbyterian colonies will be more than compensated
Researchers have found similar suggestions among 
the memoranda of Lord George Germain, Secretary of State 
for the colonies. Once King George III became convinced 
that Spain would intervene, he favored withdrawing British 
forces from the north and turning them against the 
Spanish and French colonies.49
There were two reasons why such a shift of mili­
tary objectives was impossible. It was by no means cer­
tain that Great Britain was capable of capturing and 
retaining the island colonies of the Bourbon allies, much 
less of penetrating the vast expanse of the Spanish Main.
48Quoted in.William B. Willcox, "British Strategy 
in America, 1778." The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XIX, 
No. 2 (June, 19^7), p. lOln.
49The King also suggested that New Orleans be 
seized, whether Spain entered the war or not. Mackesy,
The War for America, p . 185•
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Secondly, their former American colonies, if freed frcm all 
British pressure, would be quite capable of taking and 
occupying Canada, an enterprise which they had attempted 
before their formal declaration of independence. If Canada 
should fall, Great Britain would lose her last hold on the 
North American continent. Regardless of military logic, 
England, over-extended and driven by political necessity, 
had to continue the fight in both the northern and southern 
hemispheres.
The immediate beneficiary of the dispersion of 
British forces was the United States of America, for the 
threat of Spanish belligerency influenced British thinking 
and action before hostilities began. In the winter of 
1778/ Clinton stated that by cautious defensive action he 
might maintain the status quo against the Americans and 
the French until next year, but he saw no possibility of 
a British offensive in 1779# because
. . . the great possibility there was of our soon 
being engaged in one [war] with Spain would put it 
out of the power of government to send such augmenta­
tions for the army in America as might place it in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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any sort of condition for entering upon an active 
campaign in the ensuing summer.50
In December 1779/ when Clinton learned of the fall 
of the British posts on the Mississippi, he repeated that 
he was unable to send assistance to West Florida. He again 
asked Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica to send a frigate or two to 
Pensacola, "whereby we might be enabled to retain at least 
one hold in West Florida"; but he feared the loss of the 
whole Province, because
the Indians being somehow estranged from our interests 
and the inhabitants averse to military service, he 
[General Campbell of Pensacola] had not the slightest 
prospect of assistance from either.51
soWillcox, The American Rebellion, p. 107*
51Ibid., p. 154. Bernardo de G&lvez had devoted 
much effort to winning over the Indians. One hundred sixty 
had joined his march against the British posts on the 
Mississippi River, and the Governor was even able to per­
suade them to refrain from their usual practice of killing 
or mutilating their prisoners. Caughey, G&lvez, p. 163. 
Throughout his West Florida campaign G&lvez awarded large 
silver medals to the chiefs whose adherence he sought. A 
quantity of these medals had been struck at the Casa de 
Moneda in Mexico City and delivered to Louisiana. G&lvez 
to Mayorga, January 20, 1780, AGNM, RC, Vol. ±±8, 
expediente 49/ fol. 66.
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While Bernardo de Gcilvez was attacking enemy 
posts contiguous to Louisiana, the Governor of Yucatan, 
Roberto Rivas de Betancourt, was organizing a similar 
expedition against the British logwood cutters in the Bay 
of Honduras.52 On July 27, the Audiencia Gobierna of 
Mexico had sent 200 guintales of poweb to Yucatan. After 
the news of the war had reached the capital, Yucat&n 
received an additional 300 guintales of powder and 100,000 
pesos, because Betancourt had complained that lack of 
money and powder was delaying offensive action on his 
part.53 Two ships carried the supplies from Veracruz to 
Campeche, and Betancourt sailed with five schooners and
52Scattered settlements of Englishmen had been 
cutting logwood, or campeachy wood, along the shores of 
the Gulf of Honduras since the seventeenth century.
Although Spain had frequently attacked the centers of 
cutting and had protested against their presence through 
diplomatic channels, the Baymen simply fled to the south 
when danger threatened and returned when it had passed.
Most of the establishments were in the neighborhood of 
Belize, but there were more at Rio Negro, in present-day 
Honduras. Carlos III had determined to expel the intruders 
altogether, although by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Spain 
had agreed to tolerate the cutters indefinitely on condi­
tion that their settlements would not be fortified.
Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±936), pp. 41-43, 102, 603•
53Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, September 26, 1779, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 84, fols. 13-15.
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three hundred militiamen almost simultaneously with 
Bernardo de Gcilvez' attack on the Mississippi. By Sep­
tember 22nd, Betancourt had taken and sacked three log- 
cutting settlements on and near St. George's Island and 
Cayo Cocina, on the coast of present-day British 
Honduras.34
At the same time that Governor Betancourt was 
moving against the English logcutters a situation was 
developing in Guatemala which was to cause the Viceroy 
more trouble than British invaders. In July 1779/ Matias 
de Gcilvez, elder brother of the Minister of the Indies 
and father of Bernardo, arrived in Guatemala with the 
titles of Captain-General and President of the Royal 
Audiencia. Upon his arrival he made a tour of inspection 
and began the organization and arming of militia com­
panies.55 On August 28th, Matias de Gcilvez asked Moyorga
54Same to same, November 20, 1779/ ibid., Vol. 124, 
No. 167/ fols. 39-40. St. George's Island is opposite the 
mouth of the Belize River, and Cayo Cocina is eight miles 
north of the river.
55Agustin Menos Franco, Estudios histdricos sobre 
Centro-America: querras contra los inqleses _y administra-
ci6n de don Matias de Gdlvez (Guatemala: La Academia
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for a million pesos for defense purposes, the first of a 
series of peremptory demands which were to cause much 
bitterness between the two men. Mayorga felt that the 
resources of New Spain were not at the time adequate to 
justify such a disbursement, and in a letter to J6se de 
Gcilvez explained why this was so. The Viceroy acknowl­
edged that Matias de Gcilvez had come to Guatemala with a 
royal order empowering him to call upon New Spain for what­
ever he needed to prosecute the war, but the treasuries of 
the viceroyalty had other responsibilities besides that of 
maintaining the defenses of Guatemala:
No one knows better than Your Excellency the many 
demands which this Exchequer must meet. When news of 
the war was received here, the Audiencia Gobierna sent 
1#500,000 pesos to Veracruz, Havana and New Orleans, 
as well as aid to other places, whose total has now 
reached the impressive sum of 1,450,000 pesos, 
including the 300,000 pesos for the ships to take to 
Manila.56
Guatemalteca de la Lengua, 1959), p. 17 [hereafter referred 
bo as Menos Franco, Estudios historicosl.
56Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, September 26, 1779, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 123, foil. 19v.
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Furthermore, the Viceroy speculated, ships might 
come to Veracruz any day with orders for him to send money 
to Spain. He had written to the Captain-General of Guate­
mala that it was impossible to send him one million pesos. 
He had dispatched 100,000 pesos to Guatemala by forced 
marches, but he had only been able to gather that sum by 
borrowing it from the Factor of the Renta de Tabacos in 
Oaxaca. More money would follow as soon as it was avail­
able. Actually, withou four days he was somehow able to 
find the balance of the million pesos and sent it after 
the first shipment.57
57Same to same, September 30, 1779/ ibid.,
No. 127, fols. 65-65V. The manufacture and sale of tobacco 
was the most profitable of all the crown monopolies in New 
Spain. It had been effectively organized during the visi­
tation of Jos6 de Gcilvez, and its entire net income was 
reserved for the crown. Therefore, the only legal way for 
Viceroy Mayorga to obtain money from the Renta de Tabacos 
was to borrow it with the expectation of repaying the sum 
from some other source before the next remission of money 
was made to Spain. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, 
PP. 275-276. Mayorga's concern about the drain on the 
resources of New Spain is understandable, for there was in 
1779 no precedent for the spending of so much money in so 
short a time. The entire cost to New Spain of the Spanish 
participation in the Seven Years' War had been 3/390,4-71 
pesos, as noted in chapter I, p. 4. Yet in less than a 
month after the declaration of war in 1779/ New Spain had 
spent 2,950,000 pesos, most of it sent outside the Kingdom.
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As it happened, Guatemala needed help shortly 
after Mayorga sent the money. At dawn on November 20th, a 
messenger from Matias de G&lvez entered Mexico City with 
the news that the fort of Omoa on the coast of Honduras5® 
had fallen to the British on October 16th. The invaders, 
attacking with twelve ships and an undetermined number of 
men, had overwhelmed the garrison. The Viceroy at once 
sent a courier to Veracruz with instructions to dispatch 
any ship available to Havana to carry an account of the 
incident to the Governor and the Commander of the Havana 
squadron. At the moment Mayorga was unable to do more. 
There were at his disposal in the harbor of Veracruz only 
two lightly-armed brigantines which were incapable of 
challenging the twelve ships reported by Matias de Gdlvez.
ssThe pueblo of Omoa was located on the bay of 
the same name about ten miles south of the present 
boundary between Guatemala and Honduras. The Castillo de 
San Fernando, which defended the bay, had been completed 
in 1775* Its walls were eighteen feet thick, and if 
properly garrisoned it should.have been able to withstand 
any siege by the limited British forces available for the 
purpose in 1779*
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He would, he assured Jos6 de G&lvez, continue to rush all 
possible aid to the Captain-General by land.59
The British had not planned the capture of Omoa. 
Three ships of the Jamaica squadron had been cruising in 
the Gulf of Honduras when they learned from fugitives of 
the Spanish descent upon the woodcutters of Belize. At 
the same time, the British learned that there were two 
laden merchantmen at anchor in the bay of Omoa. There 
were aboard the British ships only a dozen soldiers com­
manded by a Captain-Commandant, William Dalrymple, but 
150 woodcutters joined his small force as volunteers.
This body of men recaptured the logwood settlements and 
then passed on to Omoa, where they achieved a complete 
surprise and took 265 Spanish prisoners in a bloodless 
assault. The amount of booty was considerable, but its 
exact value could not be determined, for Dalrymple seized 
everything and divided it among his soldiers, depriving 
the seamen and the volunteers of their shares. General 
Dalling, the Governor of Jamaica, urged Dalrymple to blow
S9Mayorga to Jos£ de G&lvez, November 20, 1779/ 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, NO. I69, fols. 40-4lv.
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up the fortifications of Omoa and to evacuate the place, 
for it was unhealthful. Dalrymple, however, garrisoned 
the fort and sailed away, leaving the men in the fort to 
await counter-attack from Matias de G&lvez while they were 
reduced by fever and disease.60
As Mayorga reported to Spain, the small garrison 
was unable to advance into the interior, and they seemed 
to have no plan of campaign (parece no saben donde ir). 
Again he wrote to Cuba to ask that the Havana squadron 
attack the fort, for the British warships had departed. 
Meanwhile, he would continue to aid Matias de Galvez as 
he could.61 Havana sent no help to Captain-General G&lvez, 
but this proved to be unnecessary. When he moved against 
the fort of Omoa in November with a motley force of 500 
Negroes, Indians, and drafted criminals62 and made
6°Dalrymple was a very young officer who had no 
previous service in the tropics, and only Dalling's oppo­
sition prevented him from attempting to advance from Omoa 
across Guatemala toward the Pacific Ocean. Portescue, 
History of the British Army. Vol. 3# P« 308; Mackesy, The 
War for AiuSr xc 3. / P. 275.
slMayorga to Jos€ de G&lvez, November 27» 1779/ 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 172, fols. 46-48v.
62Ferncindez Duro, Armada. Voir 7/ P* 283*
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preparations for a siege, the British spiked the guns of 
the fort and embarked in small boats during the night.
They took refuge on Roatan, one of the Bay Islands 100 
miles northeast of Omoa, and Mayorga sent repeated appeals 
to Havana to attack the island. It was ill-defended, and 
there the British had stored all the plunder seized at 
Omoa.63 However, Juan Bautista Bonet, the Commandant of 
the Havana squadron, did not attack, nor did he answer the 
Viceroy's letters.
The expulsion of the British from Omoa ended the 
immediate threat to the Spanish Mainland, and on Novem­
ber 20th, Mexico City learned that Bernardo de G&lvez had 
taken the British posts on the Mississippi River.64 By 
the same post the Viceroy was directed to increase the
63Mayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, December 27/ 1779/ 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 125, No. 200, fols. 20-21v. Although a 
report to the British Colonial Office disparingly reported 
Matias de Galvez' army to be a "party-colored rabble," it 
was more than adequate for the recapture of Omoa. Only 
seventy-four men of the garrison, mostly Negroes, were 
physically fit for duty when Galvez appeared. Mackesy,
The War for America. p. 335-
64Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, November 20, 1779,
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 163, fols. 36V-3 7.
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situado of Louisiana, which had been fixed at 300,000 
pesos on August 30, 1779, by 144,677 pesos, a sum which 
was its Governor’s estimate of money needed to move 
against Mobile.65 Bernardo de Galvez spent the remainder 
of the year preparing for this expedition and in argument 
with the Captain-General of Cuba, who believed that 
Pensacola, not Mobile, should be the next objective.66
On the west coast of New Spain and in the Pacific 
Ocean there had been no word of British activity. On 
November 21st the annual ship from Manila made port at 
Acapulco after a long and arduous voyage begun on May 31st* 
She had sighted no sail, and the entire trip had been 
without incident.67 The safe arrival of the Manila ship,
65Same to same, .ibid., No. 164, fols. 37~37v -
66Caughey, Galvez. pp. 173-174.
67Mayorga to Josd de G&lvez, November 25, 1779> 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 171, fols. 45v-46v. The Comman­
dant of the ship, Jos£ de Ampar^n, complained that the 
length of this voyage was due in part to his having to 
call at Monterey, California, in obedience to a royal 
opder issued in 1773* Although a Commandant could'be 
fined 4,000 pesos for not calling at Monterey, most pre­
ferred to risk the fine rather than to suffer the delay. 
Schurz, Manila Galleon, pp. 245-246.
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whose cargo was valued at 477/758 pesos,68 was the last 
noteworthy event of 1779*
The fortuitous coincidence of the death of 
Bucareli, the designation of Mayorga as Viceroy, and the 
outbreak of war had brought about an abrupt transition of 
power and an unprecedented burden of responsibility for 
the new Viceroy, who began to ask Spain for a replacement 
almost as soon as he had assumed power.69
British weakness in 1779 made a direct threat to 
New Spain impossible, and it became obvious within a few 
months that the role of the Viceroyalty was to be the 
support of the armed forces of Spain and France at any 
cost to its own economy. A recapitulation of the money 
and goods dispatched to Louisiana, Havana, and other
68Mayorga to Jos£ de Galvez, December 27/ 1779/ 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 125/ No. 191/ fol. 15v. Schurz has written 
that it is difficult to determine accurately the value of 
the goods shipped from Manila to Mexico. The merchants of 
the islands wished the Spanish merchants to remain in 
ignorance of the true value of Philippine commerce, and 
the cargo manifests were frequently falsified. Schurz, 
Manila Galleon, p. 45-
69Rivera Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico,
Vol. 1, p. 440.
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points by November 20, 1179, earned Mayorga a letter of 
commendation from Josd de Galvez;70 but the brief moment 
of good feeling between Madrid and Mexico City was not to 
last. The demands of the ports dependent upon New Spain 
soon led to bitter and protracted controversies whose 
origin will be traced in the next chapter.
7°Jbsd de Gllvez to Mayorga, May 3/ 1780, AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 119, expediente 27, fol. 31*
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C H A P T E R  I I I
THE WAR GATHERS MOMENTUM
At the beginning of 1780 'there "was no apparent 
threat to New Spain; in consequence, there seemed to be 
no need for heavy naval units to guard the coasts. 
Nevertheless, for the protection of the harbor of Vera­
cruz, Mayorga ordered a constant patrol of small boats, 
a practice which Julian de Arriga, then Minister of the 
Indies, had recommended to Viceroy Cruillas in I7 6 5 . 1 
When Job6 de Geilvez wrote the Viceroy that in case of 
need he should call on the French West Indies for 
assistance, Mayorga responded that he would do so if it
^Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, January 8, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expedients 5/ fols. 7“7V * Arriaga 
had once refused Cruillas ' request for a frigate to be 
stationed permanently at Veracruz and had advised him to 
maintain an offshore patrol which could warn shore 
defenses of the approach of suspicious craft. Chapter I, 
p. 11.
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were necessary, but that he was unaware of any English 
preparations for a descent upon New Spain.2
In January 1780, the Minister of the Indies sent 
to Mexico City a detailed account of the progress of the 
war in Europe. He stated in a preliminary paragraph that 
the King wished his subjects overseas to be fully informed 
of operations in Europe in order that they should not be 
misled by false or exaggerated news that had been pub­
lished in the London journals. Having, in effect, 
attempted to minimize the impact of bad news to come, 
G&lvez proceeded to his narrative. Gibraltar had been 
blockaded by sea and land since Spain's entrance into the 
war, and its garrison had been reduced to near starvation. 
A combined French and Spanish fleet had threatened England 
with invasion and had delayed the relief of the hard- 
pressed fortress. Yet Gdlvez admitted that on January 16, 
1780, a fleet commanded by Admiral George Rodney had 
decisively defeated a smaller Spanish force under Admiral
2Same to same, January 3 , 1780, ibid., expediente 
40, fol. 52. The Viceroy's answer is given in Mayorga to 
Jos4 de Geilvez, May 10, 1780, AGNM, CV, Vol. 126, No. 462, 
fols. l88-l83v.
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Juan de Langara and had brought food and reinforcements 
to Gibraltar. Geilvez* explained at length that inclement 
weather had dispersed Langara's command and caused it to 
be inferior in strength to the enemy at the time of bat­
tle. He praised the stubborn valor displayed by the 
Spaniards in the unequal contest, but the fact remained 
that Gibraltar had been relieved and that it was for the 
time being secure. The Minister expressed confidence 
that any future attempt to break the blockade would be 
frustrated.
Abruptly changing the topic, Geilvez promised that 
the spring campaign of 1780 would bring decisive actions 
that would end the war and establish a peace advantageous 
to Spain and France. In a final paragraph he exhorted 
Mayorga to animate the spirits of the soldiers and civ­
ilians in New Spain by "sowing the seeds of vigor, of 
patriotism and of glory."3
3Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, January 27, 1780, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 6 5, fols. 93”97v * Geilvez 
was less than candid in his relation of the attempted 
invasion of England^ In July, 1779, a force of 31,000 
troops had been assembled in and around LeHavre and 
St. Malo to be transported to England by a combined force
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His reference to the spring campaign was the 
first notice to New Spain that the relative inactivity 
that had prevailed since the recovery of Omoa in the pre­
vious November was not to last. A convoy from Ccidiz had 
been expected to sail for America in November or December, 
1779 1 it had been delayed. In January Jos6 de G&lvez
assured the Viceroy that he need have no fear for the 
safety of the ships. There had been urgent reasons for 
the postpcnemen t of the sailing date, reasons which would 
shortly be revealed. 4
of more than one hundred French and Spanish ships. Poor 
staff work, bad weather and disease forced the allies to 
return to France in September after cruising aimlessly in 
the English Channel without aver having succeeded in 
landing troops or in engaging the English naval forces. 
Disease struck with such effect that the fleet was unable 
to remain at sea. Total casualties are unknown, but the 
French alone disembarked more than 12,000 sick at Brest, 
and "so many dead had been cast into the sea during the 
last days of the cruise that it was a month before the 
people of Cornwall and Devon would eat fish again."
A. Temple Patterson. The Other Armada (Manchester: 
Manchester-.University Press, i960) , pp.. 210-212
4Jos6 de Gdlvez to Mayorga, January 13, i780, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 3 6, fol. 41.
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On February 17th the Minister of the Indies at 
last sent a general account of the coming operations.
America will be the principal theatre of war in 
the next campaign which according to all appearances 
will be more decisive than the last one. In view of 
the general preparations of both powers, especially 
of England, the King has resolved that there should 
go to Havana in the great convoy which will leave 
c£diz in March warships and troops sufficient to form 
a strong squadron in those seas, and a body of reserves 
capable of supporting the defense of our Dominions, and 
an invasion of those of the enemy which can be invaded 
with possibility of success.
France is sending to her islands, and they are 
already sailing for them, seventeen ships of the line 
commanded by Count deGuichen, which happily united, 
as is hoped> with the other French naval forces which 
France has in those waters, will form at Martinique a 
squadron of twenty-nine ships to work vigorously 
against the British possessions. In a convoy bound 
for the same destination 4,000 regulars are going to 
join various regiments in the French islands, and will 
form an army which will accompany the operations of 
the squadron.
England has ordered ten battalions to embark at 
Plymouth under escort of five ships, which will go 
directly to Jamaica where the Court of London plans 
to assemble by March 8,000 regulars and eighteen 
ships of the line and eleven frigates, with the object 
of assuring the defense of that island and of threat­
ening our possessions. Also, the enemy plans to send
2.000 men to Carolina and Georgia to supplement the
6.000 who are already there, the 8,000 in New York 
and the 1,800 in Canada.
Granting this plan of operation, and that on our 
part the King wishes that he proceed with all the
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determination and with the vigor which the defense of 
our precious Dominions and the national glory inspires, 
all Commanders of those Kingdoms and Provinces must 
give the most active forethought to being prepared 
against an enemy offense without neglecting any chances 
of taking the offensive against him which the situation 
may offer.
But the two principal objectives to which the force 
of our arms must be directed are the conquest and 
retention of Florida and the total expulsion of the 
English from the coasts of Campeche and Honduras. To 
both these en^s Your Excellency must render aid by 
sending in agreement with the Governor of Havana and 
the President of Guatemala the assistance which may be 
felt necessary for their execution. If Pensacola has 
already been taken, as some London gazettes have pub­
lished, it is necessary to station adequate garrisons 
there, because the enemy will make an extreme effort 
to recover it. If this is not sc, its conquest must 
be begun at once in compliance with the Royal Order of 
August 30. The conquest of Florida having been accom­
plished, or at the same time if possible, the recovery 
of the fortress of Omoa will be dealt with, for it is 
quite probable that it may have fallen into the hands 
of the English, and the same forces will serve after­
wards to dislodge them from the ports which they occupy 
on those coasts .
An offer which France has made, and which His 
Majesty has accepted, can assist this project greatly 
and aid in the protection of those Dominions in gen­
eral: it is to station 2 ,0 0 0 men and four warships
at El Guarico [Cap Francois] at the orders of our 
President of Santo Domingo, who will confer with the 
Governor and the Commandant of Marine at Havana about 
the useful employment of these forces. With them, the 
body of troops which will go to the island and the 
powerful squadron which will unite in its port will be 
able to deploy powerful assistance wherever the neces­
sity of defense should demand, or the opportunity of 
attack offer.
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Your Excellency on your part will assist with 
activity and vigor the accomplishment of the fore­
mentioned projects in the knowledge that the King will 
worthily reward those who distinguish themselves by 
their zeal and will not pardon carelessness or delays 
in matters so much to the interest of national advan­
tage and to the splendor of the Spanish arms and 
flag. 5
A week later there followed a more detailed account 
of the support which New Spain was to give to the forces 
due to come to the Indies. Twelve ships of the line were 
to sail from Cadiz in March bearing 8,000 troops to Havana 
as well as a regiment sent to reinforce the garrisons of 
Puerto Rico. Sailing under the protection of the warships 
would be a large convoy of merchantmen including azoques. 
ships carrying mercury, which was necessary for the 
process then in use in refining silver.
Geilvez ordered that the accumulation of foodstuffs 
for the subsistence of the troops and the crewmen of the 
fleet begin at once at Veracruz, and that preparation be 
made simultaneously to draw funds from all available
sJos£ de Geilvez to Mayorga, February 17, 1780, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 118, fols. 229“230v. The 
threat expressed in the last paragraph is an early example 
of the abuse which Mayorga suffered from the Minister of 
the Indies.
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sources to meet the expanses of the fleet and army. Even 
the funds allocated for the construction of ships at 
Havana, hitherto regarded as sacrosanct, were to be sacri­
ficed to the emergency. 6 If the money available to the 
treasuries should be insufficient, Mayorga was to seek 
loans from private individuals, local cabildos and religi­
ous organizations. The Viceroy was instructed to make 
prospective lenders understand that the maintenance of 
the army and ships would be costly, but since the rein­
forcements were destined for the common defense of all 
the Spanish colonies, all subjects should be willing to 
contribute. 7
G&lvez did not predict the date on which the con­
voy would arrive in the West Indies nor the exact nature, 
scope or duration of operations in America, but his dis­
patch made it clear that he expected the support of so 
many men and vessels to strain the financial resources of 
the viceroyalty. Even if New Spain succeeded in promptly
6 See Chapter I, p . 19 •
7Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, February 24, I78O, 
AGNM, HC, Vol. 118, expediente 126, fols. 240-240v.
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producing all the money and food asked of it, supply was 
only one aspect of the logistical problem involved. 
Transportation was the other. As far as maritime traffic 
between New Spain and the West Indies was concerned, the
Viceroy was almost completely dependent upon the Comman*-
{dant of Marine at Havana, for there was no permanent 
squadron of warships or of chartered merchantmen at Vera^ 
cruz which could be used in the royal service. He was 
further limited in the shipment of cargoes from New Spain 
by orders from Spain which restricted the type of vessel 
which he was empowered to charter or commandeer. The out­
break of war in the summer of 1779 an<3 the consequent need 
for large-scale movements of men and cargo upon short 
notice caused a shipping shortage whose effects were felt 
immediately. The arrival of twelve warships and more 
than 8 ,0 0 0 men whose subsistence depended upon a service 
of supply from New Spain could only aggravate a situation 
which was already critical.
On September 1, 1779/ Jos6 de G&lvez had reminded 
the Viceroy that long-standing and repeated royal orders 
forbade the shipment of crown funds from Veracruz in other 
vessels than warships of the Real Armada, and he had sent
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a similar warning to Juan Bautista Bonet, Commandant of 
Marine at Havana, by the same post.8 Yet from the very 
beginning it had been impossible for royal officials in 
New Spain to comply with the orders to which Geilvez had 
referred, because royal ships were seldom at their dis­
posal when they were needed. News of the declaration of 
war had reached Mexico City on August 13th, and the 
Audiencia Gobierna. ruling.New Spain in the absence of a 
viceroy, wished to send emergency aid of food, gunpowder, 
and 500,000 pesos to Cuba with all possible speed.9 On 
August 19th the Administrador de la Real Hacienda,
Pedro Antonio de Cosio, found that there were no ships of 
the Reel Armada at Veracruz, and he attempted to charter 
three merchant ships then in port to carry the cargoes to 
Havana. Two of the ships were registros from CAdiz, and 
the third had come from La Guaira, the port of Caracas.
The masters of the ships signed contracts providing for 
monthly rentals of their ships ranging from 1,250 to 1,500
8Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, September 1, 1779/ 
AGNI-l, RC, Vol. 117, expediente 139/ fol. 270.
9See pp. 58-59*
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pesos, and they expressed willingness to sail as soon as 
their freight could be delivered to Veracruz and loaded.
At that point the officers and crewmen of the three 
ships, apparently acting in concert, refused to sail, 
alleging that they feared being caught in the cordonazo. 
the Spanish seamen's term for the equinoctial storms pre­
vailing around St. Francis' Day, October 4th. Viceroy 
Mayorga took office on August 23rd, and when he learned 
of the delay, he consulted his Fiscal. 10 who advised him 
that the need to aid Cuba took precedence over extraordi­
nary methods or expenses involved in making delivery.
The master of one of the ships, the San Christoval. then 
proposed that the Real Hacienda guarantee him the full 
value of his ship, 45,000 pesos, in the event of her loss 
by storm or enemy action. Ke declared that if he were 
insured against loss, he could persuade his crew to sail.
10Mayorga's action in seeking advice from this 
official was undoubtedly taken to protect himself against 
any future challenge of the legality of his procedures. 
The Fiscal has been defined as a "sort of royal watchdog 
who defended the king's interests wherever they might 
appear." Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, p. 120n.
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The Viceroy had no choice but to agree to the master's 
terms, and by September 26 the San Christoval was loaded 
and ready to sail, while negotiations proceeded with the 
other two shipmasters. Already six weeks had passed since 
the Audiencia Gobierna had- decided to rush aid to Havana. 1,1
I
While Mayorga discussed the terms of the charters 
with the shipmasters, he grew increasingly concerned about 
the absence of news from Spain. On October 2nd, he com­
plained to Jos6 de Geilvez that the mail which should have 
left L,a Coruna on the first of July had not yet reached 
Mexico, and that lacking any notice of the progress of 
the war, he was at a loss as to how to proceed. Under the 
circumstances he felt that it was best to send a small 
craft to Havana to seek information and to ask the Comman­
dant of Marine to order several ships to Veracruz. Even 
if Havana had no mail or cargo to deliver to Mexico, the
aiMayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, September 26, 1779/ 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 119, fols. 53-5 6. The minister 
approved the chartering of the ships, and stated in his 
reply that when the supplying of an important port was 
concerned, expense and the letter of the law could not be 
primary considerations. Josd to G&lvez to Mayorga,
January 10, 1780, AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 26, 
fol. 3 5.
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ships could sail to Veracruz in ballast and return loaded 
with the materiel which the Viceroy was finding difficulty 
in transporting to the island. 12
It was not until mid-November that the emergency 
remission of supplies from New Spain to Cuba was completed. 
The San Christoval had cleared port before the expected bad 
weather, but the other two vessels had to remain at Vera­
cruz while nortes slowed their loading and prevented their 
sailing. Three other merchant ships entered the harbor 
during October, and they were promptly chartered and 
insured by the Real Hacienda. Meanwhile, in response to 
the urgent orders of the Viceroy, freight was moving to 
Veracruz faster than it could be loaded. Since there were 
now five bottoms available, the Viceroy determined to fill 
them to capacity, so that the final amount of money and 
provisions exceeded the original quantities ordered by 
the Audiencia Gobierna.
The money from Havana was distributed among the 
most seaworthy vessels, and on November 15th the five
12Mayorga to Jos4 de Geilvez, October 2, AGNM, CV, 
Vol. 123, No. 130, fols. 67-67V.
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ships sailed, carrying 1,100,000 pesos, flour, dried 
vegetables, copper, and lead. Before they sailed, the 
Viceroy received a: reply to the appeal for ships which he 
had made to the Commandant of Marine. Juan Bautista Bonet 
promised to send on ship every twenty-five days to pick 
up whatever cargo might be ready for shipment to Cuba. 
Mayorga correctly foresaw that such a limited and infre­
quent freight service would be inadequate, and he observed 
to Josd de Gdlvez that those commanding in Cuba seemed 
strangely indifferent to the money and food which they 
claimed to need so badly, else they would have allotted 
more cargo space to bring them. The Viceroy added, with 
considerable understatement, that to supply Havana ’has 
caused much labor and harassment" (han costado algunas 
fatigas y desuelos).13
New Spain could serve the needs of the Province 
of Louisiana more expeditiously than those of Cuba.
13Mayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, November 20, 1779# 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 158, fols. 27-31V. The char­
tering of the additional ships was approved by the King. 
Josd de Geilvez to Mayorga, May 3» 1780, AGNM, RC,
Vol. 119# expediente 2 7} fol. 31-
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Situados paid by New Spain to Louisiana reached New Orleans 
indirectly, for they were paid first to Havana, but Gov­
ernor Bernardo de Gdlvez did not have to depend upon Cuba 
for food. Since the acquisition of the Province by Spain 
it had been supplied from Veracruz. However, in the autumn 
of 1779 only one vessel, privately-owned, regularly sailed 
between New Orleans and New Spain. Governor Geilvez hoped 
soon to be able to assign an additional ship to this traf­
fic, but for the time being the brigantine Santa Rosa was 
the only link between the ports of New Orleans and Vera­
cruz. Recognizing that, besides its normal requirements, 
Louisiana must stockpile material of all kinds for the 
coming expedition against West Florida, the Viceroy 
directed the port officials of Veracruz to expedite the 
servicing of the Santa Rosa or of any other vessel from 
New Orleans. Ships from the Province were to be loaded 
without delay, and it was not necessary to consult the 
capital before doing so. The values of the cargoes were 
to be deducted from the sum of the annual situado. 14
i4Mayorga to Jbsd de Gdlvez, November 20, 1779» 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 166, fols. 3&-38v. These orders
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On January 10, 1780, two letters from Madrid 
commented on the difficulties of transport between Mexico 
and Cuba. The first stated that the King realized the 
necessity for chartering merchant ships when no crown 
ships were at hand, and continued with the ambiguous 
statement that:
It has pleased the King to resolve that during the 
war shipments of money and foodstuffs should not be 
entrusted to merchant ships, unless there should be 
an urgent reason, and then it is necessary to follow 
the Law of Necessity.15
The second letter of the same date, January 10, 
I78O, approved Mayorga's request to Havana for more ships, 
and stated that the Havana Commandant of Marine had been 
ordered to send ships to Veracruz at more frequent
were approved by Josd de G&lvez; Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga, 
April 26, 1780, ibid., Vol. 118, expediente 172, fols. 317” 
317v.
15Jos6 de Geilvez to Mayorga, January 10, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 24, fols. 31”31v.
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intervals than the monthly mail boats. No vessel was to 
return empty from Veracruz.16
The quarrel about shipping between the Viceroy 
and the officials of Havana continued to reverberate long 
after the immediate emergency of autumn, 1779/ passed.
While Mayorga had been attempting to find ships to move 
cargo to Cuba, the Intendant of the Army in Havana,
Juan Ignazio Utriza, had addressed complaints to Madrid 
and had alleged that the island could not long maintain 
its armed forces nor even survive unless New Spain 
delivered money and food. Through Josd de G&lvez the 
king tried to soothe both parties. The Intendant of the 
Army in Havana was told that the demands upon New Spain 
were great, because the Viceroyalty was the sole source 
of money for all Spanish North America, and that Havana 
should avoid making excessive requests and should practice 
economy. On the other hand, the Viceroy was urged to 
realize that Havana was the most important military post
16Same to same, ibid., expediente 2 5 / fol. 33*
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in America and that its needs must he given preferential 
treatment.17
On the Pacific coast of New Spain, as on the 
Atlantic coast, the initial demands of the war had created 
a shortage of shipping. To send two ships to the Philip­
pine Islands with emergency aid had required an extra­
ordinary effort.18 At Acapulco the annual ship was load­
ing and preparing to receive 4-00 soldiers being sent to 
reinforce the Manila garrison in compliance with a royal 
order of January 1780. The mixed body of infantry and 
dragoons had been drawn from all the veteran infantry 
regiments then in New Spain: those of Granada, Asturias,
the Crown, and from the Dragoons of Mexico and Spain. By 
March 1, I78O, the troops were enroute to Acapulco. All 
the men had received two months' pay, and their heavy 
Spanish army uniforms had been left in storage in Mexico 
City. The troops wore instead light, loose linen trou­
sers and jackets which Mayorga had ordered made for them
l7Same to same, January 2k, IjB/O, ibid., 
expediente 5k, fols. 6k-6kv.
18See pages Jiff.
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because of the heat of their new station. The infantry 
carried with them an issue of ninety-six sabres, not the 
normal weapons of foot soldiers, to be used to repel 
boarders if their ship were attacked.19 A ship had been 
transferred from San Bias to escort the Manila ship, for 
Jos£ de Gcilvez had warned that the English squadron of 
Admiral Edward Hughes might be in the Pacific Ocean on 
its way to attack the galleon, the Philippines, or the 
coasts of New Spain and Peru.20
The Viceroy could do no more than warn the 
officers commanding on the west coast of the possibility 
of an English attack. After two vessels had been sent to
19Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, March 4, 1780, AGNM, 
cv, Vol. 126, No. 420, fols. 144-145.
2°Josd de Gcilvez to Mayorga, February 18, 1780, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 119/ fols. 231“231v.
Sir Edward Hughes had sailed for the East Indies in 
March, 1779/ *>ut reports reaching Spain had greatly 
exaggerated the strength of his squadron. In the Indian 
Ocean Hughes was for two years out-maneuvered and out­
fought by Pierre Suffren de Saint Tropez, the greatest 
French seaman of the war. Hughes never reached the 
Pacific. William Laird Clowes, assisted by Sir Clements 
Markham, Captain A. T. Mahan, and H. W. Wilson, A History 
of the Royal Navy from the earliest Times to the Present. 
7 Vols. (Bostonc, Little, Brown and Company, l897~1903) / 
Vol. 3/ P* 543 [hereafter referred to as Clowes, Royal 
Navy] .
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the Philippines and another detached to escort the galleon, 
there were no more ships of the Real Armada in service on 
the Pacific coast. In San Bias there was only one unsea­
worthy ship, in such bad condition that she had been 
careened and was undergoing a major overhaul. Since he 
lacked means of carrying provisions to the missions and 
presidios of the Californias, the Viceroy commandeered a 
privately-owned Peruvian merchantman which had sailed 
from Guayaquil to Acapulco with a cargo of cacao. The 
Peruvian was ordered to San Bias in March 1780, and there 
she received the crew and the armament of the unservice­
able royal ship. 21
The problems of the west coast had been resolved 
for the time being, but an emergency had arisen in the 
Captaincy General of Guatemala. In February the English 
had landed, 500 strong, at the mouth of the San Juan 
River in Nicaragua in an attempt to establish a chain of 
forts across the Central American isthmus from ocean to 
ocean. The Spanish were not unduly alarmed, however, for,
21Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, March 3/ 1780, AGNM, 
CV, Vol. 126, No. 410, fols. 126v-128.
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due to grave errors in logistics, the invaders could not 
begin the ascent of the river toward their first objec­
tive, Lake Nicaragua, until April. Ignorance of the area, 
its terrain, the climate, and disease, worked to frustrate 
their effort. The little army required almost a month to 
struggle the hundred miles upstream to Fort San Juan, 
which guarded the eastern end of the lake. Even though 
the English and their Indian and zambo allies had not yet 
come into contact with any Spanish armed forces, their 
leaders realised that their force was already spent.22
Of more immediate importance to the Viceroy were 
the unceasing needs of the military and naval establish­
ments of Cuba, the expedition of Governor Barnardo de 
Gcilvez against Mobile and Pensacola, and the preparations
22"The expedition was, like so many of the oper­
ations of the time, conducted without regard to climate, 
the season of the year, the experience of the troops or 
the health of those concerned in its execution." Warner, 
Nelson, p. 2 7 . Lord George Germain, Secretary of State 
for the American Colonies, called the attempt "ill con­
cerned and worse executed, " and he blamed the greed of 
Governor Dalling of Jamaica for its failure. Mackesy,
The War for America, p. 337*
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for the arrival of the fleet from Spain with its thousands 
of mouths to feed. In March 1780 the Viceroy represented 
himself to Jos4 de Gcilvez as waiting in Mexico City alert 
for calls for aid from any quarter. From the beginning of 
the war, he wrote, he had kept constantly in mind the dis­
astrous outcome of the last war with the English, and the 
mistakes of the past would not be repeated if the resources 
of New Spain could prevent it, for "more than three quar­
ters of its revenues are now spent for assistance to for­
eign points, and within the Kingdom funds have been spent 
only for the most indispensable needs."23
The behavior of the Governor General of Cuba, tiie 
Intendant of the Army, and the Commandant of Marine con­
tinued to provoke the anger of Mayorga, and in the spring 
of 1780 Bernardo de Gcilvez, Jos£ de Gcilvez, and the King 
joined him in condemnation of the Havana officials.
The Governor of Louisiana ran afoul of the 
obstructionist attitude of Havana as soon as he began
23Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, March 5/ 1780, AGNM, 
CV, Vol. 126, No. 425/ fols. 151-151v. Another paragraph 
of this letter stated that the kingdom was peaceful and 
prosperous. Aside from the necessary disruption of
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preparations for his descent upon Mobile and Pensacola.
The forces with which he had taken the> English posts on 
the Mississippi River were inadequate for the siege of 
fortifications like those of Mobile and Pensacola, and aid 
from Havana. Yet help was slow in coming; and Navarro, 
the Governor, was reluctant to release soldiers to rein­
force Gcilvez. Twice he attempted to substitute alterna­
tive plans for the projected sea-borne attack on the two 
enemy forts. He first maintained that Pensacola would 
capitulate after a naval bombardment, and that no troops 
at all would be needed. Mobile would fall automatically 
without having been invested. The strenuous objection of 
the young Governor, who knew the power of the batteries 
which defended the bay of Pensacola, then caused Navarro 
to recommend that land forces alone besiege both Mobile 
and Pensacola. Both forts, he claimed, would surrender 
without bloodshed on either side. In any case Cubs could
overseas commerce, all activities of New Spain continued 
the normal routine (el mismo giro) .
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not spare the 7,000 men called for in Gcilvez' plan. Half 
that number would be enough. 24
Despairing of immediate aid from Cuba, Gcilvez 
sent a trusted subordinate to plead with the captain 
general; and on January 2, 1780, he sailed from New Orleans 
with 754 men traveling in twelve small vessels. On Febru­
ary 24th, after he had already entered Mobile Bay, 567 
soldiers from Havana joined him.25
While Gcilvez made ready to besiege Mobile, the 
Viceroy of New Spain wrote the Minister of the Indies to 
complain that he had been completely excluded from the 
planning of the expedition. The royal order of August 29/ 
1779/ which had given general directives for the project, 
had expressly provided that the commanders of the land and 
sea forces in Havana act in concert with the Governor of 
Louisiana and the Viceroy of New Spain, and that movements
24When Navarro made a report of his actions to 
Spain, the King received it “con much disqusto." and 
ordered that more reinforcements be sent from Havana at 
once. Caughev. Galvez, pp. 173-174.
25Ibid.. pp. 174-175.
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of ships and men be coordinated in order to avoid delays. 
Identical copies of the order had been sent to Havana and 
to Mexico City. Yet when Mayorga received the order on 
January 26, 1780, via Havana, it had been accompanied by a 
letter from Governor Navarro whose substance was directly 
contradictory to the orders from Spain.
Navarro asserted that it was inconvenient for him
. v
and his naval commander, Juan Bautista Bonet, to coordi­
nate their planning with Mayorga and Bernardo de Gcilvez, 
for the uncertainties of sea communication would delay 
the execution of the enterprise. The governor then 
informed the Viceroy of what had been planned in Havana 
and what Havana expected of New Spain. Bernardo de Gcilvez 
was to begin operations at Mobile, and he would be sup­
plied from Havana. The Viceroy was to send a fully equip­
ped veteran regiment to Veracruz at once; and there it 
must wait until ships came from Havana to transport it to 
Cuba, where it would be employed as the Governor and the 
Naval Commandant saw fit.
Then by a private vessel which arrived at Veracruz 
on February 21, Mayojtga received another letter from 
NOvarro, dated February 7th- H© was told that Gcilvez was
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enroute to Mobile, and that reinforcements were moving to 
him from Havana. Chartered ships would shortly call at 
Veracruz to load the regiment supposedly waiting in that 
port, together with the munitions and stores which were to 
accompany it. The Viceroy could not comply with this 
order, and he explained his refusal to Jos£ de Gcilvez.
I am in the firm belief that the many dispositions 
I have made since my entrance into this command to aid 
and support the needs of Havana show how clearly I 
have accorded them the special care they merit.
Equally I understand the importance of this under­
taking, and I' foresee the usefulness that must follow 
its success, and these considerations must add to my 
distress when I feel the impossibility of being able 
to station a completely equipped regiment in Veracruz 
as has been demanded of me.
The unhealthful climate of that port has already 
reduced the numbers of the only three veteran regi­
ments stationed in this Kingdom: by this misfortune
a considerable number of their officers and men have 
been, lost, as is the case with the Lancer Squadron of 
Veracruz, which is the primary defense of Veracruz 
and its adjacent coast.26
260nly compulsion could make men serve in a mili­
tary unit stationed at Veracruz. The unhealthfulness of 
the port was so feared by those who lived inland that 
Viceroy Bucareli had been forced to fill the vacancies in 
ranks at Veracruz with criminals, and he had suggested to 
judges that they keep the needs of Veracruz in mind when
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Furthermore, 400 men have just been taken in 
compliance with a Royal Order to reinforce the 
defenses of the Philippine Islands.
With all these reductions of strength, Your Excel­
lency will understand how few are the veteran troops 
remaining in the vast extent of this Kingdom, and if 
the aforementioned Regiment should be with-drawn, the 
Kingdom would be left scandalously defenseless, which 
is contrary to many repeated Royal Orders. In view 
of all this I find no more opportune solution to 
reconcile the needs of this Kingdom with those of 
Havana than to send to the latter port, if it is abso­
lutely necessary, the help cf 400 veteran troops, but 
only at a pre-determined date.
sentencing felons. Bobb, Bucareli, pp. 105-106. In 1782 
and 1783 Mayorga ordered the drafting of provincial mili­
tiamen to fill the ranks of the three veteran regiments 
stationed in New Spain. At once the Viceroy's secretary 
was deluged with letters from village priests, wives and 
employers begging for exemptions for their parishioners, 
husbands, and laborers. Nearly all the requests expressed 
fear that the drafted men would be transferred to Veracruz. 
Many militiamen fled their units and homes. The penalty 
for desertion from a provincial militia unit was increased 
in 1782. A captured deserter was forced to run a gauntlet 
of 200 men who wielded ramrods. After he recovered from 
this punishment, he was to serve six months in prison 
wearing grillos, heavy leg-irons which made walking almost 
impossible. Even this severe penalty did not reduce 
desertion. Carmen Velazques. El Estado de Guerra, pp. 128, 
129/ 134. Mayorga permanently stationed his veteran regi­
ments at Jalapa, Cordoba, and Orizaba, towns far enough 
from the coast to be regarded as healthful. Mayorga to 
Josd de Gcilvez, March 5/ 17^0/ AGNM, CV, Vol. 126, No. 425/ 
fols. 151-151v.
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Thus I have answered the Governor of Havana.27
Bernardo de Gcilvez had to attack Mobile with no troops 
from Mexico and v/ith only 567 men from Havana. The fort 
capitulated after a short siege, and the Spaniards took 
formal possession on March 14th. An English relief column 
of 1,000 men from Pensacola had almost reached Mobile When 
its commander heard of the surrender and retreated hur­
riedly. Gcilvez, Who had only 1,400 men at his disposal to 
hold Mobile, to guard his 300 English prisoners, and to 
confront the relief expedition, was forced to allow the 
enemy to fall back on Pensacola unmolested. He expressed 
his regret to his uncle, Jos£ de Gcilvez, as follows:
I cannot give expression to the sentiments with which 
all the individuals of my small army saw the retreat 
of General Campbell without coming to grips with us, 
nor could we reflect without sadness that if an expe­
dition from Havana had arrived to join us we could 
have succeeded over the English the same as Saratoga.28
27Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, March 3/ 17^0, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 126, No. 4l8, fols. 139-143.
28Quoted in Caughey, Gjilyez, p. 184.
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Ever since "he had assumed office Mayorga had 
complained to Spain concerning the excessive demands and 
the inactivity of those who commanded at Havana. Before 
and during the expedition against Mobile, Bernardo de 
Gcilvez had added his voice to that of the Viceroy, and 
their combined accusations provoked a strong letter from 
Jos4 de Gcilvez which promised changes for the better. On 
April 22, I78O, the Minister of the Indies wrote of his 
intentions to the Viceroy.
I have presented to the King Your Excellency's 
letter of last December 27/ no. 200, in which you give 
notice of having sent to the Governor and the Comman­
der of the Squadron of Havana proper warning that the 
English were holding on the island of Roat&n the 
stocks of dyewood, the ships and the other goods which 
they seized at Omoa the previous October 20, with the 
object that they at once undertake the not very dif­
ficult task of recapturing them. Your action has 
merited the Royal approval, although its effects have 
not corresponded to the well-conceived hopes expressed 
by Your Excellency, since until February 26, the date 
of the last news from Havana, the President of Guate­
mala had received no assistance from the squadron 
anchored at Havana nor had it even been reported that 
the expedition against Pensacola and Mobile had 
departed, due to the delays of the Commandant of 
Marine.
In view of this juncture, so extraordinary and so 
directly opposed to the most positive Royal Orders, 
his Majesty has taken opportune measures to liven the 
spirits of those who must execute those orders, so
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that in the future without being detained by apparent 
risks of the sea or of the enemy they will initiate 
with speed and vigor whatever military action they 
may judge worthy of the glory and honor of our arms. 29
If Bernardo de Gcilvez and Viceroy Mayorga had 
expected an immediate change of command in Cuba as a conse­
quence of this letter, they were disappointed. Bonet was 
not relieved of his command until after the great convoy 
arrived from Spain in October, because his replacement was 
to be Josef Solano, commander of the convoy. While Bonet 
held office he continued to hamper Bernardo de Gcilvez' 
efforts to follow the conquest of Mobile by a swift descent 
upon Pensacola before that post might be reinforced from 
Jamaica. On February 15th and again on March 7fch expedi­
tions sailed from Havana against Pensacola only to turn 
back without having accomplished anything. On the first 
occasion the captains were deterred by news that Pensa­
cola had received strong reinforcements from Jamaica. On 
the second approach, they decided that the entrance to the
29Jos£ de Gcilvez to Mayorga, April 22, I7S0 , AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 118, expediente 166, fols. 310-.311-
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bay. was impassable..because. of.-shaal ..water.. Both 
suppositions were false.
In April, 1780, Bernardo de G&lvez made another 
attempt to persuade Havana that the forces available at 
that time were capable of taking Pensacola, but he failed, 
for the authorities had decided to await the reinforcements 
to be brought to America by the convoy. 30 In May Gcilvez 
had no choice but to return his troops to Havana and New 
Orleans and to leave a garrison at Mobile.
The English prisoners taken during Galvezs cam­
paign were sent to Veracruz, and in May Jos£ de Gcilvez 
requested a complete list of these prisoners and their 
ranks, for at the time Madrid and London were in the 
process of arranging an exchange. 31 But the Viceroy had
3°Caughey, Galvez, pp. I88-I8 9 .
3 lJos£ de .Gcilvez to Mayorga, May 9/ 17^0/ RC»
Vol. 119, expediente 52, fol. 6 l .  The two powers reached 
agreement on a man-for-man exchange in July, 1781. This 
was the only formal exchange agreement made during the war, 
but exchanges were in fact continually made. The English 
made special efforts to recover their men, for the Span­
iards "had deplorable habits both as gaolers and goaled." 
Olive Anderson, "The Establishment of British Supremacy at 
Sea and the Exchange of Prisoners of War, l68Q -178^." The 
English Historical Review. No. CCXIV (January, i960),
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already rid New Spain of the forty officers and three 
hundred thirty enlisted men whom Bernardo de Gcilvez had 
sent to his kingdom. Mayorga stated that he understood 
why the Governor of Louisiana had promptly removed the 
prisoners from West Florida, for Mobile, immediately after 
its capture, had been threatened by the advance of an 
enemy force from Pensacola, and to detach men to guard 
the prisoners would have further weakened Galvez' already 
small army.
PP* 79/ 88. Yet conditions in all Spanish prisons could 
not have been uniformly bad. On January 4, 1781,
John Laforey, Commissioner of the Navy at the Leeward 
Islands wrote to Admiral George Rodney:
"The Star is to take from hence about 60 Spanish prisoners 
which General Burt and myself think, will be a proper com­
pliment to the Spanish Governor of Porto Rico for his 
Humanity and Good Treatment to the crew of the Deal Castle 
which Lieutenant Gerard has reported to us, and as these 
prisoners are very sensible of our reciprocal Conduct 
towards them here it may be the means of establishing a 
good intercourse in our future exchanges."
Lord George Rodney, Letter-Books and Order-Book of George. 
Lord Rodney, Admiral of the White Squadron [hereafter refe 
referred to as Rodney, Letter-Books], 2 Volumes. (New 
York: The New York Historical Society, 1932-1933)/ Vol. T,
pp. 132-133.
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Yet there were, according to the Viceroy, good 
reasons for not allowing the prisoners to remain in New 
Spain. Veteran troops would be needed to guard them, men 
who might be needed to repel an English attack. The only 
secure place of confinement was the fort of San Juan de 
Ultia, where they would be able to learn the state of the 
Spanish defenses. Under pretext of a parley or an exchange 
of prisoners English warships would enter the port and 
study its facilities. At the advice of Inspector General 
Pascual de Cisneros32 and the vote of the Real Acuerdo, 
the Viceroy decided to send the English to Havana. Pri­
vate vessels found at Veracruz were commandeered for the 
purpose, and on August 26 the prisoners left Veracruz for 
Cuba. 33
32Pascual de Cisneros was Inspector General of 
the army of New Spain, in charge of the raising, instruc­
tion, discipline, and administration of all troops in the 
kingdom. Such inspectors were regularly assigned to units 
of the Spanish army, and their authority had definite geo­
graphical limits. The title "Inspector General" indicated 
a position, not a military rank. Cisneros had come to New 
Spain during the administration of Bucareli with the rank 
of Mariscal de Campo. McAlister, "Reorganization of the 
Army of New Spain," p. 9n? Bobb, Bucareli, p. $1.
33The Viceroy wrote that each enlisted man receive 
two reales and each officer one peso, per day for their
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The expedition against Pensacola remained the 
principal concern of the Viceroy after the capture of 
Mobile. The Manila galleon and its escorting vessel 
sailed from Acapulco on March 15th, bearing 6l8 ,88l 
pesos; 34 and Guatemala was assured of continued aid from 
New Spain; 35 but the volume of correspondence concerned 
with the flow of aid to Havana and Louisiana is indica­
tive of official preoccupation with affairs in that area. 
Relations between the Viceroy and Havana continued bad, 
and Mayorga's gratuitous comments on the conduct of the 
war in the West Indies and in West Florida make it obvious 
that he held Havana in general and Juan Bautista Bonet in 
particular personally responsible for every mishap.
subsistence while in Veracruz, and that they were treated 
with the greatest urbanidad _y atencidn. Mayorga to Jos6 
de Gcilvez, August 27, 17^0, AGNM, CV, Vol. 127, No. 69 ,̂ 
fols. 72-73v. The transfer of the prisoners to Havana 
was approved, in Jos£ de Gcilvez to Mayorga, February 17, 
1781, AGNM, RC, Vol. 12C, expediente 3 8 , vol. 7 1 .
34Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, May 26, 1780, AGNM, 
CV, Vol. 126, No. 477, fols. 206-207.
3SMayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, February 7, 1780, 
ibid., No. 327, fols. 35v-36.
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In February 1780 the Viceroy went back six months 
in tipie to call to the attention of Jos6 de Gcilvez a royal 
order of August 29, 1779, and to file a belated complaint 
against Havana's extravagant demands for gunpowder. At 
thac time New Spain had been directed to send 2,000 
quintales (100 tons) to Havana, part of which was to be 
sent to Cartagena de Indias. 36 Mayorga wanted to know 
what had happened to "the immense [but unspecified] 
quantities" which had been sent. New Spain had only been 
able to send such an unprecedented quantity at the cost of 
reducing the magazines at Veracruz to a dangerously low 
level; and the new fort at Perote, which guarded the road 
to Mexico City, now had only 300 of the 1,500 quintales 
which regulations prescribed. A new powder factory was 
under construction, and it would supplement the old fac­
tory at Chapultepec, 37 but the combined production of the 
two establishments would not be sufficient to satisfy
36See Chapter II, p. 6 9.
37See Chapter II, p. 76ff.
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Havana if that port continued to ask for powder at the 
present rate. 38
After the two ineffectual sallies hy the Havana 
squadron against Pensacola in February and March of 1780, 
the Viceroy returned to the attack. In a letter of Jos6 
de Gcilvez concerning the shipment of food to New Orleans 
he made the following comments
By the latest ship which has come from that Province 
[Louisiana] its Intendant, don Martin Navarro, 
advises me that the squadron under the command of 
Lieutenant General Juan Bautista Bonet, although it 
had arrived close to Pensacola, gave little aid or 
satisfaction to the Governor of that Province don 
Bernardo de Gcilvez. In truth it seems to me that this 
attempt upon Pensacola is causing him a great deal of 
trouble,and I believe thht if the squadron had moved 
from Havana without delay, success would have already 
followed with the same felicity which accompanied that 
General's capture of Mobile. 39
By the same post the Viceroy sent to Bonet a copy 
of the royal order requiring that all monies be shipped in
38Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, February 24, I78O, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 126, No. 341, fols. 46v-4 7 v .
39Same to same, May 20, I78O, Ibid.. No. 515/ 
fols. 256-257v.
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vessels of the Real Armada, and stressed the need to 
comply with it . 40 Only six days later, with tireless 
redundancy, he repeated to Jos6 de Gcilvez the whole account 
of having been forced to charter merchant ships to supply 
Havana, while regretting the necessity of doing so . 41
Whether or not Mayorga was justified in assigning 
the blame to Bonet, Gcilvez 1 offensive in West Florida was 
halted until the arrival of the convoy, and these rein­
forcements from Spain also affected the course of British 
sea action in the West Indies. Admiral George Rodney 
spent the spring fighting a series of indecisive actions 
with the French Admiral de Guichen in the Leeward Islands. 
Near the end of May he learned that twelve Spanish ships 
of the line and numerous lesser vessels had sailed from 
C&diz a month earlier. To allow the French and Spanish 
fleets to join forces would be to lose command of the sea 
and to place his eighteen ships in opposition to an 
Allied fleet of twenty-seven. Rodney attempted
4°Same to same, May 26, 1780, ibid.. No. 483, 
fols. 213~213v.
41Same to same, June 1, I78O, ibid., No. 559, 
fols. 291-2 9 3.
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simultaneously to hold de Guichen in port at Martinique 
and to intercept the Spaniards. He failed in both 
instances. Solano sighted the English fleet without being 
seen, passed to the north, and evaded the squadron. Mean­
while, de Guichen's ships sailed unmolested from Martinique 
to join Solano at the French island of Guadeloupe on 
June 9th. The British stopped all their convoys, and 
Rodney prepared to meet an enemy descent upon the British- 
held islands. 42
42Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 332-333* 
Rodney's failure to bring the enemy to a decisive battle 
caused protests from the planters, and all the British 
West Indies feared invasion. Indecisive operations of the 
type described above had made the islands a graveyard of 
military and naval reputations. Lord Charles Cornwallis, 
no stranger to misfortune, expressed, in 1796, the general 
distaste for service in the West Indies in a letter to 
Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, in terms which 
might have been used by officers in previous wars:
"I never did, my Lord, express a desire to go to the Lee­
ward Islands, considering from the number of them and 
their jarring interests, that it was a station where an 
officer, instead of gaining credit, was likely to lose any 
little reputation he might have acquired. I hardly know 
of an instance where it has happened otherwise except in 
the case of Lord Rodney and that only the last time he was 
there; but he was a particularly "fortunate man."
Quoted in H. W. Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748, 
3 Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920),
Vol. Ill, p. 77*
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Only in Nicaragua was there any offensive activity 
by the enemy in the spring and summer of 1780. The small 
English expedition, which had begun the ascent of the San 
Juan River toward Lake Nicaragua, had caused little con­
cern to Matlas' de Gcilvez. He wrote to Mexico City that 
shipments of money and supplies from New Spain could be 
suspended for the time being, for they were not needed. 43 
But the English and their zambo allies, although they 
lost men daily from fever, sunstroke, snakebite, and 
desertion, dragged heavy artillery more than one hundred 
miles from the coast to the fort of San Juan thirty miles 
from the lake. They began a siege on April 13th, and six 
days later the garrison capitulated for lack of water. 44
43Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, May 8 , I78O, AGNM,
cv, vol. 126, No. 46l, 187-188.
44Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 3/ P- 3^5* The 
captured garrison of the fort sailed under cartel in a 
small English vessel for Santiago de Cuba. The craft 
foundered in a hurricane; the English crew, four Spanish 
officers, and three hundred two Spanish enlisted men 
died. The only prisoners who survived were one officer 
and four men who were too badly wounded to make the voy­
age. Fernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7 # P* 284.
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Matias de Galvez soon called for help. On 
April 21 he asked Mexico City for 100,000 pesos and one 
hundred quintales of powder to be sent to Realejo as soon 
as possible. By the time his letter reached the capital, 
the Viceroy had heard from other sources that the fort of 
San Juan was under siege. Feeing that Reale jo was too 
close to the scene of combat, he directed that the money 
and powder be sent instead to Sonsonate. He added one 
hundred quintales of potassium nitrate to the shipment, and 
expressed the hope that Guatemala could begin the 
manufacture of explosives for its own use. 45
It was not necessary to expel the English from 
Nicaragua by force. By the time the Viceroy ordered a 
ship from Acapulco to carry supplies to Sonsonate, sick­
ness had reduced the numbers of the invaders to the point
45Mayorga to Jos£ de Gcilvez, May 26, I7 8 0, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 126, No. 479, fols. 209-210v. Realejo was only 
twenty miles northwest of Le6n, one of the expressed 
objectives of the English. Sonsonate, fifty miles west- 
south-west of the city of San Salvador, was more than one 
hundred miles farther up the coast. The ship used to 
transport these stores to Maties de Gcilvez was Nuestra 
Senora de Balvanera. the Peruvian merchantman which had 
been chartered by Mayorga for such service.
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that there were not enough able-bodied men for camp duty. 46 
The Governor of Jamaica continued to send useless rein­
forcements, and altogether 1 ,^00 men were sent to 
Nicaragua, but by September there were only 320 men fit 
for action. Colonel Kemble, the English commander, hoped 
at least to maintain a beachhead on the coast from which 
to renew the advance later; but this proved to be impos­
sible. Troops from England which had been intended for 
use in Nicaragua were held up in Jamaica by fever, scurvy, 
and the threat of imminent invasion by the combined fleets 
of Solano and de Guichen. 47
46Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 3/ P- 3^6. Lieu­
tenant Horatio Nelson had accompanied the expedition 
upriver, although he did not take part in the final oper­
ation against the fort of San Juan, for he was recalled to 
'̂Jamaica to command a frigate. The order may have saved his 
life, for he was ill with fever at the time of his recall. 
When he returned to Jamaica, his illness caused him to 
resign his new command and to remain ashore for a year 
until the fever had runs its course. Warner, Nelson, 
p. 2 8.
47Mackesy, The War for America, p. 336. The 
effects of contagious diseases and deficiencies must be 
considered in almost all studies of military or naval cam­
paigns in the eighteenth century. Four thousand one hun­
dred men had been sent from England to Jamaica in the 
spring of 1780, of whom 1,100 had died and 1 ,500 were ill. 
When they arrived at Jamaica they had been at sea for
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The Minister of the Indies had never doubted that 
the English would fail, although he deplored their ability 
to land on the mainland at will. As he wrote to Mayorga:
The British Ministry has repeatedly stated throughout 
Europe that an expedition sent by the Governor of 
Jamaica had on April 29 last taken the fort of Pan 
Juan of Nicaragua, and from there the enemy were 
attempting to mount to the great lake and to penetrate 
with their conquests as far as the South Sea. This 
news affirms the boldness with which the project to 
open communications between the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Pacific has been followed. Although the impossibility 
of such communication has been amply proven, and con­
sequently the inaccuracy of their plans, nevertheless 
the King considers as one of the greatest evils that 
the English should make themselves masters of the navi­
gation of the lake, and at the same time should have 
an establishment as they have on the southern coast of 
Nicaragua. Moreover, the repeated calamities with 
which Divine Providence has seen fit to afflict the 
Kingdom of Guatemala leave it in no state to resist 
the force of a powerful enemy, and to be the theatre 
of a bloody war: the English are making use of this
state of affairs, and for the same reason, appear to 
try to direct toward it all their attacks. Therefore 
His Majesty wishes that from this time forward there
twenty weeks„ Conditions aboard ships can be deduced 
from the following figures: during the four years 1776-
1779/ the British Navy lost ±*,243 men hy enemy action and 
±8,541 by disease. In the same period, 42,069 men 
deserted. Clowes, The Royal Navy. Vol. Ill, p. 339*
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be employed all possible means to thwart such 
destructive attempts. . . , 40
G&lvez continued his letter with instructions for 
driving out the English, but even as he wrote the enemy 
survivors were in retreat toward the coast after having 
evacuated the fort. In November, before the minister’s 
letter reached Mexico, the last of the English had 
evacuated Nicaragua and had returned to Jamaica. 49
Poor communications, the result of distance and 
wretched roads, impeded the Viceroy's appreciation of 
what was currently occurring in the Captaincy General of 
Guatemala, and the same factors limited his grasp on 
affairs within his own domain. The press of business in 
the capital made it impossible for him to travel exten­
sively, and the execution of orders depended upon the
48Jos6 de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 15, 17^0, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 119, expediente 162, fols. 101-102v.
49Mackesy, The War for America, p. 336. The 
author of a recent history of the administration of 
Matins Gcilvez in Guatemala asserts that the English did 
not voluntarily abandon the fort of San Juan, but were 
driven out by militiamen led by Gcilvez. In this account 
the author criticizes other historians for not having 
mentioned this assault. He states that "several authentic
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ability and zeal of his subordinates. This was 
particularly true of the administration of affairs at 
Veracruz, which combined the functions of principal port' 
and the largest single defense installation. Unlike his 
predecessor, Bucareli, who had entered New Spain through 
Veracruz and had at that time inspected its defenses, 
Mayorga had never seen the port, for he had come directlyI
to the capital from Guatemala. In the summer of 1780 
something prompted Mayorga to visit the port. The expla­
nation of his trip of inspection, as given to Jos6 de 
G&lvez, reveals that he did not trust the officers at 
Veracruz, although his letter did not state specific 
reasons for his suspicions.
I took possession of it [the kingdom of New Spain] 
without having seen either the port of Veracruz, its 
fort, or its coast; therefore, having confidence in 
its Governor, Brigadier don Joseph de Carri6n y 
Andrade, I accepted what he proposed to me for the 
defense of that port because of the present war,
documents of that period mention it, " but he does not 
identify his sources. Menos Franco, Estudios Historicos. 
P. 72.
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until for well-founded reasons of distrust I resolved 
to travel to that city. 50
The Viceroy left Mexico City on July 3r<l/ an(̂  
wishing to make his absence from the capital as brief as 
possible, he entrusted the inspection of the coast adja­
cent to Veracruz to Matins de Armona, Lieutenant Colonel 
of the Regiment of the Crown. The Governor was ordered to 
muster the entire garrison and all the presidiarios of 
San Juan de Uluci as soon as the Viceroy arrived. 51 All 
ammunition magazines and food storehouses were thrown open 
for inspection. At this time the Commandant of Artillery 
of the fort, Miguel Puchalt, complained to the Viceroy 
that the magazines contained only one-half the quantity of 
gunpowder they were capable of holding. The Governor 
answered the criticism of Puchalt by asserting that the
soMayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, September 30, 1780, 
AGNM, CV, vol. 127, No. 728, fols. 110-llOv. In 1762 
Cruillas had come from the capital to inspect the forti­
fications and troops on the Gulf coast, an action which 
had earned the approval of his superiors in Spain.
51There is no one-word English equivalent to this 
term. A presidiario is a prisoner sentenced to labor 
within the confines of a garrison.
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magazines could never be kept charged to capacity because 
of the frequent shipments of explosive to other ports. 
Unfortunately, due to the brief time available and the 
fact that the necessary records were scattered and not 
immediately at hand, it was impossible for the Viceroy to 
trace the movements of war materiel through Veracruz. It 
was only possible to inventory what was actually on hand: 
4,569 quintales of gunpowder and 50,000 musket cartridges. 
A new storehouse capable of holding 800 quintales was 
under construction. If the new storehouse were kept 
filled, an4 if the fort's magazines were maintained at 
their current level, Mayorga felt that the supply would be 
adequate.52
The two companies of artillerymen who served the 
guns of the fort had been quartered within the city itself 
prior to the coming of the viceroy. Acting upon the prin­
ciple that their duty was to defend the fort and to remain 
close to their pieces at all times, he ordered them quar­
tered within the fort itself, thereby saving the crown
52Mayorga to Jos£ de Galvez, September 30, I78O, 
AGNM# CV, Vol. 127, NO. 730, fols. lllv-113.
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one thousand pesos monthly. Each week the gunners were 
to come to the city in small detachments to be trained 
in a school of practical gun handling. The presidiarios 
of the fort and picked members of the urban militia were 
to join the training sessions, so that in an emergency 
they might aid the regulars in serving the guns.5a
Mayorga found that two companies of urban militia 
were quartered in the city of Veracruz, and he ordered 
them moved to the outskirts of town where they could be 
housed more economically. Prom their new stations they 
could be quickly deployed to meet a threat from any 
direction.-54
While the Viceroy was still in Veracruz he was 
joined by Lieutenant Colonel Matias de Armona who had 
been sent to inspect militia units north and south of the 
port. Armona returned with the recommendation that no 
mere coastal defense batteries be constructed. They
53Same to same, September 30, 1780, ibid.. 127/ 
No. 729# fols. 111-lllv.
54Same to same, September 30, 1780, ibid.,
No. 734, fols. 120-120v. Another reason given for 
moving the militia out of town was that they molested the 
citizens of Veracruz.
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would be useless against a landing force, which could 
shift its operations to one of the many undefended beaches. 
He urged, instead, the erection of watch towers equipped 
with rockets and signal flags from which likely invasion 
beaches could be kept under observation. 55
Expressing himself satisfied with his inspection, 
Mayorga returned to the capital on July 30, only a few 
days before Solano's long-awaited convoy made port at 
Havana bearing 12,000 troops. This was the force which 
was to aid the expedition against Pensacola and which the 
English feared would invade Jamaica, but at the time of 
their arrival both the troops and the seamen were unfit 
for action. Yellow fever had broken out in the Spanish 
fleet, and when Solano joined de Guichen the fever spread 
to the French ships. Far from attacking Jamaica, the 
allies soon had to divide their forces by segregating the 
sick on certain vessels. The Spanish fleet was so 
enfeebled that Solano asked the protection of de Guichen 
while he completed the last leg of his voyage through the
55Same to same, September 30, 1780, ibid., 
No. 7 3 5, fols. 121-121v.
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islands to Cuba. The plague-stricken ships sailed slowly 
northward discharging sick at Dominica, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo. After the 
Spaniards anchored at Havana on August 3r ,̂ de Guichen 
sailed for Europe, escorting French merchantmen from the 
islands. 56
56Ferncindez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7* P* 286. The 
Spanish convoy consisted of thirteen ships of the line, 
two frigates, and one hundred forty-seven merchantmen, 
with some of the last-named type being used as troop trans­
ports . The wastage of men through sickness was probably 
the result of carelessness, rather than ignorance or lack 
of resources, for the marine sanitary service in the prin­
cipal ports of Spain was very good, and visiting French 
officers who made use of their facilities expressed admir­
ation at the care given to the sick. On campaign, when 
the welfare of the men depended upon the care of seagoing 
officers, the situation was quite different. A French 
historian of the period has explained the epidemic sickness 
in Solano's convoy as follows:
"The Spanish officers found details beneath the dignity of 
a commander, and they neglected the most elementary pre­
cautions . . . . This contempt for details is perhaps the 
most characteristic trait of the Spanish officer, and it 
is indeed this which made the Spanish navy incapable of 
fighting the British navy with advantage."
George Desdevises du Dezert, "Les institutions de 
1 'Espagne au XVIIIe sifecle: la marine," Revue Hispanique,
LXX (1925), P. 490.
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Governor Bernardo de G&lvez, promoted to the rank 
of Mariscal de Campo. had come to Havana the day before 
the fleet from Spain made port; and he spent several weeks 
in conference with the military and naval commanders of 
that port. On August 11th a -junta decided that 3/800 men 
should sail for the attempt on Pensacola under the Gov­
ernor 's command, and on October l6th a squadron of seven 
ships of the line and fifty-seven lesser vessels left 
Havana bearing 3/829 troops. 57 Two days after their 
departure a hurricane struck the expedition. For six days 
the storm drove the ships westward, dispersing them to 
Mobile Bay, the mouth of the Mississippi and the coast of 
Campeche. Only one vessel was <sunk, but after a month and 
a half spent in a vain effort to reunite the fleet, Galvez
t
had to return to Havana still now knowing the location of 
half his ships. 58
57Caughey, Gdlvez. pp. 192-193-
58Bernardo de Galvez (?), Diario de las operaciones 
de la expedicion contra la Plaza de Panzacola concluido 
por las Armas de _S. M. Catolico, baxo las ordenes del 
Mariscal de Campo D. Barnardo de Galvez (apparently printed 
at Madrid c. I78I; facsimile reproduction of the first 
edition with foreword by N. Orwin Rush, Tallahassee, 
Florida: n.p., 1966), p. 1.
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When news reached Mexico City that crippled ships 
from Galvez' expedition had been driven ashore in Campeche, 
the Viceroy sent a courier to Veracruz with orders that 
two ships should sail at once with 50,000 pesos and sup­
plies for their relief, and by letter he urged the masters 
of Gcilvez' ships to make their crafts seaworthy and to 
rejoin their commander in the shortest possible time.59 
This was the second time within a month that New Spain had 
been asked to relieve storm damages. On the day Bernardo 
de Gcilvez had sailed from Havana he had written to Mexico 
asking immediate aid for Louisiana, whose crops had been 
destroyed by a recent storm. On November 8th, the same 
day that the request had been received, it had been 
answered by diverting in two ships some of the provisions 
which had been collected for Havana, although Mayorga 
assured Josd de Gcilvez that the emergency aid given to 
Louisiana would not interfere with transportation of food 
to Cuba.60
59Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, November 20, 1780, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 127, NO. 8 0 0, fols. I95-I96V.
eoMayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, November 29, 17^0, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 127, No. 799, fols. 194v-195.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
The notice of the dispersal of Bernardo de Gcilvez ' 
fleet and the destruction of crops in Louisiana had been 
accompanied by a warning from Havana whose substance was 
that the English forces of Jamaica had been reinforced and 
that another invasion would shortly move to join the small 
army already in Nicaragua. One of the ships lying dis­
abled on the coast of Campeche was an aviso from Havana 
which had been bound for Guatemala carrying a similar 
warning to Matxas de Galvez. Mayorga at once sent a cou­
rier to the Captain-General with a copy of the letter he 
had received from Havana. The simultaneous arrival of so 
much bad news caused the Viceroy to write to Jos6 de 
Gcilvez that "the eighth day of the current month [November] 
was one of the most bitter I have had in my life. 1,01
The violent weather of the Gulf of Mexico was a 
contrast to that of the Pacific Ocean. The galleon from 
Manila made port at Acapulco without incident on Octo­
ber 27th. On her last voyage the ship had spent the period
6Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, November 20, 1780, 
ibid., No. 8 3 7, fols. 231-233^. The warning of an impend­
ing English invasion of Nicaragua had no basis in fact.
In November the English were in the process of withdrawing 
the remnants of their small army.
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from November 25/ 1779/ to May 26th in harbor. The Viceroy 
felt that shortening her stay in America would reduce the 
danger of the vessel's being intercepted by an enemy, 
therefore, he tentatively ordered that the sailing date for 
the return voyage be set for January 15, 1781*
Of greater concern to the viceroy than the fate of 
Gcilvez' fleet or the Manila galleon was the formation of a 
rich convoy for Havana and C&diz. With Solano's fleet from 
Spain had come a shipment of mercury, indispensable for the 
refinement of Mexican silver. The asoques and three 
escorting warships had reached Veracruz on September 23rd, 
and the eastbound convoy was to have sailed on Novem­
ber 1st, but the same winds which had scattered Gllvez' 
ships had delayed the discharging and loading of the ships 
at Veracruz. The date of departure was reset for 
November 20th.
As usual, the most valuable items were divided 
among the most heavily armed ships. On this occasion the 
cargo capacity of the three warships was insufficient to 
accommodate the most precious freight: silver, cochineal,
and indigo. Three merchant ships, considered the most 
seaworthy and the best-armed of those in port at Veracruz,
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were selected to share the responsibility of carrying the 
premium goods. Although the goods of private merchants
were to travel in the convoy of 58 ships, the principal
concern was the safe conduct of 6,680,647 pesos destined 
for the royal service. Three million of this sum was 
bound for Spain; it was money collected by the royal 
tobacco monopoly. One million four hundred one thousand 
six hundred and seven pesos were to go to Havana for the 
maintenance of the garrisons of Cuba, the expenses of the 
Havana squadron and the purchase of tobacco for the crown 
monopoly.62 Havana was also to receive 1 ,382,396 pesos 
for the payment of situados to the Windward Islands.
There was a separate allotment of 796,444 pesos for the 
maintenance from June to December of the warships which 
had recently come from Spain. One hundred thousand pesos 
were to be paid to the royal treasuries of Havana to 
reimburse them for an emergency draft for that sum made
62The manufacture and sale of tobacco were the
most lucrative of all the royal monopolies. The effective 
organization of the monopoly had been accomplished during 
the visitation of Jos£ de Gcilvez. In the early 1770's the 
annual revenue amounted to 1,500,000 pesos; in the course 
of two decades it rose to 4,500 pesos. Haring, The Spanish 
Empire in America, pp. 275“276.'
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"by Matias de Gcilvez in the first months of his service in 
Guatemala.
No one in Veracruz knew the state of affairs at 
Havana; it was feared that the hurricane which had wrecked 
G&lvez' enterprise might have damaged or dispersed the 
entire squadron based on Havana. Therefore, the Viceroy 
ordered three small craft to precede the convoy with two- 
day intervals between their sailings, so that Havana might 
be prepared to receive and to protect the treasure ships.
The viceroy informed Jos6 de Gcilvez of the depar­
ture of the convoy, and concluded his account with a 
warning of trouble to come.
The intelligence of Your Excellency will well 
recognize that the Rivers of Silver which flow from 
this Capital to all parts can be exhausted, and this 
on account of the continuing needs of the Armada of 
Havana and its Army; it pains me that Your Excel­
lency must consider that although until now I have 
asked nothing from the merchants in the way of Dona­
tions or Loans, I fear that I shall be forced to 
those recourses should the war continue, and may God 
grant that they suffice.63
63Mayorga to Josd de Gcilvez, November 20, 1780, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 127, No. 827, fols. 231-233v.
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In Spain the King and his Ministers remained in 
ignorance of all that had occurred in the West Indies 
since February 26th, the date on which the last post had 
left Havana. Unaware of the circumstances which had frus­
trated his nephew's attack on Pensacola, Jos£ de Gcilvez 
assumed that the British post had already fallen or would 
soon do so. On October 19, 1780, he wrote a letter to the 
Governor of Havana in which he outlined the course of 
action to be followed in the American theatre, and a copy 
of this letter was sent to Viceroy Mayorga.64
The minister wrote that a French fleet of at 
least twenty ships of the line carrying 3,000 troops would
64Jos£ de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 19, 1780, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 21, mui reseryada, 
fols. 32-39v. The length of this letter, sixteen pages, 
precludes its quotation .in extenso in this paper, and 
its contents are summarized in the paragraphs Of the text 
which follow. Although Jos6 de Gcilvez stated that he had 
received no definition or detailed news (noticias 
circunstanciadas) from Havana since February 26, he 
referred in this letter to the ineffectual attack made 
upon Pensacola in March. The squadron of Count de Guichen 
had sailed to Cddiz after leaving Havana in August, and 
it is likely that the minister had learned from this 
source of the failure to follow up Barnardo de Gcilvez' 
victory at Mobile. Obviously no official explanation of 
the protracted delay had come from Havana.
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arrive in Martinique in January or February of the coming 
year. The new arrivals, when joined by the nine ships and 
2,000 men already in the French West Indies, would be 
superior in strength to the English land and sea forces, 
and an offensive move on the part of the latter would be 
impossible. Unless Admiral Rodney's strength should be 
considerably reinforced-— and Gcilvez regarded this as 
unlikely— the combined forces of the Bourbon allies could 
successfully invade Jamaica. 65 Gcilvez believed that 
Rodney would be forced to divide his fleet in order to aid 
General Clinton in New York, because another French fleet 
under de Ternay was enroute to North America, "superior to 
that which the enemy have in New York, and to circumscribe 
within very narrow limits the forces of General Clinton. " 66
6SCount Floridablanca proposed the joint expedi­
tion against Jamaica and outlined the details of its execu­
tion in a letter to Count Aranda, the Spanish Ambassador to 
the Court of France, dated September 5» 1780. Florida­
blanca asserted that the combined forces must be ready to 
move against the island by the first of the coming year, so 
that the operation could be carried out before the season 
of hurricanes and hot weather. Danvila, Carlos III.
Vol. 5, p. 132.
66Josd de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 19, 1780,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 12, expediente 21, fol. 32v. Gcilvez' 
forecast of Rodney's actions was correct. The English
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Gcilvez hoped that the junta of Generals at Havana 
had already resolved to send an expedition against Pensa­
cola. Optimistically, he expressed the hopes of the King 
in the future perfect tense:
admiral was well aware of the epidemic disease raging in 
the French and Spanish fleets, and he knew that the allies 
were incapable of taking the offensive. Therefore, when 
word came to him that six French ships and 2,000 troops had 
reached Newport, Rhode Island, on August 11th Rodney sailed 
for North America believing that no one knew of his depar­
ture. As he reported to Philip Stephens, Secretary of the 
Admiralty, on September
"I flew with all the despatch possible to prevent the 
Enemy's making any Impression upon the Continent before my 
Arrival there, having left under the Command of Commodore 
Hotham, a sufficient force to Secure His Majesty's Caribee 
Islands, and without any person whatever in the West Indies 
(General Vaughn and Mr. Hotham excepted) having the least 
surmise that I had left that part of the world."
George, Lord Rodney, Letter-books and Order-book of George, 
Lord Rodney Admiral of the White Squadron 1780-1782,
2 Vols. (New York: The New York Historical Society, 1932-
1933)/ Vol. 1, pp. 9-10 [hereafter referred to as Rodney, 
Letter-Book]. Rodney's dramatic sally to New York accom­
plished nothing. He quarreled with the North American com­
manders, never fought the French squadron, and sailed back 
to the West Indies on November 16, 1780, having "stripped 
the storehouses, impressed 400 seamen, and carried off two 
frigates on his departure. Muddle and friction were the 
result." Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 351-352.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
157
So His Majesty believes that the Junta of Generals 
will have directed all their attention to the first 
objective, the taking of Pensacola, with such vigor 
that at this date it will already be under their 
domination,67
Proceeding on- the assumption that the conquest of 
West Florida had been accomplished by the time he wrote, 
the Minister of the Indies directed that ten ships of the 
line were to be secretly made ready for sea at Havana.
When word should come that the French fleet had arrived in 
the West Indies, all the troops which could be safely with­
drawn from Cuba were to be embarked on the ships with six 
months' rations. Elaborate precautions were to be taken 
to conceal the destination of the Spanish force, and rumor 
was to be circulated that it was to sail for Spain. An 
embargo was to be laid on all shipping from Cuban ports, 
and all travel by road was to be forbidden until the east-
bound ships had cleared the Old Bahama Channel, a narrow
!
and difficult passage off the north coast of Cuba. Once 
the squadron had shaped a course toward the south to join
67Jos6 de Gcilvez to Mayorga, October 19# 17^0,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 21, fol. 33-
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the French, normal land and sea traffic would be resumed. 
The Spanish were to meet the French at Cap Francois, in 
French Santo Domingo, and picket ships would be sent out 
to observe the activities of the British at Jamaica.
Perhaps Jos6 de Galvez feared that the Spanish 
ships would not sail, as ordered, with six months' rations 
aboard or that the attack on Jamaica would be delayed.
The Governor of Santo Domingo was ordered to supply the 
fleet with whatever food he could collect, and the Dutch 
of St. Eustatius and the Danes of St. Croix and St. Thomas 
were confidentially asked to help supply the needs of the 
seamen and troops. 68
The whole enterprise was contingent upon the 
arrival of the fleet from France, but it did not sail at 
the time predicted by Gcilvez and recommended by Florida- 
blanca. Count de Grasse did not sail for Martinique 
until March 22, 1781, with twenty ships of the line; and
68Maritime trade between neutral nations and her 
enemies in the West Indies had been a problem for England 
since the War of the Spanish Succession. Richard Pares,
War and Trade in the West Indies. Chapter VIII, "The 
French Colonies and the Neutral Traders," pp. 326-390, 
passim. How the English dealt with the principal 
offenders, the Dutch, is described in the following chapter.
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he bore no definite orders to attack Jamaica, but to act 
as circumstances dictated.69 In spite of the fact that 
Havana was not required to reduce its land and sea forces 
to attack Jamaica, for the rest of the year its Junta de 
Generales showed little initiative in pressing the war 
against the English. For months Bernardo de Gcilvez had 
urged the reinforcement of the garrison of Mobile, because 
he feared a counter-attack from Pensacola. His insistence 
finally caused Havana to dispatch two warships, two store- 
ships , four transports, and five hundred soldiers. The 
effort failed lamentably.
Because of the strength of his [Gcilvez'] arguments 
the Junta de Generales ordered that there be made 
ready enough ships to transport 500 men and a quantity 
of foodstuffs, and this small convoy made sail on 
December 6 under the command of Capit£n de Navio 
Joseph de Rada; but although after a few days he 
arrived safely at the mouth of Mobile Bay, he 
decided not to enter the bay on account of having 
found (so he asserted) a shift in the channel, and he 
at once made sail for Balize on the Mississippi River, 
at whose entrance he left the convoy and returned to 
Havana.70
69Mackesy, The War for America, p. 387-
70Piario, p. 1.
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The year 1780 ended in anti-climax. Mobile had 
been captured, the land and sea forces of Havana had been 
reinforced and a valuable convoy had been sent to Spain. 
Yet numerous delays had prevented the taking of Pensacola, 
the French fleet had not yet arrived to join in an attack 
on Jamaica, and the English invaders of Nicaragua had 
been defeated by nature and problems of logistics rather 
than by Spanish arms.
The coming year, I78I, was to be the high point 
of the Bourbon military effort in America. The conquest 
of West Florida would be completed, and the British will 
to continue the war against their former colonies in North 
America would be broken by the surrender of Cornwallis at 
Yorktown. To this victory of French and American arms,
New Spain would make an unpublicized but important 
contribution.
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1781: THE YEAR OF VICTORY
After the capture of Mobile by Bernardo de Gcilvez 
in March 1780, the English at Pensacola waited in expec­
tation of an early attack. Unaware of Gcilvez' failure 
to secure adequate support from Havana and of the dis­
persal of his invasion fleet by an October hurricane, 
General Campbell could only speculate as to why the Span­
iards had not appeared. At first he was unable to believe 
his good fortune, but by the end of the year he had deter­
mined to counter-attack and to attempt the recovery of 
Mobile. At daybreak on January 7/ 1781, three hundred 
English troops and an equal number of Indian allies fell 
upon an outpost of Mobile called the Village, which was 
located on the eastern shore of the bay. Although the 
garrison of 150 Spaniards were taken by surprise, they 
inflicted such heavy losses on the attackers that the 
English retreated toward Pensacola. The brief battle was
161
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of great aid to Bernardo de Gcilvez in his continuing 
efforts to stir Havana to action, for the British attempt 
on Mobile made it obvious that more support would have to 
be sent to West Florida if what had been gained was to be 
retained.1
Although the English were negligent in not rein­
forcing Pensacola during the first months of 1781 while 
time remained to do so, in another area of America they 
took swift action to correct a practice which had caused 
them serious damage since 1776: the traffic of the neu­
tral Dutch with the enemies of England. On January 5/
1781, Spain warned all her American colonies that England 
had declared war on Holland on December 21, 1780, and 
advised that all its subjects having commercial relations 
with the Dutch take the proper precautions. 2 Before the 
letter was received, the principal supply depot for Dutch 
trade in the West Indies with England's enemies, the island
2Caughey, Galvez, pp. 19^-195-
2Jos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, January 5 , I78I, AGN, 
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 5/ fol. 9»
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of St. Eustatius, had fallen into the hands of Admiral 
George Rodney.3 The immediate consequence of the capture 
of the island was the abrupt stoppage of the flow of sup­
plies to the United States and to the French and Spanish 
islands and the enrichment of Admiral Rodney and General 
Sir John Vaughn from the great quantities of merchandise 
seized on St. Eustatius. The second and more important 
consequence was that Rodney and Vaughn lingered at the 
island for three months taking inventory of their new 
riches and loading them into twenty-six vessels for ship­
ment to England. The Admiralty in London feared that 
Rodney's preoccupation with his spoils would allow 
de Grasse's fleet to reach Martinique unchallenged.
Rodney had been warned of the coming of the French in 
February; but instead of stationing his fleet to windward
3A great portion of the war materiel that reached 
American armies from French sources had been carried by 
the Dutch. Eighteen shiploads of gunpowder for America 
had sailed from Amsterdam to St. Eustatius between 
January 1 and May 1 5, 1776/ alone. Bemis, The Diplomacy 
of the American Revolution, pp. 120-121.
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to intercept de Grasse, he employed his strength to guard 
the sailing of his loot-laden ships from St. Eustatius. 4
The time which the English might have used to 
strengthen Pensacola was fast running out. The bulk of 
the naval forces was under Rodney's orders, while Admiral 
Peter Parker, in command of the Jamaica station, continued 
to ignore Sir Henry Clinton's appeals that he aid Pensa­
cola. Unable to aid the port himself, Clinton afterward 
blamed Parker for its loss. 5
4The fears of the Admiralty were realized, for 
in mid-May de Grasse's twenty ships of the line sailed 
safely into the harbor of Fort de France, Martinique, to 
join the four already there. See Mackesy, The War for 
America, p. 417. Rodney's many enemies in England were 
bitter in their criticism, and the Admiral later published 
a pamphlet in his own defense, entitled Letters from Sir 
George Brydges, now Lord Rodney, to his Majesty's Ministers, 
etc. etc. relative to the Capture of St. Eustatius, and 
its Dependencies and Shewing the State of War in the WEST- 
INDIES at that Period ( London; np. nd., 1784?TT Rodney's 
■precautions in guarding the sailing of ships loaded with 
goods from St. Eustatius were vain. Twenty-two of these 
vessels were later captured by a French squadron as they 
approached the English Channel, Fernandez Duro, Armada,
Vol. 7, p. 289.
5Since the outbreak of the war with Spain Clinton 
had been urging that Pensacola be strengthened. After its 
capture he wrote:
"This remaining hold of that valuable province might have 
been preserved to us somewhat longer by the presence there
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It was only through subterfuge that Bernardo 
de Galvez succeeded in persuading the Havana authorities 
to release troops for the conquest of Pensacola. They 
agreed to give him 1,315 men to reinforce Spanish defenses 
on the mainland, with the understanding that if he could 
withdraw enough men from New Orleans and Mobile, he would 
be permitted to attack Pensacola, G&lvez had no intention 
of sending the troops from Havana to the area of West 
Florida already under Spanish control. Having alerted 
New Orleans and Mobile to send all available forces on 
a march overland to join him, he sailed from Havana on 
February 27, 1781, with five ships and 1,315 men for 
Pensacola. 6
of even a single frigate had Sir Peter Parker, who com­
manded the squadron on the Jamaica station, been properly 
attentive to my repeated solicitations for this small 
mark of his watchful regard over that important possession, 
which it was certainly no longer in my power to assist in 
any other way."
Quoted in Willcox, The American Rebellion, p. 31^•
6Caughey, Galvez, pp. 198-199-
(
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Both land and sea forces were under the sole 
command of Bernardo de Gcilvez during this operation, and 
Juan Bautista Bonet, Commandant of Marine at Havana, had 
directed the captains of the ships to obey the young 
Mariscal de Campo. Bonet's tenure of command was drawing 
to a close, for both Bernardo de Galvez and Mayorga had 
complained repeatedly to Spain of his lethargy and inaction. 
On February 12, 1781, Jose de Gcilvez had ordered that he be 
relieved and that Gefe de Escuadra Josef Solano, who had 
commanded the August convoy from Spain, assume his duties. 7
7Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, February 12, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 16, f. 24. Juan Bautista 
(or Jean Baptiste) Bonet was apparently an able man whose 
unfortunate personality caused him to quarrel with all 
his associates and superiors. The son of a French ship­
builder who had moved to Cartagena during the reign of 
Felipe V, Bonet had risen to prominence under Ensenada, 
and had successfully stimulated dockyard work at Callao 
and Valparaiso before coming to Havana. There he improved 
operations at the royal arsenal, but he was manifestly 
unsuited for the authority of a Commandant of Marine, the 
position to which he was promoted in 1776. Three succes­
sive Captains General of Cuba endured almost incessant 
quarrels with the testy Frenchman. After his removal, 
Bonet returned to Cartagena, where he continued to serve 
the Armada until his death in 1784. J&cobo Pazuela y 
Lobo, Diccionario geogr6fico. estadlstico, histbrico de 
la Isla de Cuba, 4 Vols. (Madrid: Imprenta del Estableci-
miento de Mellado, 1863-1866), Vol. 1, p. 188.
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When the notice of Bonet's removal came from Spain, the 
Viceroy approved the change, and commented that "Solano 
has always shown me the same confidence which the King 
merits. 1,8
By the same post which brought news of Bonet's 
dismissal came a rebuke to the Viceroy for not having sent 
sufficient aid to Matlas de G&lvez and the Captaincy 
General of Guatemala. Jos6 de G&lvez, allegedly express­
ing the thought of the king, wrote that his Majesty could 
not understand why Mayorga had not sent troops from New 
Spain to aid Matias de G&lvez against the English who were 
ascending the San Juan River. He hoped that Mayorga had 
remedied that error since the last mail had arrived.
Gctlvez concluded by stating that troops should have been
8Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, July 3/ 1781# AGN, CV, 
Vol. 129, No. 1029, fols. ^3-43v. It is interesting to 
note that the copy of this letter in Mayorga's correspon­
dence is written in the clear, regular hand of an 
escribano. and that in the right-hand margin there appears 
the single word cabal, which may be translated as "just," 
"fitting" or "perfect." The writer of this gloss is 
unknown, and the script differs from that in which the 
letter is written. If one can judge from the shade of 
the ink, the marginal comment is of the same date as the 
letter itself.
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sent "because of Your Excellency's practical knowledge of 
the defenseless state of that Realm, since it was so at 
the departure of Your Excellency for New Spain."9
Before this letter there had been occasional notes 
of asperity in the communications which the Minister of 
the Indies had sent to Mexico, but there had never been 
an accusation that Mayorga had been derelict in his duty 
as Captain General. The last sentence could have been 
interpreted as an implication that Guatemala was in a 
"defenseless state" because Mayorga had left it in that 
condition.
When the Minister of the Indies wrote his letter 
of complaint to New Spain he was unaware of the English 
withdrawal from Nicaragua and of his nephew's latest 
attempt to lay siege to Pensacola. Yet in spite of delays, 
frustrations and unexpected English attacks on the main­
land, the principal objectives of Spain's war effort in 
America had remained substantially the same as they had
9Jose de G&lvez to Mayorga, February 15, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 24, fols. 52-52v.
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been when they were first stated in 1779* Both the 
Governor of Havana and the Viceroy of New Spain received 
an account of these aims in February, ±7 8 1. The eleven- 
page document, divided into fifteen points of emphasis, 
recapitulated what had been planned previously: the
expulsion of the English from West Florida and from the 
mainland of Central America, and the conquest of Jamaica, 
Two new directives had been added. Point five provided 
that once the English had been driven from Central America, 
the Mosquito Indians and the zambos, who had consistently 
aided the English, were to be completely exterminated, if 
possible. 10 The tenth point named another objective:
It is also advantageous that when the circumstances 
permit, an expedition against the Isle of Providence
l0The Mosquito Indians lived on the east coast of 
Nicaragua, and they had been friendly to the English for 
more than a century. At one time England claimed that the 
Mosquitos had ceded territory to them during the reign of 
Charles I, but Spain denied this. Although they were never 
a large tribe ( 9 ,000-11,000 in 1730), their fighting men 
made valuable, if somewhat undependable, allies to the 
English. Fugitive slaves from Spanish territory had joined 
them, had mated with the Indian women, and had produced 
zambos who were equally unfriendly to the Spanish. Pares, 
War and Trade in the West Indies, pp. 97-101.
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should be formed, and that the greatest effort 
should be made to expel the English from it, to 
forbid that place to its corsairs and pirates, 
who sail from there to infest the adjacent seas.11
While Jose de Galvez planned beyond the conquest 
of Pensacola, Mayorga continued to accumulate stocks of 
food to meet the demands of Havana and Louisiana. He 
approached three large-scale producers of grain as possible 
sources of supply: the Provincial of the Augustinians in
Michoacctn, the Count of Regia12 and the Bishop of the 
Diocese of Michoacetn. The Viceroy did not ask for dona­
tions of grain; he proposed to the three individuals that 
they sell the bulk of their crops to the crown and set 
their own prices. The three, ail of whom possessed what
i:LJose de G&lvez to Mayorga, February 12, 1781/
AGN, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 22, fols. 40-45.
l2Pedro Romero de Terreros, Count of Regia, was 
one of the wealthiest men in New Spain. He owned silver 
mines near Pachua, fifty miles northeast of Mexico City, 
one of the oldest silver-mining centers of the kingdom.
He had retired from mining years before as the result of 
continued labor troubles, but Viceroy Bucareli had persuaded 
him to reopen his mines in 1775* In 1776 the Count had 
offered to pay for the construction of two warships at the 
Havana yards, a donation which Bucareli regarded as equi­
valent to 450,000 pesos. Bobb, Bucareli. p. 114, pp. 177“ 
179.
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the Viceroy referred to as opulentes haciendas. promised 
to sell him all the grain that could be spared. Their 
responses, wrote Mayorga, meant that henceforth grain 
could be sent to Havana and Louisiana in any quantity 
needed. But, as the Viceroy pointed out, in order to 
increase the flow of grain from Veracruz, more ships would 
have to be sent to that port from Havana. The ships cur­
rently engaged in traffic between the two ports could not 
even handle the food in storage in Veracruz and Puebla.
The three vendors of grain to the crown were far 
from being war profiteers, according to the Viceroy:
It is most praiseworthy that these good vassals, 
the first two of whom [the Provincial and the Count] 
are completely ignorant of the price of wheat, 
declared their satisfaction at being able to con­
tribute whatever they can to sustain the laudable 
objectives of the day, and the Count of Regia so 
affirms his love for the King that he has offered, 
without limits, all that may be necessary for the 
satisfaction of the needs of the Kingdom.
I intend to pay justly for the wheat which the 
three have collected or may collect, with the price 
to which it may rise.13
1Mayorga to Josfe de Galvez, March 15/ 17Sir AGN,
cv ,  vol. 128, No. 971, fols. 139- 140.
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The public spirit of the three wheat-growers 
elicited the personal thanks of the King, which the Vice­
roy was told to convey to them. Jos6 de Galvez warned 
Mayorga not to take advantage of their generosity, for 
"the King has ordered that the wheat offered be paid for 
in a just manner."14
The subsistence of the land and sea forces based 
in Cuba depended upon the resources of New Spain and its 
transportation through Veracruz. In the spring of I78I 
the Viceroy became concerned about the safety of that 
port. Havana had sent a warning that an invasion force was 
gathering in Jamaica, although its destination was unknown. 
The imagined danger to the Gulf Coast caused Mayorga to 
break his repeated resolve not to expose his veteran troops 
to the dangers of the unhealthful littoral. In March he 
ordered one battalion of the Corona regiment and one squad­
ron of the Dragoons of Spain to Veracruz. At the same time 
he published a bando ordering all Veracruz merchants to 
transfer their funds from the city to the interior. The
14Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, September 12, 1781, 
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 64, fol. 159*
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merchants were also privately advised to send their 
families to places of safety away from the coast, but 
they were cautioned to accomplish their evacuation dise 
cretely so .as not to create public alarm.15
The warning from Havana had no basis in fact. 
Reinforcements of ships and troops had arrived in Jamaica 
in January, but they were not destined for an attempt 
upon New Spain. In any case, the English in the West 
Indies had learned, in February, of Count de Grasse's 
expedition to America, and this potential threat had elimf 
nated the possibility of action against the Spanish 
mainland.16
Before de Grasse had sailed, Madrid had taken 
steps to provide assistance to his fleet once it reached
lsMayorga to Jos£ de G&lvez, March 15, 1781/ AGN, 
cv, Vol. 128, No. 971, fols. 139-140.
l6Havana had greatly overestimated the strength 
of the forces in Jamaica. Although Bernardo de Gcilvez' 
siege of Pensacola lasted from February to May, Jamaica 
was powerless to relieve the port. A weak force sailed 
from the island toward Pensacola, but it turned back 
without having sighted the Spanish. Mackesy, The War 
for America. pp. 4 l5 “4 l6 .
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American waters; and the burden fell, inevitably, upon the 
treasuries of New Spain. New Spain had financed and sup­
plied American, French, and Spanish operations on the main­
land of North America and in the Gulf of Mexico. Although 
it is difficult to select from the many shipments from 
Mexico the one cargo most valuable to the common war 
against England, it is probably that this cargo was sent 
in response to the following order from Jos6 de Galvez:
By an order of this date I give notice to the 
Intendant of Havana that in the months of July and 
September of this year he must deliver by halves 
from that Treasury one million pesos to the French 
commanders who will present themselves to collect 
it. And to the end that there be neither default 
nor delay in this matter, the King orders that Your 
Excellency send the million pesos immediately to 
the Intendant, who will take care to obtain receipts 
in quadriplicate and send them to me with all possi­
ble speed, in order that the Court of France may pay 
the same sum in C eid iz .17
Mayorga received the order on July 11, 1761, and 
on the same day he sent the million pesos by forced
l7Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga, March 1 7 , 1781, AGN, 
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 82 , fol. 124.
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marches to Veracruz to he carried to Havana by two 
warships which were in port at that time.18
By April, Jos6 de Galvez had at last learned of 
the withdrawal of the English from Nicaragua five months 
before. Nevertheless, using the unfounded rumor of fresh 
enemy aggression as justification, he persisted in his 
attempt to force the Viceroy to send troops to Guatemala. 
An order to that effect was coupled with a categorical 
denial that Mayorga had ever aided Matias de Gllvez since 
the war began.19
lsMayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, July 11, ljQh AGN, 
CV, Vol. 129, No. 1111, fols. 6l-6lv.
19Although this paper is not primarily concerned 
with the personality clash between Jos£ de Galvez and. 
Mayorga, the animosity between the Minister and the Vice­
roy, from the spring of 1781 onward, colored nearly all 
their communication. The factual shortage of New 
Spain's participation in the war became distorted by the 
heat of mutual recrimination, a contest in which the 
viceroy was at a disadvantage. Although Mayorga did not 
venture to attack Jos6 de Galvez directly, he fought back 
by indirection. He repeatedly questioned the competence 
of other royal officials and challenged their probity.
He alluded to New Spain's unprecedented expenditures of 
money and supplies as prima facie evidence of his 
efficient administration.
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Although the English regard their expedition to 
the San Juan River as one of the most unfortunate 
that English arms ever made, because of not achieving 
its object which was to seize Lake Nicaragua. They 
have lost 3#000 of their best troops, seventy 
officers, many crewmen, four frigates, and more than 
one and one-half million pounds sterling: neverthe­
less, they have not yet abandoned their project. On 
the contrary, they plan to return to the same enter­
prise, and for it they have prepared seventy launches 
mounted with cannon: they have strengthened their
alliance with the chiefs of the Mosquito Indians and 
the zambos. who have offered to place 5 /0 0 0 men at 
their orders, and they have sent recruiters to Europe. 
To this should be added that they have accurate maps 
of that Province, and find themselves with the intel­
ligence necessary to arrange plans for their 
operations with certainty.
Although until now the President of Guatemala has 
thwarted their schemes without any more help than 
that which he has been able to prepare for himself in 
that exhausted Kingdom, and although he will have 
taken the most effective means to render useless the 
new attempts by the enemy: the King wishes that in
order that he may execute them with more security 
Your Excellency must send him without the least 
delay by way of Acapulco 300 veteran troops from that 
Kingdom with the necessary arms, munitions, and what­
ever else the Captain General should need and request. 
It is the intention of His Majesty that he lack 
nothing that could contribute to the security of the 
Kingdom under his command. 20
This was the first of a series of four confidential 
letters addressed to New Spain within a few days, all of
2°Josd de Gcilvez to Mayorga, April ±9, 1781, AGN, 
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 197/ reservada No. 25/ fols. 262- 
262v.
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them critical of the Viceroy. Josd de G&lvez wrote to 
Pedro Antonio de Cosio, Administrador General de la Real 
Hacienda; and carefully explained that since Havana was a 
great center of military and naval operations, it required 
large and increasing amounts of supplies. Its customary 
sources of revenue had dwindled, for the war had paralyzed 
commerce. His Majesty demanded that the Intendant of the 
Army in Havana he sent everything which he requested. 
Galvez concluded that his purpose in writing to Cosio was 
"the supposition that on this date and for your own 
motives you will communicate His Majesty's resolution to 
the Viceroy. " 21
On the same day, April 20, 1781/ the Minister 
wrote to the Viceroy to inform him of the assistance which 
New Spain had to give to forthcoming operations in the 
West Indies. Once the conquest of Pensacola had been
i
accomplished, the invasion of Jamaica must be undertaken. 
The expedition would require more men than those currently
21Jos6 de Gdlvez to Cosio, April 20, 1781, AGN,
BC, Vol. 120, expediente 204, reservada No. 28, 
fols. 270-270v.
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fit for duty in Havana, for the army had "suffered not a 
little during its ocean voyage," a reference to the scurvy 
and yellow fever that had ravaged Solano's convoy from 
Spain the previous summer. Not even the most audacious of 
the English planned an attack on the mainland of Spanish 
America (a direct and unexplained contradiction of his 
warning about a new attack on Nicaragua). Therefore, the 
Viceroy could have no reason for not releasing his veteran 
troops for service elsewhere. In any case, New Spain had 
enough resources for its own defense. Consequently, he 
declared:
When Your Excellency receives this Royal Order you 
must take the most effective measures to make ready 
and to send with the least delay to the command of 
that Army of Operations the troops which he may 
request for the purpose of replacing those which may 
be withdrawn from Pensacola, Mobile or New Orleans 
for the execution of the enterprise under discussion.
Let it be well understood that His Majesty will 
accept no excuse nor will he pay attention to any 
reason or pretext which can act against or delay in 
this matter compliance with His Sovereign Orders. 22
2aJos4 de Galvez to Mayorga, April 21, ±781, AGN, 
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 20^, reservada No. 28,
Fols. 270-270v.
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The fourth in this sheaf of accusatory letters 
was one written to Mayorga which paraphrased the one 
written to Cosio, but ended in a rebuke:
His Majesty has seen with displeasure that in spite of 
repeated remonstrances of the Intendant of the Army of 
the Island of Cuba, support which is adequate to the 
magnitude and importance of its operations has not 
been given.23
By chance, the fault-finding letters from Madrid 
had just been written when Mayorga wrote a self- 
congratulatory account of New Spain's unexampled exports 
of money and food since the beginning of the war. He was 
proud, the Viceroy declared, of having sent Matlas de 
Galvez more aid than he had asked for. Even after the 
Captain General of Guatemala had advised Mexico City that 
he required no further assistance, Mayorga had sent him 
another shipment, and G&lvez had told the Viceroy that he 
owed his triumph over the English to his support from New 
Spain. Similarly, the Intendant at New Orleans had
23Jos6 de Galvez to Mayorga, April 20, 1781, AGN, 
RC, Vol. 120, expediente 202, reservada No. 27# 
fols. 268-268v.
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recently written to Mexico and had praised the abundant 
supplies sent to Louisiana and the promptness of their 
delivery. The same Intendant asserted that the army 
before Pensacola was being well provisioned. The Viceroy 
regretted that the officials in Cuba were not satisfied. 
There was no lack of food or money for Havana; the fault 
lay with the Intendant of the Army in Cuba, whose esti­
mates of the island's needs had been too low, a fault 
which the Intendant had admitted before the Junta of 
Generals.
Mayorga made a general statement of his services:
No one knows better than Your Excellency the 
resources of this Kingdom and the state of its rev­
enue, and thus I believe that I may do myself the 
justice due me, declaring that never before have there 
been such extractions of treasure and foodstuffs equal 
to those which I have made in the time of my govern­
ment, and they reach the sum of 1 6,978 /636 pesos. Of 
this, 11,290,043 pesos have gone to Havana alone, and 
this includes 18,393 pesos for flour and l6 ,3$i pesos 
for dried vegetables.
I received on the tenth of this month [April] an 
official notice from the Intendant and others of the 
Government of Havana announcing to me the coming of a 
warship for supplies, and by the fourteenth 2 ,700 ,000  
pesos were already en route to Veracruz destined for 
the ship, besides 100,000 pesos more, the annual sum 
for the tobacco factories. In Veracruz there are 
rations enough to load not only the warship which is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
181
coming, but even two more, if they should come, and 
the supply never ceases flowing from the Capital and 
from Puebla.
I tell Your Excellency all this as proof of the 
effectiveness with which I have dedicated myself to 
the service of supply, and in order that Your Excel­
lency may judge for yourself the worth of the 
Intendant's complaint about the scarcity of supplies.
Here there occurs a marginal note written in a different 
hand:
For I shall never be able to persuade myself that the 
squadron and army could have been capable of consuming 
the amount of rations sent from here.
The letter resumes:
What I have given is clearly set forth in this 
statement, and until now I have asked neither for 
loans nor donations, to the pleasure of these 
subjects.
This, in addition to there never having been a 
shortage of food in the Kingdom in spite of such 
great exports of it and the numerous purchases which 
I have made. Now Your Excellency will see the proof 
of the manner in which I have managed- these increased 
burdens, and I hope that Your Excellency will call it 
to the attention of His Majesty. 24
24Mayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, April 23, 1781, AGN, 
CV, Vol. 128, No. 1019, fols. 215-217.
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Complaints from Madrid, which echoed the charges 
of Juan Ignacio de Urriza, Intendant of the Army at Havana, 
continued. In some cases, changing circumstances and the 
slow passage of mail had made the accusations completely 
irrelevant to current reality, if they ever had a basis of 
fact. In June, more than one month after Pensacola had 
surrendered, Jos6 de Galvez wrote to allege that the lack 
of food in Havana was delaying the attack on that port.
It was said that New Spain had sent only a small quantity 
of flour, vegetables, and meat, that the army's treasury 
was empty, and that the warehouses contained nothing for 
the maintenance of the troops. For this reason, according 
to the Minister of the Indies, Bernardo de G&lvez was 
unable to begin his attack on Pensacola. He warned that 
unless immediate aid came from Mexico, the Viceroy must be 
blamed for negating "the most important operation in the 
hemi spher e ."2 5
25 Jos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, June 11, 1781, AGN, 
RC, Vol. 121, expediente 13, reservada No. 32, 
fols. 36-37. Pensacola had been taken on May 8th. The 
Diario of the expedition against Pensacola, previously 
cited, contains no reference to a food shortage. Food is 
mentioned only rarely: the troops went ashore with three
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
To the stream of intemperate imperatives that 
issued almost daily from Spain in the spring and summer of 
1781, Mayorga responded at first with variations on a 
simple themes Havana could not be supplied unless ships 
came ro Veracruz:
I make use of all seaworthy vessels that arrive at 
Veracruz, although His Majesty has resolved that money 
and food be carried only in warships, having in that 
port more than three million pesos which are only 
waiting the arrival of the two warships which the 
Chiefs of Havana advised me would come in March.
In them will be loaded as much food as they can 
receive, sixteen thousand tercios having been col­
lected at Veracruz, as I have relat ed, and I have 
suggested to the Intendant of the Army that he send 
whatever ships there may be to transport them before 
the burning climate rots them, and in my judgment this 
is proof of the scrupulous care with which I watch the 
needs of Havana. 26
Until July 3 , I78I ,  the Viceroy responded to the 
charges made against him in moderate tones. On that date
days' rations; they were issued aguardiente on several 
occasions after having been drenched by rains; the Spanish 
conquerors issued army rations to the rouen and children 
of Pensacola after the city was taken. Th'2 lack of comment 
on food seems to indicate that provisions were not a 
problem during the siege.
28Mayorga to Jos6 de Gdlvez, July 3/ 17^1, AGN, CV, 
Vol. 129, No. 1094, fols. 44-44v.
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he received and answered the letter from Josd de G&lvez 
in which the minister charged that his brother had fought 
alone and unaided against the English invaders ascending 
the San Juan River. The copy of Mayorga’s answer as it 
appears in Volume 129 °f the Correspondencia de Virreves 
is a singular and revealing document. It is obvious in 
this much-edited letter that axiger and resentment strug­
gled with caution and rendered it partially illegible and 
somewhat incoherent:
Although the troops of this Kingdom are reduced to 
only three Regiments of Infantry and two of Veteran 
Cavalry, with very little strength when I sent the 
aids of money and gunpowder to the President of Guate­
mala, although afterwards the expenses of the Provin­
cial Militia have increased without their ranks having 
yet been filled: with all this, I could have sent at
the same time some troops (as I did to Manila) if he 
had asked me, but he did not, and since then with 
reflection about the long distance by land. . . .
Here there is a scribbled interpolation in the margin:
and, nevertheless, I could have sent troops from Aca­
pulco, repeating my grants of aid, he answered me on 
April 20 of this year, and a copy of it is included, 
that he found himself free of every harassment. Your 
Excellency will see. . . .
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The last three lines of the interpolation are completely 
illegible, and the letter resumed with a paragraph which 
has been struck through:
The President, as Your Excellency will be informed, 
succeeded in dislodging the enemy from that Province, 
yes, but the unseasonable weather and the difficult 
nature of that country contributed greatly, so that 
now he finds himself free of such danger.
The last paragraph of the letter followed:
This is what occurs to me to explain the objection 
of His Majesty to the alleged lack of troops, which 
Your Excellency indicated to me in the Royal Order 
dated February 15, and I hope that Your Excellency will 
forward this vindication to the attention of the 
Sovereign. 27
With this letter Mayorga sent a copy of the letter 
from Matfas de Galvez which appeared to prove that the 
complaints of his being laggard in aiding Guatemala were 
untrue:
27Mayorga to Jose de G&ivez, July 3* 1781/ AGN,
CV, Vol. 129, No. 1095/ fols. 45~45v. The Provincial 
Militia mentioned in this letter had been organized by 
Villalba. It was undermanned and underequipped and of 
dubious value. Viceroy Bucareli had attempted to reform 
it, and the effort had cost him 2,789/844 pesos by 1780.
In 1784 Inspector General Crespo estimated the annual cost 
of the Provincial Militia at 449/420 pesos. McAlister, 
Fuero Militar. p. 5*
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The successive notices which I have given Your 
Excellency from time to time of the enemy who invaded 
by way of the San Juan River, and in particular of 
their having abandoned the Castle [of San Juan], its 
vicinity, and the Atlantic coast, and of their not 
having captured any port of those threatened on the 
coast of the South Sea, seem to me to be sufficient 
for Your Excellency to understand that at the present 
the aid which Your Excellency offers me by confidential 
letter is not needed.
I cannot express to Your Excellency my obligation 
and gratitude for your continual offers to assist me: 
for a post has not arrived in which Your Excellency 
has not reminded me of his great wish to aid me, and 
this I have called to the attention of the King.
It is impossible for me to conceal from Your 
Excellency that I lack funds, but in view of the many 
obligations with which that Kingdom [New Spain] is 
burdened, I do not venture to ask anything while I do 
not expect an enemy attack. 28
Although Mayorga found the testimony of Mat!as de 
Galvez useful in affirming the value of support from Mex­
ico, another report from the Captain-General provoked his 
anger. Matias de Galvez had written Mayorga that upon 
his request the Viceroyalty of Peru had sent him 200,000
28Mat£as de G&lvez to Mayorga, April 20, 1781, 
AGN, Historia. Vol. 186, No. 7/ no pagination. The Min­
ister of the Indies acknowledged receipt of his brother's 
letter to Mayorga, but made no comment on it. Jos6 de 
Gcilvez to Mayorga, January 20, I7 8 2, AGN, RC, Vol. 122, 
expediente 5 / fol. 8 .
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pesos . The Viceroy of New Spain regarded this action an 
affront to his Kingdom and to himself, because, as he 
wrote to Jos6 de G&lvez, he would have promptly sent the 
same sum to Guatemala if the Captain General had requested 
it . 29 The Minister of the Indies denied that his brother 
had received that sum. Matlas had asked for, and had 
received, 100,000 pesos and 400 swords, and Jos6 Antonio 
de Areche had sent the money and weapons to Realejo. 30
While charges and counter-charges crossed the 
Atlantic and the Gulf, the resources of New Spain continued 
to move to the theatre of war as swiftly as ship movements 
permitted. On July 11 the million pesos to be given to che 
French moved from the capital to Veracruz by forced marches 
to be loaded on board two warships from Havana which had 
been promised in March and had finally arrived. 31 The
29Mayorga to Jos& de G&lvez, July 3/ 1781, AGN, 
cv, Vol. 129, No. 1098, fols. 48-48v.
3°Jos£ de G&lvez to Mayorga, January 20, 1782,
AGN, RC, Vol. 122, expediente 6 , fol. 9* Jos& Antonio de 
Areche, who had served Viceroy Bucareli as fiscal. had 
been sent to the viceroyalty of Peru as Visitador General, 
Bobb, Bucareli, p. 248.
31Mayorga to Jos6 de G&lvez, July 11, 1781, AGN,
CV, Vol. 129, No. 1111, fols. 6l-6lv.
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ships left Veracruz loaded with a total of 4,515/000 
pesos, 15,000 quintales of gunpowder, 200 quintales of 
slow-match, and as much food as they could carry. There 
was no prospect of an increase in the number of ships 
from Havana, and the Viceroy canceled further movement 
of provisions to the coast. The warehouses of Veracruz 
were filled, and there was a shortage of mules in the capi­
tal and Puebla. He also ordered that the foodstuffs which 
had been longest in storage in Veracruz be withdrawn and 
sold for whatever they would bring. In Mayorga's judg­
ment the sale of the food, even at reduced prices, was 
preferable to its total loss through rot and insect dam­
age . Ships from the Peninsula were at this time apparently 
as scarce as ships from Havana, and the all-important 
refinement of silver had suffered. The Viceroy expressed 
his concern to Madrid:
I live in the greatest affliction because of the 
lack of mercury, because of which work in the mines 
has slowed, and consequently work in the Mint, and 
Your Excellency knows our commerce and agriculture 
depend on it.32
32Mayorga to Jos6 de Galvez, July 23, 1781, AGN,
CV, Vol. 129, No- 1177/ fols. 129-130v. At that time the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
189
Beset by quarrels with the Minister of the Indies 
and harassed by the enmity of the Intendant of the Army 
in Havana, the Viceroy could not know that the million 
pesos sent to Havana on July 11th for the use of the French 
would prove to be a contributing factor to the survival of 
the infant republic of the north. The arrival of Count 
de Grasse in the West Indies had set in motion a sequence 
of events which was to insure the military victory of the 
American and French forces over the British on the North 
American continent. General Washington saw in the French 
fleet and the troops it carried an instrument by which he 
could score a decisive victory either in New York over 
Clinton or in Virginia over Cornwallis. A reconnaissance 
of the British land defenses of New York City discouraged 
Washington and his French associate, Count Rochambeau, 
from an attempt on the city. They decided to move the 
combined American and French army southward and to
mercury used in the refining of Mexican silver came from 
Spain. Production at the once-rich deposit at Huancav^lica 
in the Viceroyalty of Peru had declined to a point that 
made its mercury more expensive than that brought from the 
mines of Almaddn, in Spain. A crew of experts from Almad£n 
had searched for mercury in New Spain from 1778 to 1780 and 
had spent 160,000 pesos, but had found nothing. Bobb, 
Bucareli. pp. 193-194.
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concentrate on Cornwallis, an easier target who had no 
fortress to which he could retreat..
Two dispatches important to the outcome of the 
war were written almost simultaneously by Sir Henry Clinton 
and Count Rochambeau. Clinton knew from intercepted enemy 
letters that de Grasse was coming to North America to 
support a land action by Washington and Rochambeau, 
although the exact destination was unknown. Therefore, on 
May 26, 1781, Clinton sent an order to Cornwallis to occupy 
and fortify a position either at Williamsburg or at York- 
town. After the inevitable criticism from British officers 
that followed Cornwallis' surrender, Clinton explained his 
order as follows:
And 1 was encouraged to run that risk [occupying 
the Williamsburg peninsula] from Lord Germain's 
having, in his letters of the 4th of April and 2nd 
of May, assured me that Sir George Rodney would be 
watchful of the Count de Grasse and not give him time 
to do me any material injury before he came to my 
succour, the more especially, too, as we still had 
six weeks before we might expect his arrival?3
33Willcox, American Rebellion, p. 317-
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On May 28th, Count Rochambeau wrote to Count 
de Grasse at Cap Francois, and asked him to come north to 
Chesapeake Bay with at least twenty-five warships and 
three thousand troops. He must also bring with him 
1,200,000 livres or their equivalent, for the French forces 
with Washington had only enough funds to support them until 
August 20th. The American army was in a wbrse financial 
condition. Most of the troops had not been paid in cash
t
since enlistment, and there were disturbinig signs of mutiny 
when orders were given for them to begin the long march 
from New York to Virginia. As Rochambeau expressed it: 
"These people are at the end of their means. " 34
When de Grasse received this letter, he decided to 
cancel the scheduled sailing of a large convoy of merchant­
men from the French West Indies to Europe and to take his 
entire fleet to the Chesapeake instead of employing it to 
protect French commerce. To subordinate commercial traffic 
to naval action was unthinkable to the English command.
34Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la 
France ji 1 'establigsment des Etats-Unis d 'Amerique. 5 Vols. 
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1884-1892), Vol. 4, p. 647
[hereafter referred to as participation de la France].
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The abrupt and uncharacteristic cancellation of the French 
convoy for Europe took the enemy by surprise and enabled 
the French to execute a departure from the West Indies 
without English challenge. 35 De Grasse had communicated 
the substance of Rochanibeau's request to Josef Solano, and 
the Commandant of Marine had approved the plan to move 
against Cornwallis, for de Grasse had promised to return 
to the West Indies in October to cooperate with the Spanish 
in the invasion of Jamaica. 36
Rochambeau wanted 1,200,000 livres. but it proved 
impossible for de Grasse to raise money in the French West
35Captain Thomas White, an English naval officer, 
commented on de Grasse's interdiction on merchant shipping 
thus :
"If the British government had sanctioned or a 
British admiral had adopted such a measure, however neces­
sary to carry a political operation, the one would have 
been turned out and the other would have been hung. No 
wonder they succeeded and we failed."
Quoted in Mackesy, The War for America, p. 419.
36Boniol, Participation de la France, Vol. 4,
p. 656.
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Indies. He offered to pledge his own extensive holdings 
in French Santo Domingo as security for a loan to the 
French crown, but his offer was not accepted even though 
the value of his properties far exceeded the sum needed. 
He conferred again with Solano, and then wrote to 
Rochanibeau on July 6ths
I have likewise done all in my power to procure 
for you the sum of 1,200,000 livres which you say is 
absolutely necessary. This colony is not in a con­
dition to afford you such a supply, but I shall obtain 
it from Havana, whither a frigate will be sent for 
that purpose, and you may depend on receiving that 
amount.37
On July 23rd, when de Grasse was ready to sail, 
two ships caught fire through carelessness. Several other 
ships were damaged while attempting to escape from the 
vicinity of the burning and exploding vessels, and the 
departure was delayed. Finally, the French fleet of 
twenty-eight ships of the line and auxiliary vessels sailed 
from Cap Francois on August 5th. De Grasse took his fleet
37Jared Sparks, compiler and editor, The Writings 
of George Washington. 12 Vols. (Boston: John B. Russell,
1834-1837)/ Vol. 8, pp. 522-523.
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westward through the narrow and difficult Old Bahama 
Channel. There were two reasons for choosing the dangers 
of this unfrequented passage. It was unlikely that any 
British ship would sight him, and its waters were a secure 
rendezvous point for the fleet and the frigate which would 
return from Havana. On August 17th the treasure ship 
joined de Grasse thirty leagues off Matanzas; it had 
received the needed money within five hours of its arrival 
at Havana.
The Cuban coastal pilots who had been guiding the 
ships were dropped on the 19th, and the French turned 
northward into the channel between the Bahama Islands and 
Florida. On his way de Grasse gave chase and captured all 
the ships he encountered. Four British vessels were taken, 
one of them a frigate which had been detached from Rodney's 
fleet and sent to Charleston.
Interrogation of the frigate's officers revealed 
that Rodney had gone to England and that the British in 
the West Indies were ignorant of de Grasse's departure.
The French were thus assured of not being taken in the 
rear. Since de Grasse succeeded in capturing all the 
British ships he sighted on the way northward, it was
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certain that Cornwallis and Clinton would have no precise 
warning of his time of arrival or his destination.
De Grasse scored a complete surprise. On 
August 31st an English naval lieutenant and a party of 
dragoons left Cornwallis to make a reconnaissance to Old 
Point Comfort. There the startled officer made a hasty 
count of "some thirty to forty" French ships in the bay, 
and he hastened back to Yorktown. Cornwallis and his 
7/000 men were trapped. 38 The opportune arrival of 
de Grasse was one of the most decisive employments of 
naval power in history, according to a prominent British 
naval historian, for "before it, the creation of the 
United States was possible; after it, it was certain. " 39
It is doubtful that the French-American victory 
over Cornwallis pleased Mayorga as much as a personal
38Charles Lee Lewis, Admiral deGrasse and American 
Independence (Annapolis: United States Naval Academy,
19̂ 5) / P • 140.
39Michael Lewis, The History of the British Navy 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 164.
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victory which he won in■September. The Viceroy scored a 
belated vindication of his conduct during the invasion of 
Nicaragua by the English. The King finally approved the 
measures taken to assist Matias de GcLlvez. However,
Mayorga was cautioned to continue his shipments of money, 
munitions, and food "with the same zeal and energy that 
Your Excellency has shown until now. 1,4°
At this time, for some unstated reason, the Viceroy 
chose to call to the attention of Josd de GcLlvez a project 
which had occupied his predecessor, Bucareli, for two and 
one-half fruitless years: the proposal by the Crown to
establish a foundry for bronze cannon near Veracruz. 
Exhaustive and expensive surveys had been made and the 
reports had been forwarded to Spain, where they had been 
received in silence. Mayorga sent the mass of correspon­
dence on the subject to Miguel Puchalt, the Commandant of 
Artillery at Veracruz, so that this officer could review 
the surveys and recommendations made by engineers between 
April, 1776, and November, 1779* He did this "in case His
4°Josd de GcLlvez to Mayorga, September 23, 1781, 
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 77, fol. 177*
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Majesty should decide to found this establishment.1,41 
Apparently no one cared to reopen consideration of an 
artillery foundry in New Spain, for Jos6 de G&lvez made 
no reply to Mayorga's letter.
At the moment the Minister of the Indies was more 
concerned with the projected invasion of Jamaica, prepara­
tions for which were to begin when Count de Grasse should 
return from North America to the West Indies, as he had 
promised to do in October. When the expedition against 
Pensacola had been planned, Mayorga had objected to sending 
regular troops from New Spain to join the siege because he 
had feared that a sudden English invasion would have found 
his kingdom defenseless. In the autumn of I78I Josd de 
Galvez acted to anticipate possible arguments by the 
Viceroy against releasing troops when the invasion of 
Jamaica occurred.
41Mayorga to Josd de Gdlvez, August 23/ 1781/ AGN, 
CV, Vol. 129, No. 1357/ fols. 340-340v. The Viceroy's 
letter concluded with a curiously naive statement: "The
smelter don Francisco Orttirzar, who was here, and whom 
Your Excellency knew, is dead: therefore he can not be
considered in this matter." The unsuccessful attempts to 
locate an artillery foundry in New Spain is treated in 
Bobb, Bucareli, pp. 110-112.
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The Minister stated that the combined forces of 
Spain and France would move against the island in January 
1782. Because of the strength of the expedition and 
because the English were aware of it, all threats of an 
English offensive against any Spanish possession had been 
eliminated. The enemy had lost West Florida, and he no 
longer had anything to protect in the Gulf of Mexico.
The only possible English response to allied naval hegemony 
would be to fall back and defend Jamaica, their most valu­
able colony in the West Indies. There was no possible 
threat to New Spain; consequently the Viceroy could have 
reason for not sending troops from Mexico to Cuba. As many 
troops as possible would be withdrawn from the garrisons of 
Cuba, and the soldiers from Mexico would replace them. The 
Viceroy was to prepare one of his three veteran regiments 
for service abroad, and the Governor of Havana would send 
ships for the regiment as soon as possible. Mayorga was 
to insure that the regiment was completely equipped and 
ready for immediate embarkation, yet not even an approxi­
mate date was given for the arrival of its transport. The 
instructions included the threat of royal displeasure which 
by now had become routine;
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It is well understood that the King will hold 
Your Excellency strictly responsible for any failure 
or omission noted in the swift and punctual observance 
of this Royal Order, 42
With the invasion of Jamaica scheduled for January 
1782 the question of the service of supply to Cuba became 
of paramount importance. The controversy over aid sent 
and aid required rose to a new pitch of acrimony. Mexico 
City and Havana exchanged accusations, and both parties 
appealed to Spain. Jos6 de Galvez lost no opportunity to 
express support for the Havana officials. Prom Spain the 
Viceroy heard once again that the statements of money and 
food sent to maintain the army and squadron had been 
received and noted, but that his remittances had been 
inadequate. The Minister of the Indies added a new alle­
gation, one which Mayorga, with his limited sources of 
information, was unable to refute: only assistance from
other sources had enabled the armed forces of Cuba to 
operate:
42Jos6 de GcLlvez to Mayorga, September 28, 1781, 
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 102, reservada No. 35/ 
fols. 210-21iv.
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The Army, the Marine and the expeditions have 
consumed much more than the amount Your Excellency 
has sent from tha’t Kingdom: if recristros had not
come from Spain With supplies, and shjLps from the 
colonies [unnamed], it would have been impossible 
for Havana to attend to its many obligations.43
Only two days before this complaint was written, 
the Viceroy had compiled what he regarded as documentary 
proof of his generous aid to Cuba. On October 24th he had 
received an account from the Ministry of the Real Hacienda 
in Veracruz of all that had been shipped from that port to 
Havana since he had assumed office. He forwarded the 
detailed statement to Jos6 de G&lvez with strong comments 
on the veracity of Havana's Intendant of the Army:
This copy is passed to the hands of Your Excel­
lency in order that you may be able with this document 
to cause His Majesty to judge correctly the erroneous 
concept created by the vicious account [ "siniestro 
informe"] of the Intendant of the Army of Havana about 
the scant aid I have sent there. As of the 17th 
this month [October] it amounted to:
1 1,986,779 pesos in silver 
51/143 tercios of flour
16 ,801 tercios of various dried vegetables
43Jos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, October 26, I78I, 
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 143/ fols. 249”249v.
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2 ,7 6 0 auintales of lead
672 tons of cut stone as ballast
1 /3^5 sheets of copper
100 tercios of ochre
101 tercios of bacon 
216 tercios of lard
20 tercios of sheepskins 
236 tercios of slow-match 
50 tercios of wool 
43 tercios of coarse cloth
2 ,5 6 6 boxes of one quintal of gunpowder each 
3 ,67 3 barrels of salt meat 
8,016 barrels of ham
whose total value amounts to 13,482,218 pesos, 
7 tomines, 3 2/3 granos.44
Although the Intendant at Havana had been told 
that there was a great quantity of food in the royal ware­
houses of Veracruz waiting shipment to Cuba, ships seldom 
came; and the food was rotting. The Viceroy had rounded 
up 1 ,913 criminals and vagabonds and had shipped them to 
Havana to serve aboard the warships of the squadron. In 
obedience to orders, the Regiment of the Crown was being 
prepared for service in Cuba, but the ships to transport 
them had not come, nor had there been word of their coming. 
With the tone of one who has proved a point, Mayorga
44Mayorga to Jcs£ de Galvez, October 24, I78I, 
AGN, CV, Vol. 129, No. 1317, fols. 28l-282v.
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concluded: "Let Your Excellency, who knows how to do
justice, judge if my assistance has been scant."45
In October nine warships and fifty-eight merchant­
men arrived safely at CcLdiz after a voyage from Veracruz 
and Havana. Included in their cargoes were 3/000,000 
pesos which were the property of the crown, the profit of 
the royal tobacco monopoly of New Spain.46 Jose" de G&lvez' 
account of the king's delight at the safe transit of the 
treasure was undoubtedly accurate, for the motherland's 
need for money was great. War spending had soon exhausted 
the royal treasury in Spain, although 2,000,000 florins 
had been borrowed in Amsterdam between 1778 anc* 1780. An 
appeal to the Five Great Guilds of Madrid for money had 
been denied, and the government had feared to levy ade­
quate taxes because of the possible effect on the public.
45Ibid., fol. 282v. Jos6 de GcLlvez eventually 
ordered the Intendant of the Army at Havana to send more 
ships to Veracruz, and to send them at more frequent inter­
vals, but little improvement is reflected in the Viceroy's 
correspondence. Jos6 de GcLlvez to Mayorga, April 12, 1782, 
AGN, RC, Vol. 122, expediente 100, fol. 186.
46Josd de GcLlvez to Mayorga, November 17, 1781,
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 175/ fols. 35^-35̂ -v.
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Frequent and regular shipments of Mexican silver to the 
Peninsula were impossible under war conditions. The issue 
of some sort of paper money had become necessary, other­
wise domestic commitments could not have been met, and 
the purpose of war materials abroad could not have been 
made.
Therefore, in the summer of 1780 the government 
had accepted the proposal of a merchant syndicate headed 
by a Frenchman, Francisco Cabarrus, to advance money 
against an issue of interest-bearing treasury warrants 
known as vales reales. which functioned as money. Sixteen 
thousand five hundred vales, each with a face value of 600 
pesos, had been issued: a total of 9/900,000 pesos. They
bore four percent interest and passed at face value plus 
the accumulated interest in the payment of obligations owed 
to the Crown or to private individuals. The vales were not 
legal tender for less than 600 pesos nor in retail 
transactions, and they did not circulate in the Indies.
A second issue of vales was made on March 20, 1781, 
to the amount of 5,303,100 pesos. Through this means Spain
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successfully overcame its temporary lack of specie.47 
There was only one possible source of silver to redeem 
the vales: New Spain. On November 16, ±781, there came
the inevitable order to Mexico City to send 2 ,000 ,000  
pesos for a payment to the Cabarrus syndicate.48 The 
Viceroy complied as soon as he received the order on 
March 26, 1782.40
Shortly after the surrender of Cornwallis at York- 
town on October 19, 1781, de Grasse disappointed his 
American allies by announcing that he must return promptly 
to the West Indies, as he had promised Commandant Josef 
Solano. In any case, established custom forbade large- 
scale naval operations in North American waters during the
47Earl J. Hamilton, "Monetary Problems in Spain 
and Spanish America, 1751 -1800 ," The Journal of Economic 
History. Vol,. IV, No. 1 (May 1944), pp. 41 -44 . A third 
issue to meet the emergencies of the war was made in 1782 
to the amount of 14,799/900 pesos. Although interest was 
not always paid promptly, all the vales were eventually 
redeemed and all interest paid.
48Josd de G&lvez to Mayorga, November 16, 1781, 
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente 173, fols. 347”348v.
49Mayorga to Josd de Galvez, March 26, 1782, AGN, 
CV, Vol. 130, No. 1598, fols. 230-230V.
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winter. In September, Jos6 de Galvez had notified Mayorga 
that the invasion of Jamaica was to take place in January 
1782. By November of I78I it appeared that the attack 
could not be made on schedule, and several factors 
combined to delay the expedition.
Spanish troops had been drawn off to put down a 
rebellion in the Natchez area where the English commander 
of Pensacola had incited revolt among the settlers in an 
attempt to relieve the Spanish pressure on West Florida. 50 
A rebellion caused by the imposition of hew and unpopular 
taxes had occurred in the viceroyalty of New Granada.
Seven warships and a regiment of troops had to be sent 
from Cuba to put down the rebels. 51 The French fleet had 
encountered heavy weather on its return voyage from North 
America to the West Indies; and in December I78I the 
British Admiralty was relieved to receive information 
relayed by an observer that de Grasse's fleet was lying in 
harbor at Martinique and that some of the ships were
5°Caughey, Galvez, pp. 214-220.
5■‘•Salvador de Madariaga, The Fall of the Spanish 
American Empire (revised ed.; New York: Collier Books,
1963), PP. 197-198.
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partially dismasted. There were no signs of an early 
movement against Jamaica.52
Viceroy Mayorga was informed of the delay, 
although he was not told all of the reasons for the post­
ponement. An invasion force of 20,000 Spanish and French 
troops would attack in March 1782 under the command of 
Bernardo de Galvez, who had been raised to the rank of 
Lieutenant-General since the conquest of Pensacola. The 
naval squadron which would transport and supply this army 
would be a combined force of Spanish and French warships.
The Minister of the Indies conveyed the King's 
confidence that the Viceroy would "continue as until now 
making frequent and abundant remissions of money and pro­
visions to Havana," a confidence which was somewhat mys­
tifying in light of the torrent of charges which had been 
directed at Mayprga in the past. The dispatch left no 
doubt that the interests of the viceroyalty would be 
completely subordinated to the needs of the expedition:
52Mackesy, The War for America, p. 449-
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His Majesty hopes that you will drain, if 
necessary, all the resources of that Kingdom to 
expedite the means by which the aforementioned 
enterprise of Jamaica may be accomplished.53
Draining the resources of New Spain was less dif­
ficult than the transmission of the resources to Cuba. In 
November there occurred an incident which well exemplified 
the difficulties which the Viceroy had to overcome because 
of the shortage of shipping and the generally poor condi­
tion of Spanish ships. In this instance, the only possible 
way to comply with the repeated orders to speed money and 
supplies to Havana was to violate long-standing prohibi­
tions against commerce with aliens.
On November 1st a warship from Havana, The San 
Francisco de Asis, and a French frigate from Santo Domingo, 
anchored at Veracruz with eight lesser vessels. The convoy 
had come for money and food. The Viceroy at once ordered 
two and one-half million pesos sent to the port, and three 
days later he sent another half million. As for food,
53Jos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, November 18, I78I, 
AGN, RC, Vol. 121, expediente I7 8, fols. 358~359v *
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there was more in storage at Veracruz than the whole convoy 
could carry.
Since the Regiment of the Crown had completed its 
preparation to move to Havana as ordered , the Viceroy 
directed its Colonel, Juan Cambiazo, to inquire when the 
necessary transports would come from Havana. The convoy 
commander reported that not enough ships were available at 
Havana to call for the regiment at any time in the near 
future. Consequently, Mayorga ordered the San Francisco 
de Asis and the eight merchant ships to receive the troops 
for their return voyage to Cuba, and he ordered the regi­
ment to prepare for embarkation. Francisco de Saavedra, 
the convoy commander, countered with the plea that his 
ships could not carry both the regiment and the supplies 
which Havana needed. There was space for one battalion, 
no more. 54
54The standard Spanish infantry regiment, which 
was the model followed by Villalba in organizing the fiijo 
regiments of New Spain, consisted of two battalions, each 
composed of two grenadier companies and eight fusilier 
companies. Its total strength, which included its com­
mand and staff group, was 1,446 officers and men. 
McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain," 
pp. 10-1 1.
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Furthermore, the San Francisco de Asis was in such 
poor condition that she would be unable to sail when the 
other ships had been loaded. Since most of the convoy 
officers, including the commander of the French frigate, 
were in the capital, Mayorga held a conference with them. 
The Spanish officers agreed that the need for funds in 
Havana was great, and that it would be best to send one 
million pesos and two companies of the Regiment of the 
Crown on the French ship, which was a swift sailer and 
ready for sea. The frigate was to be given rations to feed 
the extra men and any other help needed. The other two 
million pesos would follow on the San Francisco de Asis 
whenever that warship might be in condition to return to 
Havana. The eight merchant ships which had come to Vera­
cruz with her would have to await her repairs. The French 
commander of the frigate saw in the circumstances an 
opportunity to make a personal profit by trading in a 
product whose exportation the Spaniards had always reserved 
for themselves:
The French Commander having agreed to this, he 
asked of me the concession of buying and carrying on 
board 10 ,000 pesos invested in cochineal (qrana fina),
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which I have granted him because of the service he is 
rendering by carrying a million pesos and two companies 
of the mentioned Regiment. 55
Mayorga requested the Commandant of Marine at 
Havana, Josef Solano, not to send warships to Veracruz in 
such bad condition that repairs would be necessary once 
they had reached that port. Even minor refitting at Vera­
cruz was difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, for 
neither materials nor shipwrights were readily available 
there. When Jos£ de G&lvez learned of the poor condition 
of the warship and the delay of the convoy, he approved 
the Viceroy's request of Solano; and he added a similar 
admonition of his own. But he strongly disapproved of 
the sale of cochineal to the Frenchman, and forbade a 
repetition of the transaction:
Although His Majesty recognizes the good intention 
of Your Excellency in granting the petition of the 
French Captain in respect to carrying on board those 
marketable goods, he orders me to warn Your Excellency
55Mayorga to Josd de G&lvez, November 27# 1781, 
AGN, CV, Vol. 129, No. 1410, fols. 409-410V.
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that you cannot, and must not, concede such permission 
under any pretext, much less thl+- of exporation of 
cochineal.56
The focus of Spanish military attention had shifted 
from West Florida to the West Indies, where Jamaica was its 
primary objective and the Bahamas a secondary one. Financ­
ing and provisioning the projected attack on Jamaica was to 
be the principal duty of New Spain during the coming 
months. Although after the surrender of Cornwallis there 
were still 30,000 British troops in North America, they 
remained immobile in Halifax, and in the fortified enclaves 
of New York, Charleston, Savannah, and St. Augustine.
There was no threat to the Spanish gains in West Florida.
Yet in December I7 8I the Province of Louisiana
asked for more financial aid. The colony had never been
economically self-sufficient, and it had exceeded its
resources in supporting operations in West Florida and in
suppressing rebellion in the Natchez area. Cn June 30,
*
1780, Intendant Martin Navarro had received a royal order 
which empowered him to ask New Spain for any funds he
ssTos6 de Gcilvez to Mayorga, May 23, 178?, 
Vol. 122, expediente 17^, fols. 3Q9"309v.
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might need. On December 10, 1781, Navarro requested that 
the situado of Louisiana, 315/000 pesos, be doubled for 
the duration of the war. The Viceroy notified Jos£ de 
Gcilvez of his compliance with the request, although he 
added that Navarro had testified that Louisiana had never 
in the past suffered a food shortage or a scarcity of 
money, because New Spain had always promptly fulfilled 
its obligations to the province. 57
The letter from Navarro was a portent of things to 
come. Spanish military and naval activity steadily dimin­
ished during 1J82, and after the defeat of de Grasse by 
Rodney in April, there could be no question of invading 
Jamaica. In England, Lord North's ministry fell in March, 
and its successor, the Rockingham ministry, began a grad­
ual withdrawal from the war in America. Yet; paradoxi­
cally, the year 1782 would find the treasuries of New 
Spain, for the first time since the war began, unable to 
meet the demands made from Havana.
57Mayorga to Jos6 de Gcilvez, March 13, 1782, AGN, 
CV, Vol. 130, No. 1556, fols. 183-183v.
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C H A P T E R  V 
THE FINANCIAL STRAIN OF WAR
In the year 1732 the correspondence between Spain 
and Mexico City concerning the progress of the war began 
on a familiar note: the supplies sent to Havana were
insufficient for its needs. The complaints of the Minis­
ter of the Indies were based on information which he had 
received from Cuba the previous July, so slow was the 
transmission of letters across the Atlantic in wartime.
The officials of Havana had reported that the needs of the 
armed forces were so desperate that all shipments of food 
and money from Veracruz were consumed or spent immediately 
upon their arrival, and that all the warehouses v/ere 
empty. All treasuries were exhausted, and all branches of 
the royal service had incurred extraordinary debts. Jos6 
de G&lvez wrote that this deplorable situation had been 
called to the attention of the king, who had ordered that 
New Spain redouble its efforts regardless of the means
213
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used. The Viceroy's failure to increase the support given 
Havana would prevent Bernardo de Gcilvez from the accom­
plishment of the great objective with which he had been 
entrusted: the invasion of Jamaica.1
Since this rebuke was not received in tyexico City 
until July 6th, it must have crossed in its passage a 
letter from the Viceroy in which Mayorga made it clear 
that the financial resources of New Spain had at last been 
exhausted, at least for the time being.
On January 12, 1782, the warship San Francisco de 
Asis had sailed from Veracruz for Havana with two million 
pesos, and Mayorga had been notified that another ship 
from Havana would arrive in February for more money, and 
that it would convoy a number of merchantment which would 
transport food. Although the advice from Havana had not 
stated how many food ships would arrive, their number did 
not matter. There were enough provisions in the ware­
houses of Veracruz to fill all the vessels which Havana 
was likely to send at one time.
AJos6 de G&lvez to Mayorga, January 21, 1782,
AGNM, RC, Vol. 122. expediente 7# fol. 10.
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Regardless of the number of ships that came for 
money and food, the utility of their cargoes would be 
greatly lessened unless they sailed promptly for Havana 
after loading. Their turn-around time was inexcusably 
long, Mayorga stated, and it was not the merchant ships 
that caused the delays. Their armed escorts, the warships 
of the Real Armada, were seldom ready for sea when the 
storeships were prepared to sail.
Although he had been notified to expect a warship 
and its convoy of merchantmen in February, at the date of 
writing, March 6, they had not made port, nor had any 
officer in Veracruz had word of them. No matter how he 
exerted himself to accumulate money and food at Veracruz, 
Havana could not fully benefit from his diligence unless 
the supplies moved promptly. Therefore, the Viceroy stated, 
he had on that date sent orders to the officials of the 
Real Hacienda in Veracruz not to allow any warship from 
Havana to remain in the port longer than eight days.
As for the money which the tardy warhips would 
carry to Havana, there were waiting in Veracruz 4,000,000 
pesos. One million of this sum was a payment due the ‘ 
House of Cabarrus, and the remainder was for the needs of
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military and naval installations of Havana. Mayorga 
expressed the hope that a portion of this money would be 
given to the Viceroy at Santa F£ de Bogota, who had
written both to him and to the Intendant at Havana to
ask for 500,000 pesos. By the time Mayorga received the
request from Santa Fd, the San Francisco de Asis had been
ready to sail. All that he could collect on short notice 
was 200 ,000  pesos, but he had rushed them to Veracruz.
The custodians of this emergency shipment had found the 
warship in the act of making sail, and although they had 
asked the master to receive the money, he had refused, 
alleging that his ship was already behind schedule.
It was Mayorga's belief that at the moment the 
needs of the Viceroyalty of New Granada were greater than 
those of Havana.-2 He had written to the Cuban officials 
urging them to aid Santa F6 de Bogota, but neither Cuba 
nor New Granada could be helped until the overdue warship 
arrived at Veracruz to load ths four million pesos. By 
this shipment of money, the Viceroy affirmed, "the
2In 1781 a revolt had occurred in New Granada which 
had required military aid from Cuba (see p. 2 1 5 ).
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treasuries are exhausted, as are the means that have 
availed me until now not to ask loans of the merchants, 
but now I must do so."3
In ignorance of the exhaustion of New Spain's 
treasuries, Jose de Galvez imposed yet another obligation 
on the Viceroy. At some time in the near future a repre­
sentative of Colonel Gilberto Antonio de Maxent, the 
lieutenant of Bernardo de Galvez in West Florida, would 
present himself in Mexico City with written authorization 
from Martin de Navarro, the Intendant of Louisiana. Upon 
presentation of this order the Viceroy was to pay 300,000 
pesos to the bearer for an unspecified purpose. The direc­
tive to make this extraordinary disbursement was concluded 
with the warning which had become routine in Jose de Galvez' 
to Mayorga: "the king orders that this order be executed
without excuse or delay."4
3Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, March 6, 1782, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 130, No. 1542, fols. 167-168v . In spite of the 
exhausted treasuries the Viceroy expressed confidence that 
New Spain would be able to meet an obligation to pay
4,000 ,000 pesos to the House of Cabarrus before the end of 
1782. Same to same, March 26, 1782, ibid.. No. 1598, 
fols. 230r230v.
4Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, March 18, 1782, AGNM,
RC Vol. 122, expediente 72, fols. 132-132v.
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The shortage of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico, 
which had hampered the movement of supplies from Veracruz 
to Havana since the outbreak of war, was beyond the power 
of the Viceroy to solve without the cooperation of the 
officials in Cuba. There was on the east coast of New 
Spain no shipyard capable of building ocean-going vessels. 
A shipyard had once been in operation at the mouth of the 
Coatzacoalcos River on the coast south of Veracruz, but 
construction had proved too cosely, and the yard had been 
abandoned in 173^- During the viceregency of Bucareli 
the crown had proposed to reestablish the yard, but no 
action had been taken. 5
The Pacific coast of New Spain also lacked ships 
for the royal service, and in this area Havana could be of 
no assistance. On this coast the Viceroy had the responsi­
bility of supplying the missions and pueblos of California, 
as well as sending aid to Captain General Matias de Galvez 
in Guatemala. Although the lack of serviceable royal ships
sBobb, Bucareli. pp. 112-11^. More than two years 
were spent in making surveys for the proposed shipyard, 
but work was never begun.
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had forced Mayorga to charter a Peruvian merchantman in 
1 7 8 0 ,6 several ships had been constructed at the port 
of San Bias on the coast of Nueva Galicia since 1767.
In the summer of 1781 before the demands of Havana drained 
the treasuries, the Viceroy proposed to Spain that a 
frigate be built there; and he proposed also that an ample 
supply of tools and naval stores be kept in the warehouses 
of San Bias for future emergencies. After consultation 
with the San Bias officials he made a list of the equip­
ment needed for the construction of the new ship and for 
a stockpile of replacement gear.
On March 20, 1782, after an eight-month interval, 
Jose de Galvez forbade the construction of the ship at 
San Bias. Instead, he had ordered that it be built at 
Cavite, in the Philippines, where he had forwarded the 
specifications drawn up by the San Bias officials. Con­
struction costs would be lower in the islands, and the 
excellent woods available locally would be more durable
6See p. 118.
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than those of San Bias. 7 The Minister of the Indies 
realized the necessity of maintaining extra stores at 
San Bias. Therefore he had sent orders to Cadiz to ship 
the supplies specified in Mayorga's list by the next 
reqistro bound for Veracruz. However, because such 
stores were in short supply, "there will be sent one-half 
of the equipment listed in your letter. " 8 There the 
matter apparently ended. There are no references in the 
correspondence of Mayorga to the delivery of naval stores 
from Cadiz to Veracruz nor of the delivery of a new, 
island-built ship from Cavite to the Pacific coast of 
New Spain.
7Ships were built in the yards of Cavite on 
Manila Bay by Chinese and Malayan workmen. The ships' 
frames were often made of teak, and the sheathing was 
usually of lananq. an island wood which had the peculiar 
quality of absorbing small shot yet causing large shot 
to rebound harmlessly. When the Manila-built galleon 
Santisima Trinidad was attacked by the British during 
the Seven Years' War, they scored 1,080 hits with solid 
shot on the hull of the great ship, but none of them pene­
trated the lananq sheathing. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 
pp. 196-197.
8Jose de Galvez to Mayorga;-March 20, 1782, AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 122, expediente Jk, fols. I36-I36V.
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The efforts of the Viceroy to expedite maritime 
traffic on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts were thwarted 
by the order cancelling his plans to build a much-needed 
ship at San Bias and by disregard for his orders to limit 
the time spent at Verzcruz by a Havana ship to eight days. 
On March 6 the warship which Havana had promised in 
February arrived. Its Commandant was informed that he 
was to sail within eight days and that there was no excuse 
for delay; the treasure was ready for shipment. The port 
officials of Veracruz had been given strict orders to 
speed the departure of the ship and to assist its loading 
in any way possible. On March 26 Mayorga received word 
that the warship and the 4 ,00 0,J00 pesos were still in 
Veracruz and that it would not leave until April 1, carry­
ing the money and whatever food it could take. The 
Viceroy had believed that it had gone long before. Not
only had his orders been ignored, Mayorga complained to 
* *Jose de Galvez, but the fact that no storeships had 
accompanied the treasure ship meant that the warehouses 
of Verzcruz would remain full of food which was slowly 
rotting in the heat. The problem seemed to have no
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solution. If he ceased delivery of food to the port, 
there would be none ready if ships came for it. Yet if 
ships from Havana did not come more frequently and in 
greater numbers, the stored food would be wasted.
Mayorga apparently believed that the Minister of 
the Indies was representing his actions to the king in 
the worst possible light, for he concluded the account of 
his difficulties with Havana by this admonition:
That I have not sent greater quantities of food
than I have has been because of the ships, which
failing has not been of my doing, and thus let
Your Excellency present it to the King without any
disparagement of my conduct. 9
The primary concern of both Jose de Galvez and 
Mayorga during the first three months of 1782 was the out­
fitting and provisioning of the fleet and army gathering 
to attack Jamaica, an operation which had been scheduled 
for March. In spite of the repeated warnings from the 
Minister of the Indies to Mayorga and to other American 
officials that the preparations for the invasion be kept
9Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, March 26, 1782, AGNM, 
CV, Vol. 130, no. 1571/ fols. I98-I98V.
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secret, both London and the British West Indies had been 
aware of the threat to the island as early as October,
1781. Although the ministry of Lord North had been 
shaken by the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown and 
would in fact fall in March, 1782, the decision was taken 
to make an all-out effort to defeat the enemy in the West 
Indies. It was known that reinforcements for the forces 
threatening Jamaica were being readied in Cadiz and Brest. 
The only hope of salvaging anything from the war in 
America lay in mustering all the warships which could be 
fitted out in England and outdistancing the French and 
Spanish reinforcements across the Atlantic. The task 
was entrusted to Admiral George Rodney, whose unwise 
absence from his West Indian command in the summer of 
1781 had facilitated de Grasse's skilful move to Chesa­
peake Bay to entrap Cornwallis. 10 Rodney was equal to 
the task, for in spite of supply shortages, dockyard 
inefficiency and violent weather he sailed for the West
10"While the effects of his great miscalculation 
were unfolding in America he had been rewarded with the 
Vice-Admiralty of Great Britain." Mackesy, The War for 
America, pp. 444-445-
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Indies On January 14, 1782 with fifteen ships of the 
line and a promise of more to follow as they were fitted 
out. The French ships at Brest, without whose reinforce­
ment de Grasse would not attack Jamaica, were kept in 
port by the same westerly gale which Rodney was able to 
weather. Rodney's daring meant the difference between 
defeat and victory. On February 25 he joined Admiral 
Samuel Hood's twelve ships of the line at St, Lucia.
For the first time since 1779 superiority at sea had 
passed to the English.
On the island of Jamaica preparations for defense 
were underway. Governor Dalling, who had ordered the 
costly and futile expedition against Nicaragua, had been 
cordially hated by every sector of the island population. 
He had surrendered his post and returned to England, 
leaving the government in the hands of the Lieutenant- 
Governor, Brigadier General Archibald Campbell. This 
competent and well-liked officer reorganized the militia, 
strengthened the fortifications and sent out small craft 
to gather intelligence of the enemy's moves. 11
13-Ibid.. p. 444.
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Two days after Rodney's arrival in the West Indies 
he received a letter from Campbell giving full details of 
the enemy's preparations. A Jamaica ship had just 
captured a Spanish schooner bound from Cap Francois to 
Santiago de Cuba. On board the captured ship there were 
some English seamen who had been taken prisoner some time 
before. By interrogation of both the Spaniards and the 
Englishmen the. Jamaica authorities had been ablQ. to piece 
together an accurate account of enemy strength and 
intentions.
Campbell informed Rodney that "Don Galvez" [Ber­
nardo de Galvez] had just arrived at Cap Franqois with 
eight warships and 5,000 troops from Cuba. "Don Solano" 
[Josef Solano, Commandant of Marine] was underway from 
Havana to Cap Franqois with more ships and men. Cuban 
militia were assembling at Santiago de Cuba to be trans­
ported to Jamaica. The Spaniards were collecting provi­
sions at Santiago de Cuba for the expeditionary force.
Most important of all, the invasion would not begin until
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+reinforcements of ships and men arrived from Cadiz and 
Brest.12
More ships continued to join Rodney's fleet from 
North America and England. Even after four ships of the 
line from Brest joined de Grasse at Martinique, the British 
outnumbered their foes thirty-six ships to thirty-three.
At St. Lucia Rodney waited for de Grasse to move toward a 
junction with the Spanish at Santo Domingo. On April J, 
1782, word came from English picket ships that the French 
had left Martinique and had steered northward. Battle was 
joined near the lies des Saintes and by April 11 the French 
had been defeated and de Grasse was Rodney's prisoner.
Some units of the French fleet escaped to Santo Domingo,
Rodney was on their heels, and the great attack 
on Jamaica, to which all the enemy's movements 
since Yorktown had been directed, was abandoned.13
Apparently the Minister of the Indies never sent 
the Viceroy of New Spain a formal admission that plans to
12General Campbell to Admiral Rodney, February 27/ 
1782, Rodney, Letter-Book, Vol. 1, p. 312.
13Mackesy, The War for America, p. 3^8 .
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invade Jamaica had been abandoned after the defeat of 
de Grasse's fleet. Nor does a reading of Mayorga1s cor­
respondence reveal comment on the Battle of the Saints, 
Reference to an expedition against the island simply 
ceased after April, 1782, as if by a tacit acknowledge­
ment of its impossibility.
*Bernardo de Galvez had become impatient of the 
delays in attacking Jamaica long before the French defeat 
made it impracticable, and had turned his attention 
temporarily to a lesser offensive move against the 
English. In February, 1781, the Minister of the Indies 
had directed that "when the circumstances permit, an 
expedition should be formed against the Island of Provi­
dence. " 14 British privateers based on Nassau on the 
island of New Providence in the Bahamas had by the begin­
ning of 1782 captured fourteen Spanish, twenty-four French, 
one Dutch, and 137 American vessels.
From January to April 1782, Bernardo struggled 
with the naval authorities of Havana to obtain warships
l4See pp. 179-180.
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to convoy troop transports to New Providence. General 
Juan Manuel Cajigal, who had been entrusted with the com­
mand of the expedition, finally accepted the aid of an 
American privateer to guard his flotilla on the way to 
the Bahamas. 15 Cajigal's force sailed from Havana on 
April 22 and reached Nassau on May 6 . When called upon 
to surrender, Governor Maxwell complied at once. In view 
of the condition of the garrison under his command, his 
decision not to contest the Spanish invasion was 
unavoidable. 16
15Caughey, de Galvez, pp. 244-245.
16Since Nassau was a valuable base for privateers, 
it is difficult to understand why it had not been better 
garrisoned. Apparently Sir Henry Clinton had sent to the 
Bahamas only men who were incapable of serving anywhere 
else. The men sent to the islands were only serving time 
to make them eligible for disability benefits:
"Observing that there were several hundred invalids in the 
regular corps of the line, whose time of service had not 
yet entitled them to the benefits of Chelsea Ca pensioners' 
hospital in London] and who, though unfit for the more 
arduous services of the field, were capable of being very 
useful in garrisons . . .  I formed them [17783 into a gar­
rison for the defense of the Bernudas and Bahama Islands, 
where tjiey might have an opportunity of benefiting them­
selves as well as the public by completing the time they 
wanted to entitle them to become Chelsea pensioners. This 
battalion was rendered still more respectable by being
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The 274 English regulars and 338 militiamen taken 
prisoner were freed on parole and permitted to go to any 
English possession except Jamaica. One hundred and fifty- 
five pieces of artillery were captured, but the most impor­
tant gain was the seizure of twelve privateers and sixty- 
five merchant vessels which had been trapped in port when 
Cajigal's force arrived. 17
While the operation against New Providence was
being planned and executed with little difficulty, Matias 
✓de Galvez began an attack upon the English settlements in 
the Bay of Honduras. With more than 1,000 men he invaded 
the English-held island of Roatan on March 16 and after a 
short but fierce battle forced the two forts on the island
officered either by gentlemen from the half-pay list who 
solicited employment, or by worthy old officers whose 
wounds and infirmities had obliged them to retire from 
more active service."
Willcox, American Rebellion, p. 111.
17Fernandez-Duro, Armada. Vol.. 7 , p. 291. The cap­
ture of New Providence alarmed the English in East Florida, 
who had lived in fear of a Spanish attack ever since the 
outbreak of war. St. Augustine was not well-garrisoned, but 
it was not attacked. Apparently East Florida owed its immun­
ity to the unexpected length of Spanish operations in West 
Florida, the Natchez rebellion, plans for an attack on Jamai­
ca, and the capture of New Providence. Mowat, East Florida. 
P. 123.
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to capitulate. Within a few days he passed on to the 
mainland with his amphibious force and began systematically 
to take and put to the torch all the establishments .occu­
pied by the logwood cutters. 18 In contrast to the blood­
less conquest of Nassau, the battles for the Bay settle­
ments were marked by acts of savagery committed by both 
the Spaniards and their enemies. The king had several 
times ordered that the Mosquito Indians and their allies 
be exterminated if possible. The Indians, zambos and 
fugitive slaves were well aware that they could expect 
little mercy if they were captured. Consequently, they 
gave no quarter to Spanish captives.
Although Captain General Galvez made a clean sweep 
of the coastal settlements, his temporary hold on the area 
could not be long maintained,., because of the. limited forces, 
at his disposal and the difficulties of supplying permanent 
garrisons. When hard-pressed, the Baymen and their allies 
fled into the forbidding interior or retreated to other 
points along the coast. How the Bay settlers were able to
leFernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. J, pp. 291-292.
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disperse, to obtain food and to regroup is shown by a 
letter from the Governor of Jamaica to Admiral Rodney 
written June 4, 1782:
By an express just arrived fron the Superinten­
dent on the Mosquito Shore, I am informed that the 
Spanish Armament which destroyed the Works and 
Buildings at Rattan feoatanl, proceeded to Black 
River on the 3°th March and in co-operation with a 
large Body of Militia from the Back Country, drove 
the British Settlers from that Quarter: one Line of 
Battle Ship, a Frigate, three Schooners, one Sloop, 
two half Gallies, and five large Craft composed this 
Squadron, which I understand was chiefly fitted out 
at the Havannah; and from everything I can learn 
these Vessels are still upon that Coast, and mean 
to prosecute their intentions of extirpating the 
Settlers from the Shore.
Having had reason to apprehend by Intelligence 
received from the Havannah early in March, that the 
Spaniards had such an object in view, I gave direc­
tions to the Settlers at Black River in case they 
were drove from that Post, to retreat to Cape Gracias 
a Dios [150 miles to the east]; to which place a 
quantity of Indian presents Medicines and Provisions 
were sent for their relief. I am happy to find that 
those Provisions, etc. reached Cape Gracias a Dios 
on the 7th of April, and that the Settlers of Black 
River by following my advice have in a great measure 
been preserved from the distress arising from much 
fatigue, Sickness and Want.
In the present State of matters I think it my duty 
to apply to you for the aid of such Ships or Vessels, 
as you may deem necessary to drive the Enemy from the 
Coast; without which I have reason to apprehend, that
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this valuable body of Men will fall a Sacrifice to 
the Spaniards, who seem determined to pursue the 
advantage already obtained in that Quarter with 
every possible exertion.19
Rodney did not respond to this letter,' and on 
June 24 Campbell wrote again in more urgent terms, repeat­
ing that the Bay settlers must be given aid and that the 
Spaniards must be driven from their newly-won positions.20 
The Admiral answered Campbell's second appeal thus:
I wish it was in my Power, to send a Man of 
War immediately for the protection of the Musquito 
Shore, but the blowing weather has crippled so 
many of the ships, turning to Windward, and the 
Protection of the Trade of this Island, and bring­
ing it round to proceed with the Convoy takes up 
so many of the smaller Kind, that at present it is 
not; as soon as it is, a Man of War, and a Trans­
port, if one is to be got shall be appropriated 
for that Service.21
The "blowing weather" which had crippled Rodney's 
ships had completely cut supply lines between Yucatan, 
Galvez' base in Honduras, and the positions recently taken
l9Campbell to Rodney, June 4, ±782, Rodney's 
Letter-Books, Vol. 1, pp. 440-441.
2°Same to same, June 24, 1782, ibid.. pp. 461-462.
2lRodney to Campbell, June 26, 1782, ibid., pp. 454-
466.
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by his army. Communication between the ports was possible 
only by sea; protracted onshore winds and the chronic 
shortage of shipping meant disaster for the Spaniards.
The small and isolated garrisons which the Captain General 
had left scattered along the Bay of Honduras were swiftly 
riddled by hunger and disease. In some cases the men 
were reduced to eating bananas exclusively. 22
As soon as the gales abated, the English on 
Jamaica, freed by the Battle of the Saints of the French 
menace which for months had restricted their naval opera­
tions, struck again at the Bay settlements, On August 1J, 
an expedition arrived at Cape Gracias a Dios to unite 
with the Baymen who had taken refuge at this most easterly 
point of Nicaragua. In the next two weeks the English 
recovered all the posts which Matias de Galvez had taken.
22Menos Franco, Estudios histdricos, pp. 9^~95*
An interesting sidelight of the struggle for the Bay 
settlements was the activity of a North American adventurer 
named Jeremias Terry (sic) who for some time had been 
urging Galvez to allow him to attempt to persuade the 
Indians and the negroes to abandon their British allies 
and sign treaties with the Spaniards. Yielding to his 
pleas, Galvez gave him a ship and crew and allowed him to 
seek out the chieftains. Terry sailed south and landed .at 
the mouth of the Rio Negro, where he and all his crew were 
at once put to the knife ( pasados ja cuchillo) by the 
implacable natives. Ibid., pp. 92~93» 9^~97*
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By August 31 the invaders had reached the mouth of the 
Rio Negro, where the Spanish garrison surrendered the 
settlement of Criva. In reporting this latest reverse 
to Spain Viceroy Mayorga asserted that the officer com­
manding at Criva had no alternative to capitulation, for 
the English had come in overwhelming force: two ships of
the line, six frigates, two brigantines and a galley.
The English crewmen of the squadron were aided by 1,000 
Indians and Z-ambos and 500 Negroes. Many of the Spanish 
garrison were disabled by illness, and there were neither 
munitions nor provisions. 23
When Mayarga_received notice of.the loss of 
* *Matias de Galvez' recent conquests, he offered the Captain 
General whatever aid he needed to recover the lost terri­
tory. As it happened, no other attempt was made to retake 
the Bay settlements. No further offensive action was 
undertaken by any of the powers in the Gulf of Mexico or 
the Caribbean theatre from mid-summer, 1782, until the 
formal cessation of hostilities.
23Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, December 14, 1782, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1897, fols. 255-256.
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In Europe the first tentative moves toward ending 
the war had begun. After Yorktown the Americas, France, 
and England were all anxious to begin preliminary talks. 
The North ministry had no sooner fallen in England than 
Benjamin Franklin, American Commissioner in Paris, hinted 
by a note to Lord Shelburne, Secretary for Home Affairs, 
that he would talk with an envoy from London. Richard 
Oswald, appointed as the agent of Shelburne, had his 
first meeting with Franklin on April 12, 1782. Franklin 
then introduced Oswald to Count Vergenhes, the Frendh 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.24
Count Floridablanca, the principal minister of 
Carolos III, felt that the time had come to define the 
claims of Spain to be presented in the near future. On 
May 24, 1782, he drew up an apuntamiento (abstract) to be 
presented to the Council of Castile, outlining the general 
terms which the government of Spain must bear in mind 
during the negotiations among the belligerent powers. 
Comparing a treaty to the settlement of a suit at law
24Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 
pp. 194-195.
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which had been pending for a long time without having 
been judged, he began by.asserting that Spain found itself 
in a very strong position and that the nation should be 
able to gain all that it had sought when it declared war. 
In the Mer.i^an Gulf all foreigners had been successfully 
expelled; Mobile, Pensacola and all the forts on the 
Mississippi River had been taken. Spain needed only to 
assure her claim .̂n perpetuity to these settlements and 
their dependencies as far as the mouth of the Bahama 
Strait.
In the Gulf and Bay of Honduras and on the coast 
of the peninsula of Yucatan the settlements, English for 
the most part, had been totally destroyed, and according 
to the latest news, the coast would soon be taken in its 
entirety. In Europe Spain still hoped for the acquisition 
of Gibraltar and Minorca. Minorca had been taken by a 
joint French and Spanish expedition in February, 1792/ 
and a supreme effort would be made to seize Gibraltar 
within four months. All preparations had been made for 
an overwhelming assault on the fortress, and success 
could be expected. Floridablanca called these objectives,
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with those in the Gulf of Mexico "los puntos cardenales 
de la guerra ,0 ,de ,1a paz" (the cardinal points of war or 
peace). Or, alternatively, if Spain could seize Jamaica, 
a 1 superabundante recompensa" (ample compensation) could 
be arranged by which Spain would return Jamaica to 
England, retain Minorca, and acquire Gibraltar blood- 
lessly. If the war went well, it might even be possible 
to ask for restitution of fishing rights in Newfoundland. 25 
But if the war went badly, Spain could ask for the neutral­
ization of the Mediterranean and the establishment of a 
free port in Minorca. Gibraltar might be acquired by 
ceding to England some of the African possessions of 
Spain. However, if Spain received Gibraltar, it must 
retain Ceuta, which because of its location on the Moroccan 
coast directly across from the fortress, was indispensable 
to its defense. 26
25Silas Deane, the first American agent sent to 
France by the Continental Congress, had drawn up, without 
authorization from Congress, a treaty with France and 
Spain which guaranteed their possessions in America, gave 
them access to the Newfoundland fisheries and excluded 
British ships from American waters. Ibid., p. 52.
26Quoted in Danvila, Carlos III. Vol. 5, pp. 362-363.
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At the time Count Floridablanca wrote this paper 
he had not learned of the decisive defeat of de Grasse's 
fleet the previous month, and the English counter-attack 
in the Bay of Hondura was two months in the future. 
Rodney's victory at the Battle of the Saints restored 
English naval supremacy in American waters and made the 
invasion of Jamaica impossible for the time being.
Spain attempted no more adventures in America in 
1782, because its energies were directed toward another 
attack on Gibraltar. Count Floridablanca's prediction 
of another effort within four months was accurate, for 
on September 13 combined forces of Spain and France began 
their most ambitious attempt to overwhelm the British 
defenses. The attack was a total failure. It still 
might have been possible to starve Gibraltar into sub­
mission if the Spanish and French could have blocked the 
entry of supplies into the fortrees, but a fortuitous 
combination of circumstances deprived the besiegers of 
this last weapon. The energy of twenty-three year old 
William Pitt, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who contended 
almost single-handedly with general war-weariness and
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inertia, was responsible for forming a relief expedition 
which sailed for Gibraltar two days after the Spanish 
and French began their great attack. The supply squadron 
arrived at a moment when the futile assault had been sus­
pended and the blockading fleet which lay at Algeciras 
had been scattered by a violent gale. The English 
accomplished the final relief of Gibraltar without 
opposition. 27
"Little remains but to relate how the American 
war ebbed away and Jamaica remained secure against the 
last efforts of the Bourbonse" With this sentence a 
British historian disposes of all military and naval 
action from mid-1782 until the signing of the preliminary 
terms of peace in Paris on January 20, 1783-28 Yet 
"ebbing away" of hostilities in America brought no cor­
responding diminution of the obligations of New Spain to 
support armed establishments of Spanish North America. 
Ships and fortifications had to be maintained; crews and
27Wackesy, The War for America, pp. 483-484.
2SIbid., p. 489-
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garrisons had to be paid and fed. The same problems of 
supply which had persisted since 1779 continued without 
satisfactory solutions during the rest of the year 1782.
Jose de Galvez continued his familiar exhortations 
to speed cargoes to Cuba, and the Havana officials received 
yet another rebuke for sending unseaworthy vessels to 
Verzcruz. 29 New Spain continued to support its dependen­
cies, but only by a great effort.
In July, 1782, the Viceroy made it clear to the 
Minister of the Indies that the income of the Real 
Hacienda no longer sufficed to meet the needs of the 
internal economy of New Spain and at the same time to 
satisfy the incessant demands of Havana. Yet, para­
doxically, in spite of the unprecedented sums sent to 
Cuba the members of the armed forces and the island's 
civilian population were ill-fed. In response to the 
most recent complaint from Jose de Galvez that the vice- 
royalty's support of Cuba had been "scant," Mayorga wrote
29Tose de Galvez to Mayorga, April 26, 1782,
AGNM, RC,- Vol. 122, expediente 122, fols. 217-217^.
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a long expository letter in which he described the fiscal 
plight of his kingdom.
He began by noting the recent departure from 
Veracruz of the warship San Francisco de Asis with
2,000,000 pesos destined for Havana. This shipment of 
cash raised the amount sent to Havana since January, 1782, 
to 9,000,000 pesos. In fact, money was being shipped to 
Cuba more frequently than provisions, because those who 
commanded at Havana sent too few food ships. The Viceroy 
had attempted to augment the flow of food to the island 
by commandeering ships that came from Campeche to Vera­
cruz and despatching them to Cuba, but this irregular 
source of transport could not be relied upon. The lack 
of shipping space had resulted in the spoilage of thousands 
of pounds of flour. The flour had been dumped into the 
sea, because it was unfit for consumption and could not 
be sold even at reduced prices.
The Fiscal, Ramon de Posada, had told the Viceroy 
that the lack of food in Havana was due to the fact that 
all available merchant ships of that port had been com­
mandeered by the officials of the Marine for employment
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in the royal service. The merchants of the island found 
themselves without means to carry provisions from Vera­
cruz to satisfy the normal demands of their trade. Mayorga 
stated that he had sent copies of the Fiscal1s allegation 
to Havana, and that he had asked those in command how they 
proposed to solve the difficulty. If ships belonging to 
or chartered by the Real Armada did not call at Veracruz 
for food, and if at the same time the merchants were 
denied use of cargo space, how was the island to be fed?
At the time of writing, July 6, the Viceroy had received 
no response to his queries from Havana.
In view of the distress of the Havana merchants 
and the needs of the civilian population, the Viceroy had . 
taken an unprecedented step to relieve the scarcity of 
food. He had ordered that flour consigned to private 
merchants be embarked at Veracruz on warships bound for 
Havana. Mayorga hoped that the resort to this extra­
ordinary expedient would make it clear to the Minister of 
the Indies that the food shortage in Cuba was not his 
fault. The Viceroy added, parenthetically, that he hoped 
Jose de Galvez would present the situation in its true 
light to the king.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
243
The 9,000,000 pesos which had been sent to Havana 
had been accumulated by great effort, and it would have 
not been possible to send this amount if the Viceroy had 
not borrowed 1,500,000 from private individuals.
The Viceroy had at last been forced to ask loans 
from the Consulado de Comercio and the Real Cuerpo de 
Mineria.30 Each of these bodies had offered to lend the 
crown 1,000,000 pesos, and each had demanded special 
privileges for doing so. The Consulado de Comercio 
received for its maintenance six-tenths of one percent of 
the value of all merchandise imported from Europe. This 
maintenance tax (derecho de averia para su Subsistencia) 
was to be increased to a flat one percent until the Crown
30The Consulados de Comercio have been described 
as "perhaps the most powerful nonpolitical corporations in 
New Spain and Peru." These merchant importers, through 
their guild, acted as an authoritities in matters of trade 
communication, served as a tribunal in contractual dis­
putes and questions of bankruptcy and freight charges.
They constructed canals and roads and maintained hospitals. 
The Consulado de Comercio of Mexico had been founded in 
1594. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America. pp. 253”254, 
300. The Real Cuerpo de Mineria. whose functions were 
analogous to those of the Consulado de Comerico, had been 
formally constituted in 1777 in an effort to stimulate the 
production of precious metals in New Spain. The creation 
of this body and its work are thoroughly treated in Bobb, 
Bucareli. Ch. J, "The Mexican Mining Industry," pp. 172-204.
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repaid its debt to the Consulado. The Real Cuerpo .de 
Mineria was to be permitted to collect from the Casa de 
Moneda twenty grains for each ounce of twenty-two carat 
gold and ten grains for each silver mark that the mint 
received.31
The movement of private and crown cargoes, between 
New Spain and Havana and between Havana and Spain, con­
tinued to be irregular and infrequent. On May 5, 1782, a 
fleet of mercury ships from Spain made port at Veracruz, 
and the Viceroy took advantage of their presence to
✓embark goods of private merchants for shipment to Cadiz. 
Jose de Galvez, mindful of the disruption of commerce 
caused by the war, instructed Mayorga to make preparations
31Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, July 6 , 1782, AGNM,
CV, Vol. 131, No. I69I, fols. l-2v. It is difficult to 
reduce these weights to their modern equivalents. One gram 
is the metric equivalent of 15.43 grains. Escudos, often 
called doblones because of the prevalence of multiple units 
(2 , 4 , 8— escudo pieces) were coined from 22-carat gold and 
weighed 230.246 grams, or 1/68 of a mark. The marco de 
Plata de 11 dineros, as the silver mark is described in 
the letter, was the amount of nearly pure (9 1 .7 percent) 
silver from which 68 of the famous "pieces of eight" ( reales 
de ei 8) could be struck. The problem of identifying the 
various types of money in simultaneous circulation during 
the eighteenth century is explained in Hamilton, "Monetary 
Problems in Spain and Spanish America," pp. 22-23*
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for the departure of a convoy from Veracruz in November.
The Viceroy was to "hint, exhort and demand" (intime, 
exhorte y  estreche) that all merchants collect as much 
money as possible for the purchase: of Peninsular merchan­
dise. These funds, together with all products destined 
for Spain, were to be sent to Veracruz before November 3 0,
1782. Jose de Galvez had ordered the Commandant of 
Marine at Havana to send warships to Veracruz by the end 
of November to escort "whatever reqistros might be in 
condition to sail." The merchant ships and their escorts 
were to proceed to Havana by January, 1783- There they 
would be joined by the merchant ships in that port that 
were "fit to make it" (_en aptitud de harcerlo) . The com­
bined ships were to sail for Spain in February. For the 
merchants of New Spain who were unable to meet the Novem­
ber 30 deadline for shipment another convoy might be 
arranged at a later date, "if the circumstances of the 
war should permit it."32
32Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, August 27/ 1782, AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 123/ expedients 68, reservada No. 42, fols. 164- 
175. In contrast to the vigorous and urgent style of 
Galvez' letters, this one is pessimistic in tone. In spite
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Although the war had all b:;t halted the flow of 
traffic between New Spain and Cuba, the officials of 
Havana were unfailingly prompt in the delivery of requests 
for assistance needed by the military and naval establish­
ments. Another such request reached Mexico City on 
August 28.
It was beyond the capacity of New Spain to produce 
what Havana asked. The Viceroy, in explanation of his 
inability to comply, wrote for the Minister of the Indies 
a kind of abstract which listed the contributions of the 
viceroyalty to that date and reviewed the many obligations 
of its treasuries. The Governor of Havana had begun his 
statement of needs by asking for two battalions of troops 
for garrison duty in Cuba. The soldiers from New Spain 
would serve as replacements in units whose ranks were 
thinned by sickness. The Viceroy referred to the request 
to his Inspector General, Pascual de Cisneros. The
of the emphatic orders issued to Havana, the reader 
receives the impression that the Minister doubts the war­
ships will meet the appointed deadline. In three refer­
ences Galvez speculates about the number of vessels which 
are seaworthy and capable of making the voyage to Spain.
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Inspector responded, with many plausible arguments, that 
the transfer of any tropes from New Spain was inadvisable. 33
Josef Solano, Commandant of Marine at Havana, had 
asked for more seamen, but the Viceroy maintained that 
there were hardly enough sailors at Veracruz and other 
ports to serve the necessary coastal traffic. Between
33The Inspector had never willingly relinquished 
men from the area of his command. In every instance 
that a transfer of troops from New Spain was proposed, 
Cisneros was able to muster urgent reasons for retaining 
them in New Spain. The Inspector General was apparently 
a belligerent character who seized every opportunity to 
quarrel with his superiors about every encroachment on his 
prerogatives. In I78I Jose de Galvez had asked Mayorga 
and Cisneros to resolve their continual guarirels^in the 
interest of efficient administration. Jose de Galvez to 
Mayorga, May 30, 1781/ AGNM, RC, Vol. 120, expediente 305> 
fols. 4l4-4l4v. In 1782 the arrest of a single soldier 
in Mexico City precipitated a jurisdictional quarrel between 
the civil and military authorities of the capital. Cis­
neros demanded the intervention of the Viceroy. Mayorga 
refused, and "for the next two years, two Viceroys,
Mayorga and Matias de Galvez, were harassed by representa­
tions growing increasingly acrimonious." McAlister, Fuero 
Militar, p. 34. Viceroy Bucareli had written a scathing 
description of Cisneros' character in a private letter to 
Alejandro O'Reilly:
"You knew that no one exceeds the limit prescribed by his 
talents, and you know what fell to this individual is not 
of great extent. Otherwise, he is a good man, although 
with the misfortune of always disgusting those who must 
obey him and serving little^those who command him."
Quoted in Bobb, Bucareli, p. 94.
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August, 1779/ anĉ  July, 1782, 2,003 criminals and vagabonds 
had been condemned by the courts of New Spain to serve in 
the Havana squadron, and more would be pressed into service 
as soon as enough able-bodied man could be collected to 
warrant sending a ship from Havana to transport them. 
Mayorga had informed Francisco de Saavedra that it was 
impossible to send more troops and seamen to Havana, and 
Saavedra had understood. 34
In the view of the Viceroy the demand of Havana 
exceeded reason, and he made a brief recapitulation of
34The exact identity of Francisco Saavedra and 
his mission to New Spain remain a mystery. Mayorga speaks 
of him in his letter as having been "sent by those 
Generals" [of Havana]. Bancroft describes him as a 
mysterious stranger who had no specific duties but who 
had access to the highest official circles^. Hubert H. 
Bancroft, The History of Mexico. 6 volumes (San Francisco:
A. L. Bancroft Co., 1883-1888), Vol. 3 , pp. 38I-382. 
Bustamante, a partisan of Mayorga, has written, without 
citing sources, that Saavedra was an agent of the Minister 
of the Indies sent to criticize of censure (fiscalizar) the 
unfortunate Viceroy who had unwittingly frustrated the 
designs of the Galvez family. Andres Cavo, Los tres siglos 
de Mexico durante el gobierno espanol hasta la entrada del 
eiercito triqarante con notas v supplemento por el Licienci- 
ado Carlos Maria de Bustamente. 4 vols. Mexico: Imprenta
de Luis Abadiano y V&ldes, I836-I838/ Vol. 3/ P* 42.
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that its officials were incapable of anticipating their 
own needs. In December, 1781, a French frigate had been 
pressed into service to make an emergency remission of
1.000.000 pesos to Havana because the Spanish warhips sent 
to Veracruz for that purpose had been incapable of making 
sail. When the warship, the San Francisco de Asis, had 
finally been made seaworthy, it had carried more than
2.000.000 pesos. Then had come the warship San Aqustin 
to carry back 4,000,000 pesos to Havana. The San 
Francisco de Asis soon returned, and on its second voyage 
it loaded 2,000,000 pesos for the same port. At the time 
that Mayorga wrote, September 25, 1782, the warship 
Velasco was at Veracruz, and 3,000,000 pesos had already 
been consigned to it. More than 12,000,000 pesos had 
been sent to Havana in nine months of the current year, 
1782, and that sum was in excess of Havana's estimate 
for the entire year.
Mayorga asserted that the crown income in New Spain 
had never equalled the sum collected in 1781: 18,918,390
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pesos. 35 Even so, the treasuries could not meet their 
heavy obligations. Already more than 4,000,000 pesos had
35This sum does not agree with the figure given by 
Humboldt, although his Ensayo politico seems to confirm 
Mayorga's claim that the Rentas of the Real Hacienda had 
risen to unprecedented heights during his administration. 
Humboldt gave these figures for 1779# 1780, 1781, 1782: 
15/544,574 pesos, 15,010,974 pesos, 1 8,091,639 pesos, 
19/594,490 pesos. Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre Nueva 
Espana, Vol. 4, p. 442. A recent and thorough monograph on 
the Real Hacienda during the second half of the eighteenth 
century stated that there remain unreconciled discrepancies 
in the accounts of crown income and expenses during this 
period. The most comprehensive account is Fabian de Fonseca 
and Carlos de Urrutia, Historia General de la Real Hacienda 
escrita por D. Fabian de Fonesca JD. Carlos de Urrutia por 
orden del Virev, conde da Revillaqiqedo, 6 volumes, (MexicO: 
V. G. Torres, 1845-1853). Portions of this work, one of 
which was cited on p. 2 , are scattered throughout the ramo 
Historia (565 tomos) of the Archivo General de la Nacion. 
Mexico City. One of the men who assisted Fonseca in the 
compilation of his work later wrote a brief study of the 
same subject: Joaquin Maniau Torquesmada, Compendio de la 
Real Hacienda de Nueva Espana escrito en el a no d c 1794 por 
D. Joaquin Maniau oficial mayor de la Direccion Contaduria 
general del tabaco de dicho reyno contador del Montepio de 
of icin ̂  s por S..M. (Mexico: Imprenta y Fotocopia de la
Secret a jria de Indust ria y Comercio, 1914) . These works have 
never beep, thoroughly analyzed and correlated with each 
other, much less with all the documents that were used in 
their compilation. On the whole, the figures given by Hum­
boldt for income of the Real Hacienda can be accepted, accord­
ing to the recent exhaustive monograph of Andres Lira Gon­
zales, "Aspecto fiscal de la Nueva Espana en la segunda mitad 
del siglo XVIII," Historia Mexicana. Vol. XVII, num. 3 
(Enero-Marzo, 1968), p. 389. This monograph includes a fold- 
out graphic representation of the forty-odd ramos which con­
tributed to the crown income. *'tfhi's is in itself proof of the 
great task that awaits futute investigators.
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been borrowed from private individuals, and the Consulados 
of Comercio and Mineria were in the process of raising 
another 2 ,000 ,000 pesos.
Although Jose de Galvez was well aware of the mani­
fold nature of New Spain's financial commitments, the 
Viceroy listed them for emphasis: the funds sent to Spain,
the situados of Havana, Louisiana, Santo Domingo, Puerto 
Rico, the Philippine Islands, the expenses of the Interior 
Provinces and the Department of San Bias, salaries, chari­
ties, special projects undertaken by order of the crown, 
remissions to Guatemala, and the salaries of the troops.
i ,
On September 7 the treasury officials had given
him a statement which proved that the total disbursements
from the treasuries since the beginning of the war had
reached 40,197*036 pesos. Even the unprecedented income
/could not support such burdens. Mayorga ^sked Jose de 
Galvez to present these figures to the king, "who I do not 
doubt will understand that it has been impossible to make 
greater exertions. " 36
36Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, September 25* 1782, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, no. ±824, fols. 155-157-
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In enumerating the various purposes for which the 
wealth of New Spain was spent the Viceroy failed to men­
tion that some items were subject to change without notice, 
a practice which made it impossible for treasury officials 
to predict disbursements for the coming year. Such a 
change was made less than one month after Mayorga had 
written his summary of New Spain's fiscal difficulties.
On September 28 Jose de Galvez ordered that the Province 
of Louisiana be paid 250,000 pesos to redeem an issue of 
paper money printed by its Intendant, Martin Navarro. No 
allegation was made that New Spain had been tardy in its 
payment of the situado; the shortage of money had resulted, 
it was said, from unspecified "extraordinary expenses. " 37 
On October 26 another cedula followed directing that the 
situado of Louisiana 315,000 pesos, be doubled for the 
duration of the war. The 250,000 pesos for the redemption 
of Navarro's bills had still to be paid. 38
37Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, September 28, 1782, 
AGNM, RC, Vol. 123, expediente 119, fol• 2 69.
38Same to same, October 26, 1782, ibid.. expediente 
153, fol. 333* This order to double the situado of Louisi­
ana was not received until April J, lj83> long after the 
preliminary peace treaty had been signed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
253
Of more concern to the Viceroy than sudden demands 
for money, like the increased Louisiana situado. was the 
confusion resulting apparently from inaccurate bookkeeping 
in Mexico City or Havana. Two months after Mayorga had 
protested to Jose de Galvez that the treasuries of New 
Spain could not support present obligations, his Fiscal 
informed him that it was impossible to reconcile Havana's 
account of money received from Mexico with the sums which 
the Mexican treasury officials claimed to have sent to 
Havana.
On August 28, 1782, the Governor and the Commandant 
of Marine at Havana had presented a financial statement 
divided into two parts: an accounting of all funds
received from New Spain during the past year, and an 
estimate of the money required for the coming year. 
According to its own records, Havana had received and 
had spent 13/889,726 pesos. It was alleged that this 
sum had been insufficient, and the warship Velasco had 
sailed from Veracruz with an emergency remission of 
3/000,000 pesos, all that Mayorga could collect at the 
time (Havana had asked for 5,000,000 pesos). The puzzled
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Fiscal in Mexico City could not understand why Havana 
needed money for current expenses. The records in Mexico 
City showed that 13/946,550 pesos had been sent to the 
islano, while Havana acknowledged paying out 13,889,726  
pesos for all purposes. What had happened to the missing 
56,824 pesos?
Even if the discrepancy between money sent to 
Havana and money spent by Havana could be attributed to 
errors in bookkeeping, there remained serious inconsis­
tencies between the records kept in Havana and those in 
Mexico City. Mayorga charged that Havana's reckoning 
would be incomplete even if the discovery of bookkeeping 
errors could make it arithmetically correct, for there 
were important items that did not appear in the recapitula­
tion. Where, the Viceroy asked rhetorically, were the 
shipping charges which New Spain had to pay to merchant 
ships because ships of the Real Armada had not been sent 
from Havana when they had been needed? The expenses of 
Bernardo de Galvez' army had not been listed. Mayorga
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could find no mention of the emergency shipment of 500,000 
pesos in August, 1781, to give to de Grasse.39
After the financial statements from Havana arrived, 
the conciliar machinery of the government went into opera­
tion to determine how much money could be committed to 
the expenses of Havana and its dependencies for the coming 
year. The ca~jas reales of New Spain were empty, and the 
Tribunal de Cuentas was called into session to advise the 
Viceroy and the Fiscal.40 However, the Tribunal declared
"Mayorga knew how the 500,000 pesos had been 
spent. His letter cited the name of the French frigate 
which called at Havana for the money, the name of its com­
mander and where the treasure ship made rendezvous with 
de Grasse's flfeet. He mentioned de Grasse's successful 
operations in North America, and he was indignant because 
his government's timely contribution to the common war 
effort did not appear in Havana's account of money spent.
4°Until 1605 the Council of the Indies had been che 
final court of audit for all financial matters. In that 
year three tribunales de cuentas were established at Lima, 
Mexico City, and Sante Fe de Bogata. These tribunals were 
independent of the audiencia, and they were empowered to 
audit all public accounts. Each year they inventoried the 
principal cajas reales. Haring, The Spanish Empire in 
America, pp. 282-283- The body had been described as a 
"tribunal which scrutinized the administration of the 
Hacienda and which was thoroughly informed on all fiscal 
questions." Lira Gonzalez, "Aspecto fiscal de la Nueva 
Espana," p. 365*
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that it was unable to make an estimate of the crown income 
for the coming year; consequently the body had no course 
of action to recommend. The Viceroy and the Fiscal then 
decided to send all of New Spain's records of money paid 
to Havana to the Intendant of the Army at that port in 
the hope that the difference between the two accounts could 
be explained.
Since the Tribunal de Cuentas had been unable to 
arrive at an approximation of the next year's income,
Mayorga and the Fiscal called on a lower rank of the official 
hierarchy for aid. The Directors of all ramos of the Real 
Hacienda were asked to inventory the contents of their 
respective cajas and to calculate their next year's receipts. 
When each branch had made its inventory and attempted to 
fix the amount of its future collections, the Directors 
would form a Junta to apportion the burden of fulfilling 
Havana's demands, "which are made every moment" (que a 
cada instanto se ofrezen).
Mayorga declared that he was completely at a loss 
to determine exactly how much Havana needed for the coming 
year and when the "year" began. The estimate from which
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he was working had been prepared in Havana in August, but 
since then I-Iavana had called several times not for specific 
sums but for all the Viceroy could deliver. Mayorga felt 
that Havana was already spending next year's subsidies. 
Therefore, he adjusted Havana's figures to fit his own 
interpretation.
Havana had asked for 1 3,918 ,668 pesos, and that sum 
included 2,000,000 pesos which had to be paid in Havana as 
another installment of the Cabarrus loan. The warship 
Velasco was at the moment en route to Havana with 3»000,000 
pesos, all that could be collected from the reales cajas. 
and Mayorga felt that this sum should be deducted from 
Havana's estimate. Here the Viceroy's uncertainty is 
apparent in his phraseology: "At least to me it means
the following" (_a _lo menos me significa lo siquiente): 
that he needed to send 10,918,668 pesos to Havana during 
the coming year.
From that date forward all remissions to Havana 
would be considered by a full junta of the Real Hacienda
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before being authorized and a full account of all the
proceedings would be sent to Spain in quadriplicate. 41
The question of the funds to maintain Havana and
its dependencies was the last significant war matter to
concern New Spain. No formal statement from Spain
signalled the general reduction of activity. On the
/ /other hand, Jose de Galvez outlined no more plans for 
future campaigns as he had done in past years. The war 
simply slowed to a stop, and as the year 1782 drew to a 
close, the flood of royal cedulas relative to military 
matters slowed to a trickle, and those few letters con­
cerned only routine matters.
In spite of the Viceroy's protests that New Spain 
could not meet what Havana considered to be its needs, 
money continued to flow from Mexico to Cuba. By December, 
Mayorga had collected 2,000,000 pesos to send to Veracruz, 
where the silver would await the next warship. A brief 
flurry of alarm occurred when Havana reported that an 
English fleet had sailed from New York for an unknown
4lMayorga to Jose de Galvez, November 28, 1782, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1866, fols. 213-216.
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destination. The Viceroy ordered that all treasure bound 
for Veracruz be stored at Jalapa, twenty leagues distant, 
until it should be definitely known that the enemy naval 
force was not directed against either New Spain or Cuba.42 
As it happened, the British fleet under Sir Samual Hood 
was moving to Jamaica in response to the repeated requests 
of its Governor, who feared that the French and Spanish 
were planning an invasion.43
There was a last flare-up of the old animosity 
between the Minister of the Indies and the Viceroy when 
Jose de Galvez complained that the Governor of Yucatan 
did not have enough artillery or troops to protect his 
province against an enemy attack. Mayorga answered on 
December 14, 1782, with a curt letter notable for its 
uncharacteristic bluntness. The Viceroy declared that 
he had always aided Yucatan promptly and effectively, 
that its Governor was well-pleased with the support he
42Same to same, December 14, 1782, ibid., No. 1898, 
fols. 257-257v.
43Mackesy, The War for America, p. 493*
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had received from Mexico and that he had letters from 
the Governor to prove it.44
It is possible that the Viceroy had learned from 
private sources of information that a cedula had been 
issued on October 14 relieving him of his position and 
designating Matias de Galvez as his successor.45 The
44Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, December 14, 1782, 
AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1892, fols. 247~247v.
A C T  *  '*3Matias de Galvez must have been informed of his 
appointment as Viceroy before Mayorga received notice of 
it, for he began his journey northward from Guatemala on 
March 8. Rivera Cambas, Los gobernantes de Mexico, Vol. 1,
PP. 448-449.
Mayorga had been requesting that the king name his suc­
cessor ever since a courier from Mexico City had informed 
him on April 24, 1779, that the Audiencia Gobierna of 
Mexico City had named him Viceroy. He had declared that 
he was surprised by the honor and he had been reluctant 
to accept the post. On May 3, 1779/ be wrote the first 
of many letters to Spain asking to be relieved, but a real 
cedula of August 27, 1779, had ordered him to continue 
serving as interim viceroy. After he had been in office 
only six months he wrote again to Spain to describe in 
detail the hardships he had to endure. After recapitulat­
ing his appeals for relief, he asserted that he would 
serve, as ordered, but he pleaded for full salary instead 
of the 20 ,000 pesos he received.
"I believe that I owe Your Excellency the thought that 
having served the Government of Guatemala at a most criti­
cal, calamitous and troublous time I could not produce
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261
removal of Mayorga and his replacement by the Captain
General of Guatemala may be interpreted as unofficial
admission by the Spanish government that the war had for
all practical purposes ended and that the talks then in
progress in Paris would result in a definite peace treaty.
The emergency which had caused Mayorga to be retained
against his will as an interim viceroy had passed, and 
/  /Matias de Galvez gained the post from which ..chance had 
barred him four years previously.
enough profits to compensate for the necessary move to 
America, for my decent subsistence here, and that of my 
family in this Kingdom. To this must be added the great 
costs of the slow and painful journey which I made to this 
Capital, to that end freeing the villages enroute from 
the burden which such cases entail. The necessity of 
maintaining the position of my wife in Madrid and my sons 
in the service with distinction, and lastly the need of 
great expenditures for the decoration and furnishings of 
this palace, and to subsist in this Kingdom with all the 
splendor and decorum which the rank of Viceroy demands: 
these rise to an inst^pportable height, as Your Excellency 
knows very well.
"These weighty motives, and the knowledge that the penetra­
tion of Your Excellency can do no less than find them just, 
are sufficient to compel me to ask for full salary."
Mayorga to Jose de Galvez, February 28, 1780, AGNM, CV,
Vol. 126, No. 377/ fols. 88-8 9 . His salary was not 
increased.
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Six months elapsed before the order by which 
Mayorga was relieved reached New Spain, and the Viceroy 
surrendered the baton of command to Galvez on April 28, 
1783- 0n May 19 the new Viceroy received official word 
from Madrid that Carlos III had acceded to the terms of 
the preliminary peace which had been signed in Paris on 
January 20# 1783*46 The war to which New Spain had con­
tributed so much of its wealth had ended. The nature and 
extent of that aid will be examined in the conclusion 
which follows.
46Jose de Galvez to Mayorga, January 20, 1783/ 
AGNM, RC, expediente 18, fols. 3^“3^v *
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CONCLUSION
The interval between the declaration of war by 
Spain and the cessation of hostilities corresponds 
roughly to the viceregency of Martin de Mayorga. News of 
the declaration of war reached Mexico City on August 13, 
1779; Mayorga entered the capital to begin his duties on 
August 23, 1779» The order to cease hostilities arrived 
at Mexico City on May 19, 17^3; Mayorga surrendered his 
office to Matias de G&lvez on April 28, 1783.
A real c6dula ordering the residencia of Mayorga's 
administration was issued on September 19, 1783* Included 
in the evidence collected for the judicial review of the 
Viceroy's conduct in office is a group of papers entitled 
"Orders, Drafts, Certificates concerning the cost of the 
war . " 1 Among these statements is an account of all
lnDecretos, Pianos, Certificaciones sobre la costa 
de la guerra," Archivo Historico Nacional, Consejo de 
Indias, legajo 20721, cuaderno V, folios 77”109-
263
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
264
shipments made from the port of Veracruz during Mayorga's 
tenure of office. The detailed analysis of goods which 
left the port is invaluable for two reasons: the period
covered corresponds almost exactly to the duration of the 
war in America, and Veracruz was the only port on the 
east coast of New Spain through which war materiel moved 
to other ports of the eastern seaboard and to the 
dependencies of New Spain in the gulf area. 2
The original paper, a long, fold-out ledger sheet, 
enumerates types of cargoes shipped to each port, 
quantities of each item, and the total value of all money
2In describing the contribution of New Spain to 
the war effort the writer has not included remissions to 
the Philippine Islands except to illustrate the shortage 
of ships and trained personnel on the Pacific Coast of 
the viceroyalty. The dissertation concerns the war in 
America, and, in any case, the islands did net figure in 
the war; neither Manila nor the annual galleon was 
attacked. In one respect the Phillippine Islands were 
unique among the nominal dependencies of New Spain. 
Although they received a situado fixed in 1700 at 140,000 
pesos, Jos6 de Vasco y Vargas, Governor during the war 
years, established in 1779 a state tobacco monopoly whose 
receipts made the captaincy general financially self- 
sustaining. Schurz, the Manila Galleon, pp. 54-55» 182.
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and goods sent to each port, year by year, from August 16, 
1779/ to May 20, 1783* T^e cost of individual items is 
not given, e.g., 1,762 barrels of meat and 1,116 cartons 
of gunpowder were sent to Havana in 1780, but what each 
cost must remain unknown. The two commodities cited are 
among fifteen categories of aid shipped to different ports, 
and evaluated in terms of total cost per year. The dis­
tribution was as follows:
General and comprehensive statement of the funds, 
provisions, goods, munitions of war, impressed 
seamen, troops of the Infantry Regiment of the 
Crown of New Spain which in obedience to the orders 
of His Excellency Senor Viceroy have left this port 
Veracruz for other places, which is expressed below, 
since the sixteenth of August of 1779 when the war 
was proclaimed in this city until the twentieth of 
May of 1783, when there departed from this port the 
warship Santo Domingo, in which the Most Excellent 
Senor don Martin de Mayorga embarked, whose values 
are expressed in terms of the prices that prevailed 
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Tercios3 of flour: 1,163
Tercios of dried vegetables: 3»683
Tons of ballast: 480
Quintales of lead: 132
Sheets of copper: 1,000
Tercios of almagre C red. dye]: 100
Impressed seamen: 137
Total value: 1,302,187 pesos
3Where it has been possible, units of weight and 
measure used in this statement have been translated 
directly into English even when their exact value cannot 
be ascertained, e.g., caxas (cartons or boxes)of gunpowder, 
planchas (sheets) of copper, barriles (barrels( of meat, 
zurrones (skin bags) of cochineal. The arroba is equi­
valent to twenty-five pounds; the quintal to one hundred 
pounds.
The tercio is difficult to define. It is one- 
half a carga. which was originally a mule load. As a 
Castilian unit of grain measure, the carga is equivalent 
to four bushels. Yet some of the items whose quantities 
are expressed in tercios do not lend themselves to measure­
ment in bushels, e.g. cloth and rockets. There is great 
variation in the measure of a carga as a unit of weight. 
Father Francisco Javier Clavigero in his Historia Antigua 
de Mexico gave the figure of 500 pounds, surely too heavy 
for a mule load. Waddy Thompson, first United States 
Minister to Mexico, stated in his Recollections of Mexico 
that mules carrying goods between the capital and Veracruz 
bore 300 pounds. The Englishman H. G. Ward, who was 
apparently a careful observer, defined a carga as 300 
pounds in his book, Mexico in 1827. Howard T. Fisher and 
Marion Hall Fisher, editors and annotators of a recent edi­
tion of Fanny Calderon de la Barca's Life in Mexico, dis­
cuss these and other definitions of units of weight used 
in Mexico-in their book, Life in Mexico New York: (Double­
day and Company, 1966), p. 7^7-




Tercios of flour: 800
Total value: 11,600 pesos
Campeche
Money: 150,250 pesos
Cartons of gunpowder: 334
Total value: 200,350 pesos
Presidio del Carmen 
Cartons of gunpowder: 83
Cartons of nails: various
Muskets: 150
Balls of various calibres: 150
Total value: 21,514 pesos
1780
Spain
Money: 3*287*091 Pesos 0.1.
Sheets of copper: 1,384
Bags of cochineal: 14
Bags of vanilla: 120
Total value: 3*311*608 pesos
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Havana
Money, 6,210,806 pesos 7 . 11.
Tercios of flour: 2,807
Tercios of dried vegetables: 9,208
Quintales of lead: 2,508
Tons of ballast: 192
Arrobas of b^con: 101
Arrobas of lard: 216
Tercios of sheepskins: 20
Tercios of slow-match: 208
Tercios of wool: 50
Tercios of coarse cloth: 20
Cartons of gunpowder: 1,166
Barrels of meat: 1,762
Arrobas of ham: 2,534
Impressed seamen: 694
Total value: 7 ,028,567 pesos 2. 11.
New Orleans
Money: 14,075 pesos 6 . 2.
Tercios of flour: 1,220
Tercios of dried vegetables: 430
Cartons of gunpowder: 100
Total value: 55,335 pesos 6 . 2.
Campeche
Money: 125,146 pesos J.
Tercios of flour: 150
Tercios of dried vegetables: 150
Cartons of gunpowder: 200
Barrels of meats 200
Arrobas of ham: 320
Quintale3 of biscuit: 600
Arrobas of oil: 25
Total value: 175/139 pesos 3*
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*Presidio del Carmen
Money: 44,675 pesos 5. 5.
Cartons of nails: 8
Arrobas of oil: 6
Arrobas of pitch: 55
Quintales of canvas: 16 
Quintales of sheet iron: 12
Total value: 46,777 pesos 6 .
Tabasco
Cartons of gunpowder: 11
Tercios of slow-match: 1
Cakes of wax: various
Muskets: 200
Balls of various calibres: 255
Total value: 6,735 pesos
1781
Havana:
Money: 7/796,644 pesos 4. 6 .
Tercios of flour: 16,325
Tercios of dried vegetables: 5,195
Quintales of lead: 300.94
Sheets of copper: 315
Tercios of sheepskins: 14
Tercios of slow-match: H O
Tercios of wool: 50
Tercios of coarse cloth: 23
Cartons of gunpowder: 2,200
Barrels of meat: 4,567
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Impressed seamen: 807
Companies of troops: 12 (944 men)
Total value: 8,616,557 pesos 0. 11.
New Orleans
Money: 127,621 pesos 3 .
Tercios of flour: 525
Tercios of dried vegetables: 300
Arrobas of ham: 369.!
Total value: 143,444 pesos 5 .
Campeche
Money: 30,150 pesos
Tercios of flour: 25
Crowbars: 16
Total value: 31/350 pesos
Presidio del Carmen
Money: 90,743 pesos 4. 6.
Tercios of flour: 300
Muskets: 155
Swords and sabers: 83
Total value: 98,194 pesos 4. 6 .
1782
Havana
Money: 9/308,548 pesos 6. 7-
Tercios of flour: 14,079
Tercios of dried vegetables: 1,578
Tercios of rockets: 8
Tercios of sleeping mats: 50
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Pieces of bunting: 200
Quintales of lead: 1606.24
Tercios of sheepskins: 33
Tercios of wool: 40 
Tercios of coarse cloth: 4 
Cartons of gunpowder: 400
Barrels of meat: 1,805
Arrobas of tallow: 1,317-3
Crowbars: 54
Impressed seamen: 477
Companies of troops: 6 (44l men)
Total value: 9/639/888 Pesos 3- 9-
New Orleans
Money: 117/424 pesos 1. 6 .
Tercios of flour: 2,200
Total value: 128,224 pesos 1. 6.
Campeche
Money: 162,692 pesos 7 . 1.
Tercios of flour: 300
Tercios of slow-match: 4
Cartons of gunpowder: 3^
Muskets: 1,500
Arrobas of pitch: 598
Total value: 181,370 pesos 6 . 9*
Presidio del Carmen
Money: 60,798 pesos 6.
Tercios of slow-match: 2
Sheets of copper: 70
Crowbars: 6
Total values: 62,138 pesos 6.




Money; 3 ,914 pesos 3 . 6 . 
Havana;
Money; 5/264/527 pesos 1. 3 . 
Tercios of flour; 5/460 
Tercios of dried vegetables; 1,400 
Tercios of coarse cloth; 300 
Tercios of sheepskins; 15 
Tercios of wool; 23 
Cartons of gunpowder; 1,114 
Impressed seamen; 359
Total value; 5/554,167 pesos 3 .
Hew Orleans
Money; 1,167 pesos 2.
Cartons of gunpowder; 400
Total value; 59,950 pesos
Campeche
Money; 119, 668 pesos 0. 6 .
Presidio del Carmen
Money: 102,115 pesos 4. 3 .
Guarico Leap Frangois]
Quintales of lead: 960 .25
Cartons of gunpowder: 1,098
Balls of various calibres: 24.277
Bombs: 1,000
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Total value; 314,044 pesos4
Note; to the total sum of this statement have been 
added the expenditure for the impressed seamen 
embarked for Havana, likewise there have been added 
the expenses of the embarkation of the Regiment of 
the Crown.
Seamen; (±779' 918 pesos; (±780/ i ,688 pesos; 
(1781) 3/598.4 pesos; (I782) 4,202.4 pesos; 
(1783) 2,481.3 pesos;
Total; 12,395-1 pesos.
Regiment of the Crown: (178l) 9,874 pesos; (1782)
21,774.4 pesos.
Total; 31,648.4 pesos.
Grand Total; 37/254,998 pesos 2.0.
La Contaduria de Veracruz 
Veracruz: June 16, 1784
From this account it appears that within a period 
of less than four years New Spain disbursed to its West
4T'nis French-controlled port of Santa Domingo had 
been designated two years earlier as a rendezvous point 
for the combined French and Spanish fleets before their 
attack on Jamaica. The movement of this quantity of gun­
powder and projectiles to El Guarico, long after Rodney's 
defeat of de Grasse, indicates that the Spanish had never 
given up hopes for an invasion of the island. One historian 
has stated that another attempt was planned, but the project 
was abandoned after peace negotiations began. Caughey, 
Galvez, p. 144.
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Indian dependencies (and indirectly to France and the 
United States) treasure and goods whose total values 
were greater than that of all situados paid to the same 
colonies between 1764 and 1777/ a period of fourteen 
years. The wartime payments represented approximately 
one-half of the total crown income in the viceroyalty.5 
After the war ended, the situados sank to their pre-war 
level. In the years 1788-1792 an average of 3/500,000 
pesos passed annually from New Spain to other Spanish 
colonies. This figure represented approximately one- 
sixth of all money collected from the rentas of the Real 
Hacienda.6
Reference has been made in previous chapters to 
evidence found in Mayorga's correspondence that he felt
5According to Humboldt, 33/851 pesos were paid 
out in situados during the years indicated. It must be 
emphasized that it is impossible at this point to prove 
the absolute accuracy of these figures. The reasons for 
accepting Humboldt's figures have been stated in note 36 
of this chapter. Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre la 
Nueva Espana. IV, p. 442.
6Ibid.. p. 181.
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the demands made upon the resources of New Spain exorbitant 
and that he suspected wastage of money and supplies by the 
officials of Cuba. It is apparent that the treasury 
officials of Mexico shared his suspicions. The following 
declaration, which is included in the mass of testimony 
taken for Mayorga's residencia, not only states that New 
Spain met its obligations promptly and in full; it seems 
to suggest irregularities in the use of crown funds. The 
device employed by the wr'ters of this paper is to dis­
claim all knowledge of or responsibility for the spending 
of funds sent abroad and then to list the uses to which 
the money should have been put:
The royal officials of the Real Hacienda and 
Treasury of Mexico, for the King Our Lord, may God 
protect him:
*We certify that having previously examined with 
the greatest exactitude all the books, papers and 
other documents with which we are entrusted, we con­
clude from them that during the government of His 
Excellency Don Martin de Mayorga. Viceroy, Governor 
and Captain General of New Spain there occurred no 
captures of pirates of which this office has knowl­
edge, and therefore there was neither punishment nor 
distribution of their goods and effects: that
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likewise there occurred the swift and efficient 
dispatch of mercury ships7 and others: that the
situados were sent with punctuality from these 
Treasuries to all military and naval installations 
with all else necessary for their maintenance, as 
men, munitions, provisions and other goods, without 
knowing in these cases if the aids were needed, or 
if the Armada and its crews were paid, or if the 
ships were properly careened and maintained, that 
being properly the duty of the royal officials of 
those ports.8
Although the Viceroy and the royal officials of 
Mexico suspected incompetence and malversation on the part 
of Cuban officials who spent the money which New Spain was 
at such pains to produce, they could prove nothing. There 
was, however, incontestable evidence that a substantial 
portion of the food collected at Veracruz for shipment to 
the West Indies had been wasted through the inability of 
Havana to establish and maintain a regular and frequent 
schedule of food transport.9 Further wastage and spoilage
7This must be a reference to a swift turn-around of 
azoques in the harbor of Veracruz. Certainly the mercury 
carriers did not come regularly from Spain, for a shortage 
of quicksilver during the war reduced the production of 
Mexican silver.
8"Interrogatorio y certificaciones en cuanto a la 
guerra," AHN, Consejo de Indias, legajo 20720, cuaderno II.
90n one occasion in 1782 thousands of pounds of
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occurred in transit, because of carelessness in handling 
by royal ships. On one occasion in 1777# prior to the 
outbreak of war, when there was the normal flow of maritime 
traffic between Veracruz and Havana, Jose de Galvez went 
so far as to recommend to Viceroy Bucarcili that foodstuffs 
be shipped exclusively by merchant ships rather than by 
ships of the Real Armada. The loss of food through improper 
handling aud stowage was prohibitive, therefore: "Let it
be done by merchantmen, because it is more profitable to 
pay the freight if they [provisions] arrive in gooci condi­
tion, than to be forced to buy other provisions to make up 
for their lack.10
In addition to money and food, New Spain exported 
great quantities of gunpowder during the war, for the 
factory at Chapultepec was the sole source of supply for 
this essential commodity. All of Spanish North America 
depended upon this establishment in Mexico City for
spoiled flour had to be dumped into the sea at Veracruz 
where it had rotted while awaiting shipment.
10Jose de Galvez to Bucareli, April 8, 1777# AGNM, 
RC, Vol. 110, expediente 263, fol. 2 9 8.
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explosives until Mayorga built another factory in I78O.
The demand for their products sometimes exceeded the 
supply, and again Havana was the chief offender. In 1780 
Mayorga warned Jose de Galvez that unless the Cuban offi­
cials moderated their demands for gunpowder, the combined 
production of the two Mexican powder mills would be insuf­
ficient to satisfy the requirements of the island. The 
Viceroy complained that Havana could not possibly consume 
so much gunpowder. He asked: "What has happened to those
immense quantities?" a question which was never answered.11
Although during the war Viceroy Mayorga endured 
almost constant harassment from Jose de Galvez, who found 
fault with New Spain's war effort, the verdict of the 
juez de residencia, Francisco de Anda,12 and his court 
was one of approbation. While historians have warned that
lxSee pp. 133.
l2The Real Audiencia of Mexico in the eighteenth 
century was divided into oidores (judges)^ who had juris­
diction over civil cases; alcaldes del crimen (judges of 
criminal cases); and fiscales (attorneys for the crown). 
Juan Francisco de Anda was one of the five alcaldes del 
crimen). Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, p. 120.
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the judgment of a residencia is far from trustworthy,13 
in this case it seems apt to quote the conclusion reached 
by Anda and his associates. Comment on New Spain's role 
in the war was reserved for the last paragraph of the 
statement of the court's findings:
And finally, that he [Mayorga] demonstrated 
courage and perseverance in the success of our arms 
in the past war with the English: he exerted himself
to the utmost, in the defense of this Kingdom, keep­
ing it free of enemies and pirates, giving prompt 
orders for the construction of powder mills in Santa 
Fe and Chapultepec, where great quantities were pro­
duced, and there were sent from them to Havana 400,000 
cajones, and the rest, amounting to 740.000 caiones, 
to New Orleans, Campeche, Presidio del Carmen, Tabasco 
and El Guarico, expediting with equal energy and col­
lection, embarkation and shipment from Veracruz of 
great sums of money, provisions, goods,war stores, 
troops and seamen to support them: to the Army and
Squadron of Operations [Havana] went the sum of 
31,941,304 pesos, 3 reales and 2/3 grains: and adding
to this account the value of money spent on account of 
the fortifications of Havana: he x3id not fail to aid 
promptly and amply the Kingdom of Guatemala, the 
Philippine Islands, the Department of San Bias and the 
Californias, the forts of the interior, the expeditions 
sent from Yucatan and other ports and the other obliga­
tions of the treasuries of this Kingdom; for whose
13Haring has stated that witnesses were notoriously 
unreliable. He paraphrased Ernesto Shafer's allegation 
that judgment of a dead official was likely to be lenient. 
Haring, The Spanish Empire in America. pp. 141-142.
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defense he succeeded in removing the sand dunes in 
the vicinity of the forts of Yucatan: the coastal
batteries of Alvarado and Mocambo and Coatzacoalcos: 
launches armed with cannon were built and galleys for 
the coast: picket boats which could go twenty leagues
offshore were equipped with signal flags and explored 
the coast to observe the enemy ships: barracks and
hospitals were established for the troops quartered 
at Orizaba, Cordoba and Puebla, and officers of the 
army were assigned to the instruction of the militia 
on the coast and in the several provinces, and 
v a c a . / e r e  fill ed in in the Infantry Regiments 
of A! • Granada and the Crown, and in the
Dra - of Spain and Mexico.14
The force of this statement is lessened by its 
poor organization, and the presentation of its factual 
material is badly made. Yet its content is substantially 
correct, although how much the response of the viceroyalty 
to the challenge of the war owed to the personality of 
Mayorga is uncertain. Bernard E. Bobb, in his study of 
the Viceroy Bucareli, confessed that he had been unable 
to determine whether the success of his subject as an
14"Representacion que Dn. Juan Francisco de 
Anda cdfriisionado para la residencia del Virrey que fue 
de Nueva Espana Dn. Martin de Mayorga, haze a V.M. en 
relacion de lo actuado en complmto de dicha comision, 
conforme a lo que se le previno por Real Cedula de 19 
de Septre de 1783 anos," AHN, Consejo de Indias, legajo 
20720.
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administrator wai due to his personal ability or to the 
general and increasing prosperity of the Spanish empire 
under Carlos III. The same statement may be made in 
regard to Martin de Mayorga. Actually, as far as the 
contribution of New Spain to the war for America is con­
cerned the measure of Mayorga the man is an interesting 
subject but one of secondary importance. The accident 
of his accession to power, the animosity of the Galvez
family, and his dramatic death during his long voyage
*home just as his ship made a landfall at Cadiz, all tend 
to divert attention from consideration of the specific 
measures taken by the government of New Spain to meet the 
wartime emergency.
The enigma of the personality of Mayorga should 
not obscure other and more pertinent questions to which 
there are at present no answers.
Did the unprecedented income of the rentas of the 
Real Hacienda result from efficient administration by 
royal officials and economy in the internal spending by 
the government or did it result from the increased taxes 
imposed during the viceregency of Mayorga? The answer to
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questions must await a detailed analysis of all the sources 
of crown revenue during the war years, its disbursement, 
and a comparison with analyses of equivalent pre-war and 
post-war periods. Such studies have never been made 
because of the sheer labor involved. 15
For whatever reason, the total rentas from all 
branches of the treasuries increased substantially during 
Mayorga's viceregency, a gain which was reflected in the 
heavy disbursements made to the dependencies of the king­
dom. The "Representacion" previously cited stated with 
unusual clarity and brevity: "He was vigilant in the con­
versation, increase and promotion of the interests of the 
Real Hacienda, and he accomplished the considerable increase 
of more than four million during his government, this com­
pared to previous ones. 16
15Lira Gonzalez, "Aspecto fiscal de la Nueva Espana,"
P. 389.
16The increment of revenue given here agress'with 
the sums listed by Humboldt for the years 1779 through 
1783: 15,544,574 pesos, 15,010,974 pesos, 18,191,639
pesos, 19,394,490 pesos, 19,579,918 pesos. Humboldt,
Ensayo politico sobre el reino de la Nueva Espana, IV, 
p. 442. "Representacion," AHN, Consejo de Indias, legajo 
20720.
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Should the Viceroy and the port officials of 
Veracruz he held responsible for the frequent congestion 
of storage facilities on the coast and the consequent 
spoilage of perishable material? Could the officials of 
Havana have moved cargoes from Mexico to points where they 
were needed more efficiently and swiftly? In order to 
answer these questions an investigator would have to 
determine the number and types of vessels available for 
the royal service in the area during the war years and 
whether they were wisely employed. It is highly unlikely 
that even painstaking research could produce definitive 
statements of the number of ships available at the time, 
their routing and their cargoes. 17
Finally, were the funds and the supplies sent from 
New Spain sufficient to meet the needs of the military and
l7Many Spanish vessels had the same name, and many 
of these ships were often in operation in American waters 
at the same time. Furthermore, there was no rigid classi­
fication of ship types, and the same craft might be 
described in different terms in different records. Richado 
Cappa, Estudios criticos acerca de la dominaclon espanola 
en America, 26 Volumes (Madrid; Libreria Catolica de 
Gregorio del Amo, l880-l894, Vol. XI, Industria Naval, p. 3*
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naval establishments which were dependent upon the 
resources of Mexico, or did maladministration in Cuba and 
elsewhere cause temporary shortages of money, gunpowder 
and food? Here again is a question likely to defeat the 
most assiduous investigator. Even if it were possible to 
trace every shipment of money, food and materiel of war 
from New Spain to its ultimate destination, more questions 
would immediately arise: were these aids properly used:
were ships and shore establishments properly maintained 
and their personnel paid, fed and clothed? Conclusions 
drawn from examination of the records of military and 
naval units could be grossly inaccurate and misleading. 
Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa demonstrated with a wealth 
of evidence that the records kept by the armed forces 
were more often false than not? that paymasters and supply 
officers, both ashore and afloat, habitually defrauded 
service personnel of their rations and money and withheld 
weapons and gear for sale to private individuals or to the 
crown itself. 18
18Jorge Juan de Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa,*Noticias secretas de America (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Mar
Oceano, 1953)» PP. 65-7 0.
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Because of these questions it is at present 
impossible to assess exactly the efficacy of New Spain's 
aid in the war against England, and consequently this 
study must be called provocative rather than definitive. 
Yet even with the lacunae in the available data it is 
clear that during the war New Spain was virtually the 
sole support of Spanish arms in America and that the 
kingdom made for the mother country and. her allies a 
contribution unmatched in the history of colonial Spanish 
America.
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PRIMARY SOURCES 
Manuscript Materials
Tnis study is largely based on unpublished 
manuscript material contained in two repositories: the
Archivo General de Naci6n in Mexico City and the 
Archivo Hist6rico Nacional in Madrid. The bulk of the 
material from the Archivo General de la Nacion consists 
of correspondence between the office of the Viceroy in 
Mexico City and the Ministry of the Indies in Spain. 
Missives from Spain to the viceregal establishment are 
found in the ramo entitled Reales C6dulas, a series of 
180 volumes which covers the years I69O-I82I. The com­
munications directed by the viceroys to Spain are col­
lected. in the ramo Correspondencia de Virreves . 3̂ -6 
volumes spanning the years 1755“1821. The ramo Historia. 
565 volumes of miscellaneous documents dating from the
287
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
288
sixteenth to the nineteenth century, contains much 
interesting information of such diversity that it does 
not readily lend itself to inclusion in the 162 other 
branches into which the manuscript material of the Archivo 
General de la Naci6n is divided. 1
It is difficult to categorize for bibliographic 
purposes the documents described above, for each document 
is complete within itself. Therefore, precise identifica­
tion of such material can be made only in the footnotes, 
where the exact location of each manuscript is given. In 
this bibliography it has seemed sufficient merely to 
specify the general sources within the archives from which 
the cited documents have been drawn.
1The two ramos Correspondencia de Virreves and 
Historia are of interest to investigators because they 
represent the earliest attempt to classify the official 
papers deposited in Mexico City. Their collection was 
ordered in 1790 by Viceroy Count Revillagigedo.
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I. Documents from the following ramos and volumes 
located in the Archivo General de la Naoion,
Mexico Citys
Reales Cedulas. Volumanes 80(1760) ; 8l(176l);
8 2 (1762) ; 8 3(1763) ; 84(1764) 8 6 (1765) ; 8 7(1765) ;
8 8 (1766); 8 9 (1766); 9 0(1767); 9 1 (1767); 9 2(1768);
94(1769); 95(1769); 97(1770); 98(1771); 101(1772);
106(1775); 107(1776); 108(1776); 109(1776);
111(1777); 113(1778); 115(1778); 116(1779);
117 (1779) ; 118 (17-80) ; 119 (1780) ; 120 (1780) ;
121(1781); 122(1782); 1 23(1782); 124(1783).
Correspondencia de Virreyes. Mayorga. Volumenes
122(1779); 123(1779); 124(1779); 125(1780);
1 26(1780); 1 27(1780); 128(1781); 129(1781);
130(1782) ; I3K I T 82-I783) .
Historia. Tomos, 44, 168, 168, 186, 425/ 426.
II „ Documents from the following legajos located in the 
Archivo Hist6rico Nacional, Madrid:
Consejo de Indias. Legajo 20720: "Expediente de
la Residencia tomada a D. Martin de Mayorga, 1787#" 
"Representacion que dn Franco de Anda comisionado por 
la Residencia del Virrey que fue de N. E. don Martin 
de Mayorga, haze a V„M. en relacion de lo actuado en 
cumplimto de dicha Comision, conforme a lo que se le 
previno por R_1 Cedula de 19 de Sepre de 1783 anos , " 
"Interrogatorio y certificaciones en cuanto a la 
guerra."
Legajo 20721s "Decretos, pianos, certificaciones 
sobre la costa de la guerra."
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